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The purpose of the thesis is to identify and describe the arbi-
trage activity conducted in the Bitcoin ecosystem at its early
stages. This work is the first attempt in the literature to inves-
tigate empirically the individual behavior of the arbitrageurs,
and provides evidence that they are few and sophisticated.
I exploit a dataset containing the history of trades executed
within the exchange platform Mt. Gox between 2011 and 2013.
I follow and improve upon the established methods to pre-
process the data by proposing a new approach whose valid-
ity is documented extensively. Crucially, trades are labelled
with user specific identifiers, allowing to reconstruct the indi-
vidual sequences of actions and thus to identify arbitrageurs,
and explicit transaction costs are accounted for. The core of
the work is thus the implementation of two novel method-
ologies that aim at identifying the triangular arbitrage activ-
ity within the Mt. Gox platform and the two-point arbitrage
across Mt. Gox and two counterpart exchanges, Bitstamp and
BTC-e. In the former I focus on the mispricings of the bitcoin
price denominated in different fiat currencies; in the latter, I
compare differences in price - across Mt. Gox and the coun-
terpart exchanges - denominated in the same fiat currency.
I classify as arbitrageurs respectively 23 and 49 users, for a
total of 72. A comparison of aggregate statistics between ar-
bitrageurs and non arbitrageurs is given and discussed. This
work represents the first empirical contribution on arbitrage
at the micro level that goes beyond anecdotal evidence: the
findings challenge the textbook definition of arbitrage and
demonstrate that arbitrage is conducted by a limited number




Arbitrage is a founding and unifying concept in financial economics. In
the simplest form, it is the simultaneous purchase and sale of the same
asset in two markets at different prices. It leads to price convergence, a
necessary condition for efficiency and equilibrium among markets, and
in principle it yields riskless profits to the investors who conduct it. Yet,
studies on practical arbitrage show that instead it is risky and costly, and
market anomalies can arise in the form of persistent mispricings: as a
matter of fact, limits to arbitrage do exist. Moreover, anecdotal evidence
suggests that arbitrageurs are few and specialized, whilst the textbook
definition of arbitrage envisages the existence of many small traders,
each exploiting an infinitesimal fraction of risk. Nonetheless, the eco-
nomic literature lacks of empirical studies providing an answer to the
question: “Who are the arbitrageurs?”. I investigate the market of the cryp-
tocurrency bitcoin and seek an answer to these related questions.
Bitcoin is a communication protocol that provides the users with a
peer-to-peer network to transfer the ownership of a digital currency - that
is, bitcoin - without the need for an intermediary or a central authority.
This protocol relies on (and is the first implemented application of) the
Blockchain, an innovative technology that employs extensively cryptog-
raphy. In its essence, the Bitcoin Blockchain is a distributed, public and
decentralized ledger composed of cryptographically linked blocks stor-
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ing the whole history of the bitcoin transactions; each participant records
and maintains an individual copy, and the consensus on the state of the
system is ensured by a mechanism called Proof of Work (PoW) without
resorting to any third party.
The procedures envisaged in the original design to obtain and possess
bitcoins are non-trivial and require the users to be direct participants of
the network, and to understand well the Bitcoin design principles. To
circumvent this obstacle, centralized services known as cryptocurrency
exchange platforms provide interfaces to conventional payment systems,
acting in practice as intermediaries, and allowing their users to trade
units of cryptocurrency against fiat money. Typical exchanges manage
and match orders in a private limit order book and update their cus-
tomers’ account balances in cryptocurrency or fiat money when trades
are executed. Thus, trades on such exchanges are kept in a private ledger
and have no effect on the public Blockchain ledger, unless users with-
draw cryptocurrency from the exchange. Mt. Gox was the first relevant
exchange platform service active in the Bitcoin ecosystem. The competi-
tors Bitstamp, BTC China and BTC-e entered the market in mid-2011 and
gained a considerable role especially from late 2012. Mt. Gox dominated
the market from 2011 to 2014, with a market share above 80% for most of
that time, before being filed for bankruptcy in 2014.
The purpose of my work is to identify and describe the arbitrage ac-
tivity conducted in the Bitcoin ecosystem: such exchanges play a promi-
nent role in this sense, as they are the place where demand and supply
meet and the Bitcoin price formation occurs. They are thus the natu-
ral target for studying arbitrage in the Bitcoin ecosystem. Intuitively,
one would expect the identification procedure to rely on a comparison
of the bitcoin flows across exchanges, publicly observable on the Bit-
coin Blockchain, with the related differences in published prices (thereby
generating evidence of arbitrage). However, bitcoin transactions are too
slow and (at times) too costly for this strategy: arbitrageurs maintain a
stock of both bitcoins and fiat money in accounts at each exchange in or-
der to react quickly to price differences. Thus, the public ledger does not
provide any advantage to identify arbitrage transactions, and evidence
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of arbitrage must be searched within the private ledgers of the exchanges
themselves.
Most importantly, the internal log of Mt. Gox, who was leaked to
the public in 2014, is characterized by the essential feature that trades
are labelled at the user level, and explicit transaction costs are reported.
This allows to identify the sequence of actions of each trader, and conse-
quently to analyse empirically both their trading behavior and the prof-
itability of their strategies. The leaked dataset contains the history of
trades executed within the platform in between 1 April 2011 and 30 Novem-
ber 2013: I thus focus on the investigation of the Bitcoin ecosystem at
its early stages. My approach is based on exploiting information on the
trades performed in Mt. Gox, and in two other major exchange platforms
active at the time of the analysis, Bitstamp and BTC-e.
I mine the leaked dataset with two aims in mind: to investigate the
magnitude of the triangular arbitrage activity within the Mt. Gox plat-
form, and then to identify the two-point arbitrage activity across Mt.
Gox and the two other relevant markets at the time in the USD mar-
ket, that is, BTC-e and Bitstamp. My goal is to observe the dynamics of
arbitrage at the micro (individual) level. To the best of my knowledge,
this work is the first attempt in the literature that exploits user-specific
information to identify exactly the arbitrage actions, describing their fea-
tures, and outlining the trade patterns of the investors who conducted it.
Rather than investigating aggregate data, my approach grounds on the
reconstruction of individual sequences of actions and on their compari-
son to time series of bitcoin price differences - denominated against dif-
ferent fiat currencies within the same market, and denominated against
the same fiat currencies across different markets. Eventually, I classify
the Mt. Gox users into two distinct categories: non-arbitrageurs and ar-
bitrageurs. The latter is further subdivided in two (partial overlapping)
categories, that is, the expert and the non expert arbitrageurs. In my
work I provide exhaustive evidence that specific features and character-
istics distinguish each group.
The remainder of the thesis is structured as follows. In this Chapter I
briefly describe the main fields of study at the base of my investigation,
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in order to provide a leading thread and background information key to
understanding the purpose of my work as part of a broader context. I
cover a series of interdisciplinary topics that range from the recent find-
ings in computer science related to the Distributed Ledger Technologies
(focusing on Bitcoin, which I discuss both as a digital currency and as a
communication protocol in Section 1.1), to more traditional concepts of
traditional finance, such as the concept of arbitrage and the microstruc-
ture of the financial markets (Section 1.2). Finally, Section 1.3 focuses on
the intersection of the two fields and describes the working principles of
the cryptocurrency exchange platforms.
Chapter 2 describes the data cleaning procedures implemented to
pre-process the Mt. Gox dataset. This stage involves the deduplication
and correction of misreported data; I follow the methods established in
the literature and purposefully deviate to improve upon them. I report
my results together with comparisons to aggregate sources of informa-
tion to ensure the validity of the proposed method. Then I provide an
overview of the main economic dynamics that characterise the Mt. Gox
ecosystem, and I devise and fit a model to estimate the fees paid by the
users in each trade. This model is based on a comparison between the
transaction costs reported in the leaked dataset and the official fee sched-
uled posted by the same exchange.
The methodologies to identify the two types of arbitrage (and the
investors who conducted it) are different: information required to de-
tect the triangular arbitrage is entirely contained in the private ledger
of a single exchange. I thus exploit in Chapter 3 the Mt. Gox dataset
to identify the triangular arbitrage activity conducted within the plat-
form. I implement an algorithm to detect the arbitrage actions based
on the fact that the availability of user identifiers per trade allows us to
observe the historical record of each investor. Consequently, I describe
the arbitrageurs’ behavior. A considerable difference appears between
users that conducted arbitrage in a single or in multiple currency mar-
kets, as well as between those who conducted few or many actions. Sim-
ilarly, strategies that involve splitting orders to reduce market impact,
or entail the execution of non-aggressive trades only, are good indica-
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tors of expertise. Using these elements as a proxy for trade ability, I
find that trades performed by non expert users are on average non prof-
itable when transaction costs are included, while skilled investors con-
duct arbitrage at a positive and statistically significant premium. Finally,
I exploit within-user (across hours and markets) variation and document
that expert users make profits on arbitrage by reacting quickly to plau-
sible exogenous variations on the official exchange rates. Based on these
indicators, I classify only 23 users as expert arbitrageurs; however, they
are responsible for the vast majority of the actions and profits, support-
ing the thesis that arbitrageurs are few and expert users.
To identify two-point activity, instead, it is necessary to compare in-
formation from two different exchanges, and the data from the two coun-
terpart exchanges Bitstamp and BTC-e are less richer, as the trades from
their published datasets are anonymized. In Chapter 4 I identify the in-
vestors who performed two-point arbitrage across Mt. Gox and the two
counterpart exchanges Bitstamp and BTC-e. Exploiting again the avail-
ability of user identifiers, I reconstruct the sequence of actions of each
user and match these sequences to ‘ideal’ sequences of arbitrage trades,
considering the price differences between exchanges and a user-specific
estimate of transaction costs. The subset of investors whose actual se-
ries matches the ideal series best are potential two-point arbitrageurs. I
identify 1,441 potential arbitrageurs with all two counterpart exchanges.
Then, I cross-compare the actions executed by the potential arbitrageurs
in the Mt. Gox platform to the logs of anonymized trades from the coun-
terpart exchanges, and I construct a second metric that indicates if matches
(equivalent and simultaneous trades) are found. I post-filter the first es-
timation and further reduce the set of detected users to 10 arbitrageurs
with Bitstamp and 45 with BTC-e (49 in total).
Chapter 5 provides a summary of the main findings. I compare the
results from Chapter 3 and 4, which are consistent in providing evidence
that arbitrage was indeed executed in Mt. Gox, and that such activity was
conducted by a restricted group of sophisticated investors. Noteworthy,
I highlight that no user conducted both triangular and two-point arbi-
trage, suggesting that arbitrageurs are also specialized users.
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1.1 Bitcoin
Before introducing exhaustively Bitcoin, it is worth noting that the term
is used, somehow misleadingly, to refer both to a digital currency and
to the payment system itself: indeed, Bitcoin is a communication proto-
col that provides a public community of untrusted pseudonymous users
with an online peer-to-peer network infrastructure, along with a set of
rules encoding how to mint and transfer the ownership of digital valu-
able assets, that is, bitcoins1. Decentralization is the most important de-
sign feature and the reason why Bitcoin is believed to be a potentially
disruptive technology: transactions are executed without the need for
an intermediary, and once the consensus on the state of the system is
reached, transactions are stored without resorting to any third party on
a public ledger distributed across participants, the so-called Blockchain.
Thus, both statements are true: Bitcoin is a communication system
that uses extensively cryptography to reach consensus across untrusted
participants, and bitcoin is the first digital currency that enables peer-to-
peer transactions with physical cash-like features, such as no need for an
intermediary and anonymity.
Incidentally, it is often not clear to what extent Bitcoin and Blockchain
are two disentangled concepts. In these paragraphs I try to clarify some
of these elements and briefly describe both Bitcoin and the Blockchain
(more broadly, the concept of Distributed Ledger Technology)2. To do so,
I first describe Bitcoin as a digital currency, and subsequently its charac-
teristics as a communication protocol.
1.1.1 Digital currencies
Decentralization is the most important feature of Bitcoin. Thus, I first
provide a broader definition of this concept, so fundamental in this frame-
1An established convention in the literature is to refer to the protocol using the capital
letter (Bitcoin), and to the currency in lowercase letters (bitcoin).
2The main references used to cover this brief introduction to Bitcoin are Nakamoto
(2008a), Bonneau et al. (2015), Böhme et al. (2015), Narayanan et al. (2016), Halaburda,
Sarvary, et al. (2016), and Antonopoulos (2017).
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work, in the light of a remark by Buterin (2017)3. In his view, the concept
of decentralization is often misconceived, as in many cases it is implicitly
intended as an abstract, not clearly defined concept, or as a synonym or
notion complementary to the term ‘distributed’. According to Buterin,
decentralization can unfold in three main dimensions: architectural de-
centralization, political decentralization, and logical decentralization. Whilst
this classification is envisaged mainly for computer systems, it can be
thought at a more abstract and broader level4.
By architectural decentralization it is intended the physical structure
of the system5: how many computers compose a system, and to what
extent such system will resist to a shutdown of a fraction of the comput-
ers? In other words, does the system have any single point of failure? A
peer-to-peer network can be considered a fully architectural decentral-
ized structure, in the sense that each participant is totally independent
from each other and the network does not depend on the participation
of any of the single users. Bitcoin relies on a peer-to-peer network that
has no central point of failure, nor depends on third parties. Political
decentralization arises when it is not possible to identify an entity or
institution who has a form of control on the system; that is, when the
system is not the liability of an entity. In Bitcoin nobody is responsible
for the upkeep of the network; rather, it is a public good with embed-
ded economic incentives that allow for its maintenance without relying
on a central authority. Finally, the meaning of logical decentralization
is more subtle. A system is logically centralized when the parts of the
system behave coherently, that is, when the system appears as a ‘mono-
lithic object’. E.g., it may be useful to think of law, a single corpus, equal
for every person: ‘the law is the law’. Buterin suggests, as a heuristic to
3Vitalik Buterin is the founder of Ethereum, that is, a cryptocurrency that grounds on
a DLT technology similar to the one implemented in Bitcoin. Highlighting the differences
between Bitcoin and Ethereum goes beyond my scope. Should it be of interest for the
reader, see e.g. Buterin et al. (2014) and Antonopoulos and G. Wood (2018).
4An alternative and interesting discussion on the interpretation of decentralization is
given in Allen et al., 2020. Decentralization can take place in the form of role separation,
trust dispersal, and threshold trust.
5Roughly speaking, this facet of the term decentralization is comparable to what is usu-
ally meant by ‘distributed’.
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classify a system as logically centralized or decentralized, to ‘split it in
half’: does it still work properly? Bitcoin is logically centralized: people
agree and reach a consensus on the state of the system, that is, who owns
what amount of the digital valuable asset bitcoin. It is impossible to split
such network while preserving its functioning.
In the light of this definition, I first discuss the novel aspects brought
by bitcoin as a currency and in contrast with other forms of money; I will
also profit of this brief description to introduce the cryptographic proto-
cols relevant for the Bitcoin system. Comparing bitcoin to other forms
of money may be helpful to understand better where the innovative side
of Bitcoin resides. To do so, I refer to Figure 1, which represents an in-
terpretation and re-elaboration of the taxonomy of money introduced in
Bech and Garratt (2017)6 by including the contribution of Buterin on the
meaning of decentralization.
Coins and banknotes - physical cash - offer two distinctive features.
First, everybody can exchange them with everybody else, i.e., in a peer-
to-peer fashion, without resorting to an intermediary7: no bank inter-
venes when you pay with coins your coffee at 1 a.m. in the library, to
write your Ph.D. thesis in time. Second, such transactions are mostly
anonymous, i.e., there is not an intrinsic way to keep trace of physical
cash transactions. This combination of properties was common also to
commodity money, that is, objects like metal or food who were used in
past as money for their intrinsic value; interestingly, money in this form
shares with Bitcoin the feature of not being the liability of an institution.
On the other side, commodity money does not share the property of be-
ing logically centralized, while cash does; there is no necessarily agree-
ment on the value of a commodity, while everyone agrees on the value of
one dollar. Most importantly, it has been overwhelmingly hard to repli-
cate the combination of these two features (anonymity and absence of
intermediaries) for electronic cash - indeed, before Bitcoin offered a solu-
6see also CPMI (2015) and Bjerg (2017).
7However, intermediaries do play a role in the minting of physical cash: the amount in
circulation, e.g., is controlled and regulated by a central authority, normally a central bank.
This also ensures that cash is a logically centralized system: everybody agrees, e.g., on the
value of dollars.
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Notes: the classification is based on Bech and Garratt (2017) and Buterin (2017). I
classify money according to the following dichotomies: 1) is universally accessible or
local; 2) is physical or electronic; 3) is architecturally decentralized, that is, fully peer-
to-peer or not; 4) is politically decentralized, that is, money which is ‘not the liability
of anyone’, or governed by an entity or institution. The latter contains an important
subset: money controlled by central banks. The gray area indicates a set of possibil-
ities that were not technically feasible before the Bitcoin protocol was implemented.
Bitcoin (as well as Ethereum) is public: everybody can participate to the peer-to-peer
network without restrictions; a set of protocols (permissioned DLTs) slightly modify
the Bitcoin original mechanism and propose an alternative scheme where some priv-
ileged users have formally a political role, while still providing a fully decentralized
peer-to-peer network; private DLT protocols go even further and restrict the access
to the network only to invited users, and are often used by private companies for
internal accounting and data storage. See Ruiz (2020) for the classification of permis-
sioned and private DLTs. Note that the distinction between these two areas is not
always sharp, and depends on the individual projects and protocols. Finally, several
projects of Central Bank CryptoCurrencies (CBCC) are currently in development.
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tion, this had never been achieved. The gray area in Figure 1 identifies
a set of typologies of currencies - that is, cryptocurrencies - based on the
DLT technology and not technically feasible before the Bitcoin protocol
was implemented.
Several attempts were done in past to reproduce the properties of
physical cash in electronic format. A large fraction of the transfer of
money as it is known today is indeed electronic: from central bank de-
posits to commercial bank money, the digitization is widely adopted for
its clear advantages in simplifying transactions by reducing (time and
speed related) costs. However, these are cases where the digital currency
is an electronic representation of a physical counterpart regulated by an
institutional entity. The idea of digital cash with no physical counterpart
is relatively new and was introduced by the work of Chaum et al. (1983
and 1988), who implemented a cryptographic protocol called blind sig-
nature and subsequently commercialized his proposal under a company
named DigiCash. This proposal is the first that applies digital signatures
to a form of digital money.
Digital signatures are an essential concept in modern cryptography
and are strictly related to two other cryptographic algorithms, that is,
hash functions and public/private keys pairs. The three concepts are in-
troduced in a seminal paper by Diffie and Hellman (1976); Rivest, Shamir,
and Adleman (1978) provide a fundamental contribution to digital sig-
nature schemes by proposing the RSA algorithm.
Cryptographic hash functions are algorithms that take data inputs of
arbitrary length and map them into strings of fixed length. Such func-
tions satisfy some important properties: the output is deterministic, is
computed efficiently (i.e., in short time), and every hash should be gen-
erated with the same probability; small changes in the output lead to
large variations in the output; it is infeasible8 to find two different inputs
mapping to the same output (collision-free), and it is infeasible to invert
the function, that is, to obtain the input knowing the output (hiding).
Preneel (2010) provides an overview on existing hash functions.
Public-private keys are an inherently related cryptographic protocol
8It is plausible in theory, but not in practice.
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based on one-way functions that take a private key as input (essentially, a
code string that must be kept hidden to the public) and generate a public
key, that is, a second string that is mathematically related to the private
key; the one-way functions (e.g., elliptic curves) ensure that it is unfeasi-
ble to reconstruct the private key from the public one. The most impor-
tant application of public-private keys are the digitally signed messages.
Like real signatures, digital signatures must satisfy the following prop-
erties: given the same message, only one private key can generate a cer-
tain signature, but everyone can easily verify its validity; and it must
be tied to a given message, i.e., it must not be usable in other contexts.
Thus, a digital signature is a function that takes as inputs a message and
a private key and cryptographically provides a signature that does not
reveal any information on the private key and the message. Any change
in the two inputs will lead to a totally different signature. Moreover, ev-
eryone can easily verify it: a second function takes as input the message,
the signature, and the public key, and exploits the mathematical relation-
ship between public and private key to prove whether the private key
associated to the provided public one was the one used to sign the mes-
sage. The verification is straightforward, as the function is purposely not
computationally intensive. A digital signature proves the identity of the
sender of the message, the validity of the message, that a transaction is
authorized by the sender, and that the content cannot be modified. Dig-
ital signatures can be used also by signing a message with the public key
of a receiver, in order to send messages that only the receiver can open.
In Chaum’s design, intended to facilitate transactions across users
and merchants, the blind signature played an essential role as it was ex-
ploited both to provide anonymity for the users and to prevent double-
spending, that is, the possibility to spend twice the same amount of
money.
Double-spending is an issue of fundamental relevance for electronic
money (as well as counterfeiting for physical money): indeed, electronic
money is essentially a string of numbers, and in principle it could be
copied as easily as it would be to copy and paste whatever digital string
text, unless a measure to avoid such counterfeiting is implemented. A
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viable and simple solution would be to combine the digital string corre-
sponding to money with a serial number and let a central authority verify
that a transaction between two individuals is feasible, i.e., by assessing
that the sender has not already spent such amount of money. (Note that
this procedure is actually similar to how physical banknotes are traced
and protected against counterfeiting.) The blind signature introduced by
Chaum grounds on this intuition and improves upon it via cryptography
by ensuring that the users can conduct transactions anonymously.
However, this mechanism suffers from some drawbacks: the system
ultimately proposes a form of digital bank-issued cash relying on a cen-
tral provider for transactions to be executed; rather than being a peer-to-
peer system, it is a peer-to-merchant scheme; furthermore, information
on the latter group is in part exposed to the central provider, who could
infer their cash movements, and thus not fully anonymous. In this sense,
DigiCash is not a good electronic substitute for physical cash. It filed
for bankruptcy in 19989. Chaum’s proposal was anyway seminal, and
many alternatives tried to improve some of its aspects, but none of them
actually achieved a significant role in the market.
Other proposals which are relevant are the cost functions introduced
in Dwork and Naor (1992), and Hashcash (Back, 2002). Scarcity is a pre-
requisite for a good to have value. DigiCash was inherently pegged to
the value of the dollar and eventually was controlled by a bank; Back,
Dwork and Naor introduced in two independent works a solution to fab-
ricate scarcity for an otherwise un-metered (non limited) digital resource
by imposing, as a precondition to access the resource, the execution of
a costly computational task. Whilst they did not conceive the mecha-
nism explicitly for monetary purposes, their work introduces implicitly
a requirement which is mandatory for a digital currency to acquire value
independently of other currencies10.
Dwork and Naor devised an algorithm (pricing functions) as a solu-
9https://www.forbes.com/forbes/1999/1101/6411390a.html. This, and all
the following links, were accessed on 18 June 2021.
10Unless an entity controls it: in this case, such digital resource would be metered, as the
authority would control its provision; i.e., an authority controlling the digital resource and
the design discussed here are two different ways to achieve scarcity.
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tion to email spamming: as the cost of sending automatically the same
mail to few or a million people is slightly increasing, malicious users
have an economic incentive to perpetrate the spamming activity. How-
ever, if every sender had to pay a small enough amount of computational
resources to perform the task, the additional cost would be negligible
for normal users, but prohibitive for spammers, deterring them from ex-
ecuting it. An un-metered digital resource (e-mail spamming) is now
limited by design. Adam essentially proposed independently the same
mechanism, which he calls cost-function, acknowledging that this proce-
dure is conceptually closely related to money minting: in his proposal he
made explicit11 the similitude with the minting process (not coinciden-
tally, Satoshi Nakamoto12 cites this work in his paper and not Dwork and
Naor’s proposal). However the intuition never evolved into a broader
project designing a digital currency.
The idea of minting a digital currency by solving a computational
puzzle was instead implemented in two other projects, namely Dai (1998)
and Szabo (2005). However, ultimately, both proposals were not backed
by implemented code and received limited attention. They are anyway
important as they are closest to Bitcoin in that they try to solve the same
problem: to provide a secure peer-to-peer framework for transactions
among anonymous users, in order to make monetary transactions inde-
pendent of governmental institutions or trusted third parties, by using a
virtual currency not pegged to the value of any other physical currency
(thus, scarce by design; noteworthy, as the same name suggests, Bitgold
was chiefly a tentative to replicate a gold-like virtual resource). The two
projects are inherently similar: first, in both cases, money is minted di-
rectly by solving the computational intensive task: the money supply is
controlled by design by binding the minting process to the execution of
a computational expensive action. Both rely on a peer-to-peer network
11“[. . . ]In the context of cost-functions I use client to refer to the user who must compute
a token using a cost-function MINT() which is used to create tokens to participate in a
protocol with a server. I use the term mint for the cost-function because of the analogy
between creating cost tokens and minting physical money.[. . . ]”, Back (2002) (p. 1).
12Satoshi Nakamoto is the alias used by the unknown inventor(s) of Bitcoin. See https:
//nyti.ms/2TzEN1Y.
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of pseudonymous users13, and both employ a secure timestamping pro-
tocol.
Secure timestamping was introduced by Haber and Stornetta (1990
and 1997) and refers to cryptographic algorithms intended to encrypt
digital documents (more broadly, bit-string information) and simultane-
ously ensuring their chronological order of execution. Given a series of
files incoming in chronological order, the idea is simply to hash the first
file (bit-string) together with the date and a signature of the sender; the
second step is to construct a hash pointer, that is, a data structure that
contains a hash of the data and a string of code indicating (i.e., point-
ing) to where such information is stored, to retrieve it easily. The pointer
will be attached to the second bit-string, together with the new date and
signature, and hashed; and so on. Most importantly, not the date (or-
der of creation) nor the content of any of the documents can be modified
without altering all the subsequent files, as the manipulation of a single
element of the chained documents (whether the content of the bit-string,
the date, or the signature) would compromise the hashes of all the fol-
lowing documents, providing immediate evidence of tampering. Thus,
secure timestamping offers a proof of the order of creation, guarantee-
ing simultaneously tamper-proof resistance. This simple yet powerful
solution can be applied to more complex structures, e.g. Merkle trees.
Merkle (1980 and 1987) introduced a data structure that exploits cryp-
tography to store large amounts of files in a single hashed string, by iter-
atively repeating hash functions on pairs of single (hashed) documents.
E.g., consider 4 hashed files which I call Hashi , i = 1,...4. In a simplified
notation, a merkle tree is constructed as follows:
13Pseudonimity differs from complete anonymity as the identity is hidden through the
use of pseudonyms; privacy is partially preserved, as the users are still exposed to some
form of traceability.
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Hash00 = hash(Hash1 +Hash2)
Hash01 = hash(Hash3 +Hash4)
Hash000 = hash(Hash00 +Hash01))
The individual files are thus contained in a single string, Hash000,
that identifies the whole block of files in a compact form. The main bene-
fit of merkle trees is that the number of computations necessary to assess
the data integrity grows proportionally to the logarithm of the number of
files stored (and not linearly). Applying the above described timestamp-
ing protocols to merkle trees instead of single documents is straightfor-
ward. The result is a chain of chronologically ordered blocks of files. (Such
collection of timestamped blocks is, in simplified terms, the structure
used in the Bitcoin protocol to store the bitcoin transactions: hence the
name Blockchain.)
As stated above, the two proposals never took off in part because
they were never implemented; however, they also had intrinsic limits:
in b-money, users would broadcast transactions globally, and just a lim-
ited set of (trusted) participants would maintain and update the ledger
of balances in accordance to such movements. Most of all, in case of
disputes among parties, the author ultimately suggests to resort to an
arbitrator. The design implies some form of cooperation among partic-
ipants; it does not solve the double-spending issue between untrusted
parties without resorting to an intermediary. Similarly, Szabo makes ex-
plicit that the minting and broadcasting should be performed “with min-
imal dependence on trusted third parties” (p. 1, Szabo, 2005): to record
the transactions, users would rely on an external secure timestamping
service. Still, third party is not utterly excluded.
Ultimately, both proposals rely somehow onto trusted servers. In ad-
dition, the authors realize that solving computational puzzles to enforce
scarcity implies pegging the value of the minted money to the cost of
computing power, but the protocols do not describe a detailed solution
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to manage the fact that computational costs might change due to, e.g.,
limited or inaccurate information provision, or technological evolution.
1.1.2 The Bitcoin protocol
Bitcoin succeeded where the previous projects had failed, that is, in find-
ing a solution to the double-spending problem in a purely peer-to-peer
network: the users can conduct value-based transactions using a dig-
ital currency, anonymously and without requiring the intervention of a
trusted third party. A peculiarity of the Bitcoin protocol is that it does not
introduce brand-new concepts or cyptographic functions; rather, it re-
lies on several established methods14. The novelty regards how Satoshi
Nakamoto (2008a) brilliantly merged them together to design a virtual
currency embedding core decentralized technologies. The Bitcoin whitepa-
per is not an academic paper, and it does not provide all the specifications
of the protocol; it is rather a description of the high-level idea, intended
for an experienced and specialist audience, describing why the protocol
should work. The reference point to understand Bitcoin design princi-
ples is the actual implementation of the protocol itself, which was devel-
oped by Satoshi Nakamoto between 2007 and 2009, and it is continuously
updated by the Bitcoin community. The key components of the Bitcoin
protocol are the following:
Users and the peer-to-peer network. An entity becomes a node of
the Bitcoin network via a designated software15 that generates pairs of
public and private keys using standard cryptography. In principle, there
is no way to recover from it information on the real identity of a person
or institution16. The entities appear in the network as pseudonyms via
14It grounds on the aforementioned protocols: private-public keys to generate nodes to
store and spend money on the network, digital signatures for cryptographic validation of
transactions, hash pointers to timestamp blocks of transactions in Merkle root structures,
and computational puzzles to secure them.
15Among the softwares that implement and follow the consensus rules,
BitcoinCore is the reference open-source project https://bitcoincore.
org/en/about/; for alternatives, see e.g. https://bitcointalk.
org/index.php?topic=4180898.0 and https://bitcoin.eu/
bitcoin-core-alternatives-dont-fork-blockchain/
16However, many de-anonymization techniques indeed exist. Trivially, in a single direct
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an address, obtained by hashing the public key, which is visible to every
other node; it is used to publicly announce the existence on the network,
and thus to receive bitcoins. The private key instead is hidden and is
necessary to prove ownership of the bitcoins, and thus to redeem them.
The term wallet is used to identify the data structure that stores and
manages the private keys under the control of the same node. The bal-
ance is the sum of bitcoins associated to such keys and thus redeemable
by the user of a node. Interestingly, the protocol does not specify the
concept of users or identities; rather, the Bitcoin network is composed
of nodes that are essentially pairs of public-private keys. Similarly, also
wallets and balances are superstructures not defined by the protocol and
deducible by the history of transactions. (Note also that a user can man-
age more than one node.)
Ledger and Transactions. As stated above, Bitcoin is logically central-
ized in the sense that users agree on the state of the world, that is, on who
can spend which bitcoins. Transactions are data structures used to broad-
cast on the network that two users are willing to accept a transition from
a state s0 to a new state s1 where bitcoin ownership has changed: the
output of a transaction is made of one or more digital strings, each iden-
tifying an amount of bitcoins and the new owner. The latter is not refer-
enced directly; the string contains a code called locking script or scriptPub-
Key which is a cryptographic puzzle that only the new owner can decrypt
using its private key.
Thus, at any point in time, the state of the world is represented by a series of
transaction outputs that are unspent, in the sense that they are encrypted and
redeemable only by the entity able to provide the correct private key unlocking
them. Such strings of code are called unspent transaction outputs (UTXOs).
Each new transaction thus takes as inputs some of these UTXOs and
generates new UTXOs that describe a new state of the system. Suppose
purchase, the merchant’s identity can be associated to the used address; as transactions are
publicly auditable, it is good practice to use a new key pair (and thus address) for each
transaction, to avoid direct association to the other transactions executed. Transactions
point by design to previous transactions: algorithms have been proposed to exploit this fea-
ture to link addresses and plausibly reconstruct the identities of users. De-anonymization
can also involve the IP address used to broadcast information. See, e.g., Ron and Shamir
(2013) and Meiklejohn et al. (2013) and the subsequent literature.
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for simplicity that a new transaction is made of only one input and one
output17 . The procedure works as follows: the input contains a reference
to the hash of the transaction that generated the UTXO that is being spent
(i.e., the UTXO must be retrieved); and a scriptSig, that is, the part of the
code that contains the solution to the puzzle in the referenced UTXO.
Specifically, the scriptSig contains two elements: a digital signature exe-
cuted by the sender (in this simplest case) on the referenced transaction
and the hash of the public key of the new owner; and the public key of the
sender. By signing the transaction, the sender ensures that it possesses
the money and that the data in the signature cannot be modified.
The validation consists in processing the scriptSig and the scriptPub-
Key: the input calls by reference the UTXO generated in an older trans-
action; first, it verifies that the public key of the sender corresponds to
the public key hash included in the referenced UTXO; then, it solves the
computational puzzle by verifying the validity of the signature: indeed,
a digital signature on a given message can be produced only by knowing
the private key. On the contrary, it is computationally easy for everyone
to take a digital signature, the message, and to verify whether a public
key corresponds to the unique private key that generated such signature.
If the one reported in the scriptSig confirms the signature, then the trans-
action is validated. This transaction produces a new UTXO containing
an amount of bitcoins and the public key of the new owner included in a
computational puzzle that allows only such entity to unlock it in further
transactions.
The transactions proposing the new UTXOs (the new states of own-
ership) are broadcasted to all other participants. By construction, on av-
erage every ten minutes the overall state of the system is updated: a
block made of pending transactions is collected and stored in a Merkle
tree structure; then it is added to the chain containing all other previous
blocks of transactions (hence the name Blockchain). Each block contains
a hash pointer to the previous block, so that the tampering of one single
17This is the simplest case, which is the one of interest for this dissertation, and it is
called pay-to-pub-key-hash (P2PKH). More complex transactions can involve more parties
and thus more private keys.
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transaction will modify the hashes of all the subsequent blocks. Besides
being tamper resistant, the chain ensures also a timestamping ordering
of the transactions. Note that each node stores an ‘individual’ blockchain
that represents the personal view of the system; in addition, every user
independently verifies and validates cryptographically all the transac-
tions proposed in a block before accepting the block in their personal
blockchain.
However, ultimately everybody agrees on how to update the system,
that is, everybody ends up accepting or rejecting in a coordinated man-
ner the incoming blocks: each blockchain, which is updated indepen-
dently of each other, reflects the same view of the system. How is it
achieved? And how is double spending prevented? Up to now, I de-
scribed a protocol which is similar to Chaum’s and the other examples
reported above. However, their solution ultimately had to resort to an
intermediary to secure no double-spending; in Bitcoin, there is no need
of it, as trust in a third party is substituted by the trust that the computa-
tional power invested to store the blocks in the chain is large enough to
prevent an attacker from tampering (by double spending) existing trans-
actions.
Consensus and mining. The procedure to add a new block to the
chain works as follows. Every user can decide (but is not forced) to par-
ticipate to a ‘competition’ that consists in trying to solve a task which is
resource intensive and thus costly: the first that finds a valid solution is
entitled to update the ledger by proposing a new block of transactions to
be added to the existing chain of blocks. This task is called Proof of Work
(PoW), and is based on the idea of cost functions proposed by Dwork
and Naor and Hashcash. Users that invest computational power in the
‘competition’ are called miners. In simple terms, every miner collects
some transactions in a Merkle Tree structure and computes its hash18.
Such hash is coupled with a parameter called nonce and hashed again.
The goal of the Proof of Work (PoW) is to find a nonce such that the hash
18Note that each miner will likely construct different blocks: usually there are more pend-
ing transactions than available memory ‘slots’ in the Merkle tree; in addition, transactions
are broadcasted on a global network: different miners can have access to different transac-
tions at a given moment due to latencies.
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starts at least with a certain number of zeros. This number is established
by the target, a parameter setting the difficulty of the PoW: the higher the
number of zeros required, the harder the PoW. The difficulty is variable
and is based on the computational power invested in the mining, and is
re-targeted when the last 2.016 blocks took on average more or less than
10 minutes to be mined. The solution can be found only by brute force,
that is, by changing the nonce until the hash has enough zeros. Miners
invest resources as they have economic incentives: by design, adding a
block implies earning an amount of bitcoins.
The winner miner proposes and broadcasts to the network an updated
version of the state of the system, which only differs in that it adds an
additional block at the end of the chain. All the other users verify the
new transactions, and they update their own blockchain to the proposed
version only if all these transactions are correct.
Suppose instead that the block contains double spending. The net-
work is momentarily divided: there are two competing versions of the
chain, and there is no consensus, as the miner proposed a fraudulent
block which is not accepted by the rest of the network19. The only possi-
bility for the fraudulent node to let prevail its version of the blockchain
is to have more computational power than the sum of all the other hon-
est participants: once its block is added, a new competition begins. The
malicious attacker (or attackers) would build on the new block, while the
honest community would reject it and mine on the last accepted block.
On average, the group of users that will impose its version is the one
with more computational power, as the consensus is always achieved on
the longest chain (that is, the chain that embeds the highest amount of
computational power).
Thus, assuming that users are small and each one has only a fraction
of computational power with respect to the total, the next competitions
would be likely won by the larger group of honest users, who would
19Note that, should the task be not computationally intensive, there would be no deter-
rent for the users in the network to spam continuously malicious blocks with already spent
coins, as the creation of such blocks would not be costly, exactly as the email spamming
that Dwork and Naor tried to deter! The fact that the procedure is costly prevents users
from spamming blocks embedding double spending.
20
append the new blocks on the penultimate (i.e., the last legit one for the
honest community), ignoring the last block. The malicious user would
be unable to spend the reward in bitcoins, mined on a ‘dead branch’ of
the chain not accepted by the rest of the community. Should instead the
malicious attacker(s) control more than 50% of the computational power
in the network, then it would end up being able to impose its version
of the chain to the honest participants, as in the long term it would be
able to win more ‘competitions’, and thus eventually would propose the
longest chain20.
Novelties: In its essence, the innovation of the Bitcoin protocol lies
in the mechanism envisaged to reach consensus across untrusted par-
ties, without resorting to an intermediary, and to consequently store the
record of bitcoin transactions in timestamped blocks secured by compu-
tational power; such process is executed independently (i.e., each node
updates independently its chain), but eventually consensus on the state
of the system is achieved.
Timestamping is not trusted, in the sense that it is not provided by
third parties but by the miners, and ensures the ordering of transactions:
actual timestamps are not essential, what matters is the determination of
a relative ordering through the pointers from block to block. The times-
tamping is secured by the amount of computational power invested and
implicitly embedded in the Blockchain: such computational effort pre-
vents tampering of the stored transactions, as this would imply redoing
all the proof-of-work embedded in the subsequent blocks, and double-
spending, as the reward in bitcoins for mining a block is obtained only if
all the included transactions are correct. It is precisely in this sense that
20In computer science, distributed computing refers to a network of independent com-
ponents that communicate to coordinate their actions. Errors may arise, due to potentially
faulty parts or an unreliable network. A fundamental problem for such distributed systems
is to avoid the so-called Byzantine faults, that is, situations in which the system responds
inconsistently to failure-detection, as the individual components do not succeed to reach
consensus on the state of the system. The name of this class of errors comes from Lam-
port, Shostak, and Pease (1982), who described allegorically the faulty parts of a system as
Byzantine Generals preparing a coordinated attack. It is important to understand to what
extent a system is Byzantine fault tolerant, that is, to what extent it can provide a consis-
tent outcome in the presence of faulty components. Bitcoin is a solution to the Byzantine
Generals Problem (see Nakamoto (2008b) and Gramoli (2020)).
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the introduction of the computational puzzle secures the blockchain: the
network is secure up to the amount of (quantifiable) total computational
power invested in the competition for the blocks, and up to how it is dis-
tributed across participants. The longest chain is the one that embeds the
highest amount of computational power - and thus trust - from the net-
work participants: as long as the majority is honest, the chain is secure.
The trust in a third party is substituted by a protocol that deters mis-
behavior through economic incentives conditional to executing resource
intensive tasks. Only indirectly the proof of work is used to mint the
coins.
Interestingly, Bitcoin does not provide specifications on the entities,
wallets, balances, or any other superstructure: in its essence, the data
structure is nothing else than a database containing, in a public and easy
to verify way, the historical record of the change of ownership of bit-
coins, and a network of nodes having the rights to redeem them with
private key cryptography. Each bitcoin is linked to its previous change
of ownership, thus the full history of a bitcoin can be traced. The unique
structure introduced is the chain of timestamped blocks that stores the
transactions.
1.1.3 Blockchain and Distributed Ledger Technologies
Such structure, called Blockchain, is the backbone of the Bitcoin proto-
col and is an example (the first implementation) of a broader class of
databases called Distributed Ledger Technologies (DLTs). The Blockchain
is so innovative not as a data structure in se, but because it is combined
with the idea to use proof of work to securely timestamp and store trans-
actions without requiring a third party. Thus, DLT identifies whatever
data structure - e.g., a Blockchain, the chain of blocks in Bitcoin; or Di-
rected Acyclic Graphs in IOTA - exploited to record the history of the
ownership of a digital valuable asset exchanged in an architecturally de-
centralized structure, but reaching a logically centralized state of the sys-
tem, i.e., consensus.
The Blockchain has no central authority, that is, there is no need for a
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third party to execute the transactions. In addition, the network is com-
posed of nodes with the same read and write access to the system (for
instance, miners are not privileged users: every node deliberately de-
cides whether to participate in the mining competition or not); in this
sense, Bitcoin is politically decentralized21. Nonetheless, more recent
cryptocurrencies introduced intermediate forms of political centraliza-
tion by design, where e.g. only some nodes have write permission (per-
missioned DLTs), or participation is only on invitation (private or con-
sortium DLTs): in that latter case, both write and read permissions are
not granted to every user.
1.2 The microstructure of financial markets
This section deepens two related concepts: first, I introduce the micro
level structure of the financial markets, and describe its main features.
Second, I focus on the arbitrageurs, a specific category of informed mar-
ket participants that ground their trading strategies on seeking price in-
consistencies of financial instruments with respect to their fundamental
value.
1.2.1 Market microstructure
Market microstructure is the field of research in finance that investigates
how the financial markets operate, and how the micro level design and
structure, as well as the internal frictions, affect the overall price and
the market dynamics. Understanding their working principles is of fun-
damental relevance: the essential function of the financial system is to
foster the efficient allocation of capital, facilitating the transfer of funds
21While this is true by design, in practice it is debatable: developers that decide how
to improve and modify the protocols do have political power. Miners are strongly subject
to concentration dynamics and consequently have oligopolistic behavior: to increase the
probability of winning, individual miners use private services called mining pools that
redirect their hashing power on a single node - and subsequently redistribute earnings
based on the individual contribution. Currently, more than 50% of blocks are mined by less
than 10 mining pools.
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from participants with a surplus to those who are in shortage, and such
transfers take place mainly in financial markets.
In essence, financial markets are (physical or virtual) dedicated facil-
ities that enable and favor the purchase and sale of tradable securities -
that is, claims on the borrower’s future income or assets - in organized
markets. Despite in practice their functioning is extremely complex22,
the general principles that determine the internal trading dynamics de-
pend on the market design of the trading venues, which are common to
the vast majority of such instruments.
Indeed, the financial instruments are generally issued in the primary
markets, where securities are sold to other organizations directly by the
issuer. This phase involves primarily investment banks that buy large
quantities of securities and guarantee a price to the issuing entity. The
instruments are consequently sold to the public in the secondary mar-
kets. The issuer acquires new funds only in this first negotiation, and
the price paid on the primary market is based on the price that the in-
vestment banks expect will be set in the secondary markets through the
buy and sell interactions among individual investors. Thus, as a mat-
ter of fact, the places where price formation occurs are the secondary
markets. Moreover, such facilities allow greater flexibility as they make
assets readily tradable, thus increasing their liquidity (the measure of the
ability to easily trade an instrument and convert it into cash).
The participants of the secondary market are generally divided in two
groups: the buy side, composed of institutional and individual investors
who purchase trading services; and the sellers of such services, such as
brokers and dealers. Brokers are middlemen that execute orders on be-
half of clients23, in a principal agency relationship; they earn profits by
22The instruments traded are countless and variegated, and many intermediaries, heav-
ily regulated and with specific functions, play an essential role in channelling funds be-
tween parties. An overview of the financial system goes beyond the scope of this section; a
broader description can be found in Mishkin (2018). In addition to this source, I based the
following introduction on the works of Larry Harris (2003), De Jong and Rindi (2009), and
Barry Johnson (2010).
23Currently, direct trading is restricted to members of the trading venues. To circum-
vent such restrictions, intermediaries can provide Direct Market Access (DMA) services to
clients, by allowing them to use the broker’s infrastructure and directly submit orders.
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charging commissions on the executed trades. Dealers instead facilitate
trades on behalf of themselves, that is, they operate on their account as
principals, and possess capital. They earn profits by supplying liquid-
ity to the market, i.e., they post information regarding the total volume
they are willing to buy or sell and at what price, and they profit from the
difference between the two.
Investors define their strategies by communicating a series of orders
to their brokers, who consequently submit them to the trading venues.
Orders are essentially instructions, or algorithms, that encode whether
and how to buy or sell a given security in response to specific changes of
the market conditions. Typically, the providers of exchange services of-
fer to investors a wide range of possible executable orders, that allow to
control several aspects of the trades (such as the desired price, the timing
and/or lifetime, the behavior in case of partial execution, or more com-
plex options to link trades and generate cascade effects among orders).
The two most important types are market and limit orders. The latter
is an instruction to execute a trade at a price not worse than the speci-
fied one. Limit orders provide liquidity to the market, in the sense that
they stand ready to be filled when the desired market conditions are met.
They never break the imposed price limit, thus they eliminate price risks,
at the cost of increased timing and execution risks. Market orders are
executed immediately, at the best (bid or ask) price on the market. They
ensure speed and execution, at the cost of increased price risk: market
orders are always completely filled, even if it means accepting matches
with orders placed at unfavourable conditions (i.e., bids lower than the
best bid or asks higher than the best ask). This also implies that they
erode liquidity, contrary to limit orders. For these reasons market orders
are classified as aggressive orders. Many orders are hybrid forms of the
limit and market. Others may indicate further instructions that specify
the behavior conditional to certain market conditions; e.g., stop orders
are submitted only when the price reaches a threshold specified by the
order. Hidden and iceberg orders instead are used by investors seeking
to place large orders without affecting the price significantly, and allow
them not to disclose publicly their full position. Orders can be linked
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together, so that the submission to the market is conditional to the exe-
cution of other orders.
Financial markets are the trading venues where such orders are ex-
ecuted, and are commonly distinguished into two broad categories, or
a hybrid of the two: order-driven and quote-driven markets24. Trading
venues organized in the first form are commonly known as exchanges.
Brokers submit the traders’ buy and sell orders, which are collected and
ordered by the trading venue in an order book. An automated engine
matches them according to a predefined set of rules that determine the
execution precedence (generally, priority is based on best price and time
order). The distance between the highest priced bid - the best bid - and
the lowest priced offer - the best ask - determines the bid ask spread, a mea-
sure of the market liquidity. The orders that are submitted at prices far
from the equilibrium passively wait the correct market conditions to be
met before being executed. The total volume of such orders is a measure
of the depth of a market: the impact of large trades on price is smaller in
deep markets. In the case of order-driven markets, the price formation
mechanism is directed by the actual posted orders. In quoted-driven
markets, instead, dealers provide quotations at which they are willing to
buy and sell a given amount of a security; the efficiency of the market is
guaranteed in principle by the competition among dealers. Such trading
mechanism is of the type Over-The-Counter, as brokers are instructed by
their principals to accept or decline the dealers’ published offers based
on specific conditions. The latter type of market is more suitable for ne-
gotiation among parties.
Another important aspect of financial markets is the mechanism used
in the trade execution process, as it has direct implications on the final
price upon which parties reach consensus. For this reason, the process
is also called price discovery, as it reveals the actual prices the agree-
24A broader overview would be much more complex; for instance, alternative trading
venues such as Dark Pools and Electronic Communication networks (ECNs) are gaining
more and more importance in financial markets. The latter are similar to exchanges, with
the difference that they facilitate direct access to customers; Dark Pools are venues that
provide confidentiality (at the cost of reduced transparency), and thus are often used to
guarantee privacy between institutional investors executing large orders.
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ment between parties is grounded upon. The three main mechanisms
used are bilateral trading, continuous auctions, and call auctions. The
first one is a one-to-one interaction between known parties, it is typical
of negotiation-based venues, and facilitates customized deals. The latter
two are both auction-based processes; in the continuous one, traders can
submit their orders without any time constraint. The orders are added
to the venue’s internal queue list, and the matching mechanism fills the
orders according to the predetermined set of rules that determine the
execution precedence. In call auctions, instead, orders are collected for
a predetermined period of time and executed together in a second mo-
ment. While the first is more flexible and guarantees immediacy, the
latter reduces price volatility and increases the depth of the market.
Finally, transaction costs are another key aspect of financial markets.
Besides explicit costs such as fees, commissions, and taxes, many im-
plicit costs arise and are hard to evaluate for traders. For instance, high
spreads imply high costs to traders seeking immediate liquidity; delay
costs may arise due to changing market conditions between the decision
and the execution timing; and the impact of an order on the market may
cause significant price variations, especially in illiquid markets. A cor-
rect identification of such costs is essential for the implementation of a
profitable strategy.
The research in market microstructure focuses on the actual trad-
ing processes in secondary markets, and on how the features described
above affect prices and volumes traded. Indeed, traditional finance ab-
stracted for long time from the actual trading mechanisms and depicted
the markets as perfectly efficient and frictionless. Recent research shows
that this is not the case, and mainly three fields have been investigated.
First, authors studied the primary features of the market design and how
they affect the trading dynamics; e.g., Amihud and Mendelson (1987)
and (1991) showed that returns have different behavior in the opening
and closing phases of the intraday market, due to the different execution
methods, and that the trading mechanism impacts significantly prices.
Glosten (1994) and Foucault (1999) introduced and discussed the eco-
nomic principles of limit order books, and Christie and Schultz (1994)
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exploited a sample of stock quotations at Nasdaq in 1991 to show that
anomalies in the distribution of spreads are plausibly explained by a
strategic (collusive) behavior of the involved dealers. The second rele-
vant topic is the process that leads from individual expectations to price
formation through price discovery and trade execution; Grossman and
Stiglitz (1980) provided a model describing how imperfect transmission
of information affects price discovery and consequently the price for-
mation mechanism. R. A. Wood, McInish, and Ord (1985) studied the
price formation conditional to micro level characteristics of trades such
as size, frequency, timing; similar investigations on the relationship be-
tween the market size and volatility are conducted by Jones, Kaul, and
Lipson (1994). The third relevant field is related to the analysis of the
transaction costs, their impact on returns, and the possible strategies to
minimize them. Roll (1984) introduced an influential method to mea-
sure the effective bid-ask spread in efficient markets, and Stoll (2000) de-
scribed a series of methods to identify and quantify frictions in trading.
In the recent years the market was revolutionized by the use of elec-
tronic and automated trading tools: trading techniques that exploit al-
gorithms to implement complex predefined sets of instructions are more
and more common, and are known as algorithmic trading (AT); high fre-
quency trading (HFT) is a strictly related concept, and encompasses the
trading strategies based on the execution of many small intraday trades
that exploit low latency to profit. Latency is the elapsing time between
decision and execution of an order. A large fraction of the current re-
search in this field focuses on how these techniques changed the way
financial markets operate: e.g. Hendershott, Jones, and Menkveld (2011)
and Brogaard, Hendershott, and Riordan (2014) respectively show that
algorithmic trading is informed and consequently narrows spreads, and
that high frequency trading has a positive effect on market liquidity. A.
Kirilenko et al. (2017) investigate the effect of electronic trading on an
event, known as ‘The Flash Crash’, that took place in the E-mini S&P 500
stock index futures market on 6 May 2020. From a different perspective,
Budish, Cramton, and Shim (2015) assert that low latencies, HFT and AT
made the current market design outdated and that frequent batch auc-
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tions would be more suitable. The dynamics of HFT are studied also in
cryptocurrency markets (Daian et al., 2019).
1.2.2 Arbitrageurs, and limits to arbitrage
Arbitrageurs are a specific typology of investors that attempt to profit
by seeking relative mispricings between assets. Expertise and knowl-
edge are essential requirements for them to profit. Indeed, traders are
commonly divided between informed and uninformed: the former ground
their decisions on correct information regarding the true value, or fun-
damental value, of the instrument, while the latter “trade on noise as
if it were information” (Black, 1986, p. 529) and are also called noise
traders. Informed traders exploit both private and public information,
and have an essential role in the markets as their activity conveys in-
formation into prices. Their actions reflect their own evaluation of the
fundamental value. Instead, by basing their actions on noise or incor-
rect information, uninformed traders provide liquidity and thus create a
market at prices far from fundamental values. Thus, despite they are a
source of inefficiency in markets, they are also vital for financial markets
in the sense that they make trading possible (Larry Harris, 2003; De Jong
and Rindi, 2009; Barry Johnson, 2010).
Besides exploiting information itself, informed traders compete on
the collection and incorporation of new information to predict the price
changes and to identify predictable patterns or systematic errors. Arbi-
trageurs are a specific category of informed traders who focus instead on
relative price differences between assets that share equivalent (or similar)
factors determining their fundamental value. Their activity is essential,
as it ensures the law of one price; that is, equivalent assets must be priced
identically. Indeed, they buy undervalued assets and sell those overval-
ued, thus pushing prices towards equilibrium and enforcing the price
convergence by concurrently profiting from this activity. The textbook
description of pure arbitrage, in its simplest case, is that of the simul-
taneous purchase and sale of the same (or equivalent) asset at different
prices: it yields risk-free profits, as the investor exploits advantageously
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the mispricing and the position is immediately hedged, without net in-
vestment of capital (Bodie, Kane, and Marcus, 2018).
More specifically, the theoretical approach distinguishes between two
different types of arbitrage (Ingersoll, 1987). Given a set of states S =
{1, ..., S} andN securities, the payoff matrixAij defines the payoff in the
state i for each security j. The portfolio x ∈ RN is a combination of such
securities, whose vector of prices is defined by q ∈ RN . A state-price
vector is a vector ψ such that AT · ψ = q. The arbitrage of type I takes
place when the final payout is non-negative and no initial investment is
required: that is, q · x ≤ 0 and Ax > 0. Type II arbitrage can be exploited
if the cost of a portfolio is negative (i.e., one receives money today to hold
the portfolio) and the payoff is non-negative: q · x < 0 and Ax ≥ 0.
The first implies that one allocation stochastically dominates the others,
while in the latter case the market includes mispriced redundant assets
(linear independence implies that Ax = 0 only if x = 0).
The fundamental theorem of asset pricing (or FTAP, whose first ver-
sion is described in the seminal works of S. Ross, 1976, and 1978) states
that, in a market with S states and N securities as the one described
above, no arbitrage opportunities arise if and only if the vector ψ exists
and is consistent with the security prices q. That is, for a portfolio with
payoff Ax which is uniquely priced by q ·x (linear pricing rule), there is a
strictly positive state-price vectorψ such that the relationship AT ·ψ = q
holds (positive pricing rule). If it is not possible to find such a strictly
positive vector ψ, then there are arbitrage opportunities in the market.
The proof is based on the Separating Hyperplane Theorem (see Cerny,
2009; Björk, 2009; Duffie, 2010 who provide additional references on the
topic). The absence of arbitrage is also implied in a theoretical frame-
work of rational individuals who optimize their choices and prefer more
to less: Dybvig and S. Ross (1989) show that such assumption is equiv-
alent to the no-arbitrage condition (and thus to the existence of positive
linear prices; see also Varian, 1987).
The contribution of Ross is seminal for the whole body of literature
on the theory of asset pricing. The subsequent research on arbitrage,
primarily focused on the mathematical generalization of these concepts,
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investigates the relationship between the no arbitrage condition and the
martingale theory. The seminal paper of Harrison and Kreps (1979) is
the first that explicitly reformulates the principles of the fundamental
theorem of asset pricing in terms of martingale measures. The authors
provide a general theory of option pricing based on the stochastic mod-
eling, and show that no arbitrage opportunities exist if and only if it is
possible to define a probability measure under which the price is a mar-
tingale. Most importantly, the prices are also consistent with those of the
economic equilibrium. Harrison and Pliska (1981) turn this principle into
a theorem for finite probability spaces, and Kreps (1981) extends it to a
more general case by introducing a stronger assumption (known as ‘no
free lunch’). Delbaen and Schachermayer (1994) and (1998) introduce
the concept of ‘no free lunch with vanishing risk’ (NFLVR), which is a
slightly stronger assumption of the no arbitrage condition, and extend
the formalization to semi-martingales: they show that the fulfillment of
the NFLVR condition is equivalent to the existence of a semi-martingale
measure equivalent to the original one, and this is essentially equivalent
to the absence of arbitrage opportunities (see also Delbaen and Schacher-
mayer, 2006).
In summary, the theory on arbitrage is well established, and probably
one of the most studied concepts in the financial literature. Interestingly,
however, practical arbitrage appears to be far from the one described
by the theoretical approach. Theoretical arbitrage yields risk-free prof-
its, and is conducted by fully rational arbitrageurs with homogeneous
expectations who do not need any endowment of capital to perform it.
However, this seems not to be the case in real markets. Arbitrage can be
essentially risk-free only when it involves mean-reverting assets (securi-
ties whose mean price is known in the long run). In most of the cases, the
instruments are non-stationary and thus intrinsically risky (i.e., prices do
not converge to a mean value in the long run). Furthermore, also in the
case of theoretically riskless arbitrage, arbitrageurs can end up trading at
worse than expected prices (implementation risk); aggressive orders entail
price execution risk, as they demand liquidity and thus have a higher im-
pact on price. Conversely, limit orders are subject to execution risk, that
31
is, the trade (or worse, only part of it) might never be executed. Arbi-
trageurs face also the risk of a short-term trend reversion of one of the
two assets (basis risk), and may misinterpret a change in fundamental
values as the effect of noise trading (model risk). Prices can take longer
than expected to converge, and arbitrageurs can be forced to modify their
positions in suboptimal situations, due to capital requirements (carrying
costs risk).
Risk is not the only concern for arbitrageurs: markets are not fric-
tionless, and investors need to account for additional costs such as fees,
capital requirements, entry, strategy implementation, non-instantaneous
diffusion of information (R. Merton, 1987). Capital requirements for ar-
bitrageurs in an agency relationship may represent an issue: Shleifer and
Vishny (1997) propose a model where, in the presence of extreme price
deviations, principals evaluate erroneously the arbitrageurs (the agents)
by judging them on their current performance, and refuse to supply ad-
ditional capital precisely when it would be most needed, de facto limit-
ing the arbitrage itself. De Long et al. (1990) show that irrational noise
traders can operate on a bias, and consequently introducing an addi-
tional risk that limits arbitrage activity. Thus, as a matter of fact, arbi-
trage in real markets is far from the one described in theoretical works:
Lawrence Harris and Gurel (1986), Froot and Dabora (1999), and Lamont
and R. H. Thaler (2003b) provide empirical evidence of price anomalies
and persistent mispricings; Barberis and R. Thaler (2003) and Gromb and
Vayanos (2010) provide a survey on the recent developments of the anal-
ysis of the limits to arbitrage.
Somehow surprisingly, despite the authors of the latter work high-
light the importance of understanding who actually are arbitrageurs in
practice, the empirical evidence describing how user-specific characteris-
tics of arbitrage lacks completely in the literature. Practicioners acknowl-
edge that many small investors, each bearing an infinitesimal portion of
risk are not the ones that would conduct arbitrage in practice. Rather,
arbitrageurs are few and competing informed users that exploit sophis-
ticated trading strategies that need capital. This statement is however
mainly anecdotal and not supported by any academic study.
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Finally, the major typologies of arbitrage are:
Shipping (or two-point) arbitrage: two identical securities are traded
in different markets. Moving the security between the markets can bound
the arbitrage opportunities (due to the shipping costs), but often it is not
necessary in practice. Conversion arbitrage is performed between secu-
rities with similar - but of a different type - risk, to hedge it. Triangular
arbitrage exploits price differences for the same asset quoted in different
currencies: arbitrage opportunities arise if the implied exchange rate dif-
fers from the original one. E.g., in the Forex market it is possible to com-
pare the official exchange rate of two currencies A and B with the rate
implied against a third currency C. Spreads: the arbitrage is conducted
on securities essentially identical, except for one element (maturity, credit
quality, . . . ). Merger (or risk) arbitrage takes place when the stock prices
of two firms involved in a merger react inconsistently with respect to the
terms and cost agreed for the acquisition. Pairs trading consists in the
identification of correlated assets, depending on similar common valu-
ation factors: profits arise when only one of the two responds to price
changes of the common valuation factor (viceversa, losses incur if the
changes are due to instrument-specific factors). Statistical arbitrage ex-
ploits advanced mathematical and statistical methods. It can be thought
of as an evolution of the former, applied to a bundle of instruments; in
essence, the arbitrageur tries to identify their common factors, and deter-
mine price inconsistencies within the bundle.
1.3 Cryptocurrency exchange platforms
This section focuses on the exchanges dedicated to the trading of cryp-
tocurrencies against fiat currency that blossomed in the last decade. The
trading mechanisms on which they rely upon are in most cases adpoted
from traditional finance, with some key differences to adapt them to
the cryptocurrency characterstics. The majority of cryptocurrency ex-
changes are organized as order-driven markets with two sided continu-
ous auctions; contrary to traditional market design, investors trade di-
rectly among them without resorting to brokerage services, and the role
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of intermediaries is much less - if not at all - regulated. Nonetheless, as
a matter of fact such exchanges are centralized entities acting as an inter-
mediary between the Bitcoin network and the traditional finance system.
Indeed, as described in Section 1.1, the Bitcoin design originally en-
visages two primary ways to obtain bitcoins: by winning the competition
to add new blocks to the chain (the mining process), and by selling goods
for bitcoins (the transactions). In both cases, users must be active nodes
of the network and possess sufficient technological skills to master and
run a dedicated software. This aspect raises some issues, as the protocol
itself exposes users to high risks, if mishandled (see Conti et al. (2018)
for a broad review on Bitcoin related privacy and security issues): first,
transactions are irreversible, and no authority controlling the network
can invert them in the presence of operational errors (e.g., sending the
wrong amount, or selecting the wrong receiver25). Second, the loss of
private keys is a common issue, and entails the impossibility to redeem
bitcoins controlled by such key; again, there is no way to resort to an au-
thority to recover them. A study executed by Chainalysis estimates that
in November 2017 between 2.8 million and 3.8 million bitcoins (on a total
of 21 million) were likely lost, that is, nobody has the control of the pri-
vate keys to redeem them26. Even in the absence of operational errors,
users can also be subject to attacks from malicious entities: some, like
DDoS attacks (Benjamin Johnson et al., 2014) or the 51% attack described
in Section 1.1, are distinctive of the Bitcoin infrastructure; others are com-
mon crimes facilitated by bitcoins, such as scams and frauds, hacks and
bitcoin-denominated ransoms, that flourished around the Bitcoin ecosys-
tem (Vasek and Moore (2015), and https://bit.ly/37Y6WZc). In
summary, handling bitcoins correctly is non-trivial and several barriers
to entry exist: especially at the early stages, the adoption of Bitcoin was
confined to a limited number of users with a good knowledge and un-
derstanding of Bitcoin design principles and mechanisms. Despite this,
Bitcoin started attracting the attention of less expert investors as an in-
25Bitcoins sent to a wrong address: https://bit.ly/3jRqCQJ , or https://bit.
ly/3oMSBVm; wrong amount indicated in the transaction: https://bit.ly/3jJ2GyY.
26See https://bit.ly/32196Dl and https://cnb.cx/34NvcLn.
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vestment asset, rather than an alternative payment system (Glaser et al.,
2014; Yermack, 2015).
Exchange platforms came into play exactly for this reason: to reduce
technological and switching costs for less expert users willing to possess
bitcoins, and to facilitate trading against conventional payment systems
for miners willing to sell their bitcoins in exchange of traditional fiat cur-
rencies. Indeed, the demand for bitcoins and the number of users relying
on such platforms increased steadily from 2011 on (see e.g. Figure 18 in
Section 3.2). Besides this, exchanges grew in importance also as they ex-
ploit economies of scale, by reducing the fixed costs a user would pay27.
Currency exchanges are trading platforms that provide users with
an online interface to trade bitcoins (and other cryptocurrencies) against
fiat currencies. They share many working principles with traditional eq-
uity markets, where traders submit buy and sell orders and the exchange
clears trades, providing the service for a fee. The first exchanges operated
on single currency markets against bitcoins; e.g., Mt. Gox, the first rele-
vant platform, at first allowed users to trade bitcoins against USD, and
only subsequently additional fiat currency markets were introduced. In
the last years institutional investors have entered into the market, the
use of cryptocurrencies has become more widespread, and competition
across exchanges has increased: while the first platforms where more
rudimentary (though they already provided API structures allowing to
conduct automated and complex order strategies), such services are now
much more sophisticated and list often several crypto- and fiat- curren-
cies, allowing to trade cryptocurrencies against all of them. Often ex-
changes focus on specific geographical locations, that is, list one or few
specific fiat currencies and allow to trade it in a limited geographical area
against several cryptocurrencies. Noteworthy, a subgroup of the current
exchanges allows only trading among cryptocurrencies. Bearing this in
mind, for the purpose of this dissertation I now focus on the dynamics
regarding only the bitcoin markets against fiat currencies.
A key difference with traditional trading platforms is how funds are
27Costs related to security measures, to investments in knowledge and technology, to run
the Bitcoin software on a personal device, . . .
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deposited into the exchanges: to start selling bitcoins, users must send
them ‘blindly’ to a public key indicated by the exchange28; users with no
bitcoins can enter the market by blindly sending an amount of money to
the exchange that will buy for them bitcoins from the network and open
an account at their name (noteworthy: not as a node of the Bitcoin net-
work, but as a user of the online platform). To non expert investors, the
platform simply appears as a web interface with a password and an iden-
tifier that gives access to a personal area reporting the user’s balances,
and an online market where to buy and sell fiat- and crypto- currencies.
There is no need for them to know that exchanges are actually centralised
superstructures basically acting as intermediaries between customers.
Under the scenes, indeed, exchanges are managed by a company
that directly controls the customers’ funds, through a series of bank de-
posits holding customers’ fiat money, and at least one node of the Bit-
coin network storing the bitcoins29. They control the keys, thus they ulti-
mately possess the funds, and they appear in the Bitcoin network as very
wealthy entities managing large amounts of bitcoins. On the (poorly de-
veloped) regulatory side, it is often not clear whether exchanges guar-
antee to just hold coins on behalf of the customers, as if they were gold
merchants keeping labeled bars of gold - in this case, every trade across
users would be executed and then transcribed on the public ledger - or if
customers have a claim on an amount of money that the exchange com-
mits to pay under request. In practice they always implement the latter,
behaving as a matter of fact similarly to traditional banks (Anderson et
al., 2018)30. This has two important consequences: first, they do not need
to possess the exact amount of bitcoins owed at any moment in time;
and second, they keep the balances updated off-line, on a private ledger:
28The private key is managed by the platform itself; nobody guarantees that the owners
will not steal the bitcoins or use them for other purposes. Indeed, reputation systems are
essential for the exchanges to be trusted and for the market to hold.
29Usually, the same exchange uses cold wallets with the highest security standards to
store offline the vast majority of funds, and keeps the liquidity necessary for daily with-
drawal/deposit operations in the so-called hot wallets.
30Decentralised exchanges (DEXs) represent an alternative business model, in which the
exchange does not take the cryptocurrency in custody, and trades are executed via smart
contracts on a blockchain.
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trades executed in cryptocurrency markets are not stored on the Bitcoin
Blockchain.
Figure 2 reports the evolution in time of the main exchange plat-
forms31. The upper panel shows the evolution of the daily volume per-
centage traded in the main exchanges, while the lower one reports the
percentage per currency. Time series are reported as a mean rolling aver-
age over three days. Three different temporal windows with distinctive
patterns can be clearly identified: the first one, from 2010 to the end of
2013, corresponds to an early phase dominated by a single platform, that
is, Mt. Gox; the vast majority of the trades executed in this platform are
in USD. The exchange is notorious for a long story of security breaches
(the first one caused the variations visible in both panels at the end of
June 2011, when a security breach pushed the bitcoin price to almost 0$
in few hours, and forced the platform to stop operations for some days);
it ceased activity on 7 February 2014, when it halted all withdrawals and
was subsequently filed for bankruptcy; most of the customers sued the
exchange in order to recover their funds, and the case is still open. This
platform is especially important for my work, as I exploit the private
ledger containing the log of internal trades (that was leaked and pub-
lished in 2014) to conduct the analyses.
The second time window is dominated by trades denominated in
CNY, and most of the orders were cleared in three major platforms: OK-
Coin, Huobi, and BTC China. This phase ended in 2017: alarmed by the
growing use of bitcoin to circumvent capital controls, the People’s Bank
of China’s (PBoC) intervened directly in January 2017, and pressured the
exchanges into changing their business models by introducing fees and
halting margin trading; the volumes in these platforms felt abruptly in
few days, and eventually in September the Chinese government ordered
to completely shut down the country’s bitcoin exchanges32.
The last (and current) phase is dominated by few but competing plat-
forms with a solid reputation system, and trading is conducted mainly
31Data from https://data.bitcoinity.org/. The Mt. Gox data are based on per-
sonal estimations obtained by the exchange’s private ledger.
32See https://on.ft.com/3820Uqu, https://bit.ly/2HZwqe4, and https://
on.wsj.com/3kWkLuJ
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Notes: evolution of the daily volume percentage traded in the main exchanges (Panel
a), and percentage per currency (Panel b). Three different phases with distinctive
patterns appear. The first coincides with the preponderant presence of Mt. Gox, from
2010 to 2013; the second, from 2014 to 2017, corresponds to a time window mostly
dominated by Chinese exchanges; the last and current phase is more heterogeneous,
and few but competing exchanges share the market and operate against multiple fiat
currencies. 38
Figure 3: Fee scheme for the main exchanges active in the USD market be-
tween 2011 and 2013.































Notes: The plots show a comparison in time of the fee schedule across the main ex-
changes active at the early stages of the Bitcoin ecosystem. Dashed lines refer to time
windows where I inferred the fee scheme, or that go beyond the time window cov-
ered by the Mt. Gox leaked dataset. Mt. Gox transaction costs went from 0.65% to
0.3% in June 2011, and from mid August the exchange introduced a scheme with
fees varying depending on the volume traded in the last month. Bitstamp adopted
a similar schedule from January 2012, after imposing a fixed fee for short periods of
time (0% and 0.5% between mid June and the end of 2011). The transaction costs in
BTC-e followed a similar pattern with respect to Bitstamp (0%, then 0.2% and finally
0.5% between June and December 2011). The fees finally stabilized at a fixed 0.2%
rate. Bitfinex, who entered later in the market, imposed instead a fixed 0.1% fee and
later introduced a distinction between market makers and takers (up to 0.15%). The
lower panel reports other exchanges, that is, TradeHill, CampBX, Bitfloor: each of
them offered stable fees over time (respectively 0.6%, 0.55%, and 0.4%).
39
in USD, but a relevant market share is executed in other currencies like
EUR, GBP, JPY. CoinmarketCap and Bitcoin Wiki33 provide a detailed list
of the most prominent exchange platforms active to date.
Figure 3 focuses on the first time epoch identified, which is the most
relevant for the following chapters, and reports in two separated plots
the evoluton in time (x-axis) of the percentage fees (y-axis) that users
would pay in the main exchanges active in the USD market before 2014,
that is, Mt. Gox, BTC-e, Bitstamp, Bitfinex, TradeHill, CampBX, Bitfloor.
As one can see, the patterns vary greatly across them: some venues mod-
ified their fee scheme often in time, and offered discounts to users with
high trading volume, such as Mt. Gox; others, such as CampBX, or
Bitfloor, offered instead stable fees over time. Overall, the comparison
shows that fees tended to decrease in time.
Whilst in the recent years a large number of alternative exchanges
were launched, it is widely acknowledged that most of them are scams
or report fake volumes to lure customers in; a study by the BitWise Asset
Management Company (2019) proposes a few methods to spot fabricated
data and show that only a small number of the listed exchanges are in-
deed working transaparently and can be trusted34. When the market is
narrowed down to these few companies, it appears more ordered, effi-
cient, much smaller in terms of volumes traded, and competitive across
exchanges for the services offered. This aspect highlights one of the most
prominent risks associated to trading on such platforms: exchanges can
host (or be) fraudulent entities that manipulate markets in order to send
misleading signals to customers. Furthermore, as the textbook example
of Mt. Gox shows, exchanges are also frequently subject to shutdowns
and most of them do not refund customers when ceasing operations35;
see Moore and Christin (2013) for this form of counterparty risk. For
completeness, another important risk associated with the exchange plat-
33Respectively https://coinmarketcap.com/rankings/exchanges/ and
https://en.bitcoin.it/wiki/Comparison_of_exchanges.
34E.g., some of the major ones are Binance, Bitfinex, Kraken, Bitstamp, Coinbase, Bitflyer,
Gemini, itBit, Bittrex, Poloniex.
35Or the owner of the exchange might die without a secure back up of the private key:
that really happened to QuadrigaCX, in December 2018 (https://bit.ly/2JCzo8T).
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forms is that of price manipulation: the lack of regulation facilitated
fraudulent users to conduct trading techniques otherwise illegal in tra-
ditional financial markets (Gandal, Hamrick, et al., 2018; Feder, Gandal,
Hamrick, Moore, et al., 2018).
In summary, despite being risky and poorly regulated, currency ex-
changes facilitated the diffusion and a widespread adoption of Bitcoin,
by providing an online interface to conventional payment systems and
thus fostering an efficient allocation of resources between demand and
supply. They reduce the barriers to entry and technological costs; they
also exploit economies of scale that reduce overall costs. It is curious that
exchanges are so important for the Bitcoin ecosystem, whilst they are a
Bitcoin superstructure that dramatically favors the dynamics of central-
ization and power concentration, where users accept to lose the direct
control of their own coins, and essentially functioning through a design
at the opposite of the one that constitutes and characterises the innova-
tive core of the Bitcoin technology.
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Chapter 2
The leaked Mt. Gox dataset:
preprocessing, and an
economic overview
This Chapter describes the Mt. Gox leaked dataset, the primary and most
important source of information used to conduct the analyses. It contains
the log of all the internal trades performed in the exchange platform in
between 1 April 2011 and 30 November 2013.
First, I compare the deduplication methods and cleaning procedures
I implemented to the ones used in the literature. In particular, I show
that my procedure combines and comprises the former ones by improv-
ing upon them in some ways that I will clarify below. Then I exploit
the preprocessed data to provide an economic overview of the Mt. Gox
ecosystem, and how it evolved over time. Finally, I propose a model to
estimate the fees a user would expect to pay given the official fee sched-
ule published by the exchange platform.
Besides this model for the expected explicit transaction costs, the main
novelty of this chapter consist in the provision of a public and prepro-
cessed version of the leaked Mt. Gox dataset. In this sense, Section 2.1 is
especially useful as it also provides a tool to understand both the mean-
ing of the variables and the steps necessary to clean the dataset.
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2.1 Dataset cleaning procedures
The first part of the polishing procedures is devoted to identify and re-
move the redundant duplicate rows contained in the leaked dataset. I
follow the methodology described in the literature by Feder, Gandal,
Hamrick, and Moore (2018), Gandal, Hamrick, et al. (2018) and Scaillet,
Treccani, and Trevisan (2017). I discuss which files of the leaked dataset
can be safely discarded without any loss of information and control for
the presence of duplicate rows in the remaining files. Second, I further re-
move the rows with misreported entries. In some cases the correct values
can be retrieved: thus, when possible, I chose to extrapolate the plau-
sibly correct values. Finally, I conduct additional sanity checks on the
quality of the data: I verify the correctness of the filtered data by com-
parison to external sources of information, that is, a dataset made public
by Mt. Gox, and aggregated data from the website Bitcoincharts.com1,
a benchmark for many studies on cryptocurrency markets that collects
anonymously information at the trade level for the main cryptocurrency
exchange platforms.
2.1.1 Description of the leaked log files
The analysis is conducted over a total of 62 CSV monthly files that cover
a time period ranging from April 2011 to November 2013. Once merged,
they amount to 22,175,247 rows per 19 columns. Overall, they share a
common structure: the data are reported as a sequence of trades, each
identified by a trade ID, and each composed of two rows corresponding
to a buy and a sell leg. Most importantly, each leg is associated to a user
ID. A trade can be schematized as follows:
Date Trade ID User ID Type Bitcoins Money Currency Fees
T 0 1 buy AmountBTC AmountCUR CUR F1
T 0 2 sell AmountBTC AmountCUR CUR F2
1http://api.bitcoincharts.com/v1/csv/
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Along with the standard matching mechanism, from September 2011
on Mt. Gox allowed to trade bitcoins against other currencies. To facili-
tate the trading in illiquid markets, the platform introduced also a feature
called multi-currency trading, allowing investors to match orders even if
buy and sell sides were executed against different fiat currencies (at the
cost of an additional fee). This matching mechanism, slightly more com-
plex than the single currency trade, requires the administrator of the ex-
change platform to act as an intermediary between parties. These trades
represent a marginal fraction of the whole log of trades.
The single leaked files largely overlap: several legs are duplicates and
the data are not reported in a homogeneous format. Some patterns can
anyway be identified. First, for each month it is possible to identify one
primary file that contains all the relevant information, while the remain-
ing ones are redundant subsets. Second, the whole body of files can
be grouped in 3 macro sets, each sharing the same structure; the dif-
ferences across them mainly concern the way multi-currency trades are
transcribed, and the columns stored. Thus, files are divided and ana-
lyzed in three blocks, sharing a similar pattern:
1. files related to April 2011. Two different files are reported for April
2011, both composed of 15 columns: Trade_Id, Date, User_Id, Japan,
Type, Currency, Bitcoins, Money, Money_Rate, Money_JPY, Money_Fee,
Money_Fee_Rate, Money_Fee_JPY, Bitcoin_Fee, Bitcoin_Fee_JPY; multi-
currency trades are not present.
2. files from May 2011 to October 2012: for every month there is only
one .CSV file, each with the same columns of the April 2011 files.
Multi-currency trades are implemented as follows:
User ID Type Bitcoins Money Currency
1 buy ABTC ACUR1 CUR1
TIBANNE_LIMITED_HK sell ABTC ACUR1 CUR1
2 sell ABTC ACUR2 CUR2
TIBANNE_LIMITED_HK buy ABTC ACUR2 CUR2
44
I will refer to this implementation method as the ‘Tibanne’ one;
3. files from November 2012 to November 2013. Two files per month
are available, one denominated ‘Coinlab’ and one denominated
‘mtgox_japan’. In addition, for February, March, and April 2013,
also weekly datasets (with a similar nomenclature) are included.
All of them are composed of 19 columns: the 15 aforementioned,
plus User, User_Id_Hash, User_Country, User_State; the ‘Coinlab’ and
weekly files are subsets of the original ‘mtgox_japan’ ones. The
multi-currency trades are stored in the database as follows:
User ID Type Bitcoins Money Currency
3 buy ABTC ACUR1 CUR1
THK sell ABTC ACUR1 CUR1
3 buy ABTC ACUR1 CUR1
THK sell ABTC ACUR1 CUR1
I will refer to this implementation method as the ‘THK’ one. Note
that the trades are misreported, as already noticed in the literature:
the buy side of the trade is reported twice. The sell side of the
‘THK’ multi-currency trades is never reported.
4. The file related to July 2012 represents an exception to this clas-
sification: it shares the same structure and properties of the sec-
ond group, but the multi-currency trades follow the ‘THK’ scheme.
Note that in all the files the ‘Tibanne’ and ‘THK’ methods are mu-
tually exclusive.
The 19 columns can be interpreted in the following way:
• Trade_Id: identifier of the trade. Each pair of buy and sell legs is
associated to a specific identifier; the identifiers are reported as a
simple sequential increasing number until 19 June 2011, while from
26 June 2011 on, as suggested in Scaillet, Treccani, and Trevisan
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(2017), they correspond to the concatenation of a POSIX timestamp
and a microsecond timestamp2;
• Date: date of execution of the trade. Time is reported in format
YYYY-MM-DD hh:mm:ss;
• Type: value that determines whether the row represents a buy or a
sell leg. The object of exchange is an amount of bitcoins; thus the
buyer purchases bitcoins denominated in fiat currency, and vicev-
ersa for the seller;
• User_Id: parameter that identifies the user who performed the buy
or sell action;
• Japan: the meaning of this variable is not clear. It can take two
values: ‘JP’ and ‘NJP’. It could be a parameter informative on the
geographical origin of the trade execution, or it might indicate a
special category of users (or trades);
• Currency: fiat currency used in the trade. In total, 17 different
currencies are used: US Dollar, Euro, British Pound, Polish Zloty,
Australian Dollar, Japanese Yen, Canadian Dollar, Swedish Krone,
Swiss Franc, Russian Ruble, Chinese Yuan, New Zealand Dollar,
Singapore Dollar, Hong Kong Dollar, Danish Krone, Norwegian
Krone, Thai Bat.
• Bitcoins: amount of bitcoins exchanged;
• Money: quantity of fiat currency traded;
• Money_JPY: quantity of fiat currency traded, expressed in Japanese
Yen;
• Money_Rate: exchange rate used to convert the value in the field
‘Money’ into Japanese Yen;
2On 19 June 2011, Mt. Gox’s website went down for several days after a security breach.
See https://bit.ly/3dtzNFf. This link and the following were all accessed on 14
October 2020.
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• Money_Fee and Bitcoin_Fee: fees paid to perform the trade. Nor-
mally, fees were paid in fiat money by the seller and in bitcoins by
the buyer (with a certain degree of flexibility on the choice of how
to pay the commission fees3);
• Money_Fee_JPY and Bitcoin_Fee_JPY: fees paid to perform the trade,
expressed in Japanese Yen;
• Money_Fee_Rate: exchange rate used to convert the value in the
fields ‘Money_Fee’ and ‘Bitcoin_Fee’ into Japanese Yen;
• User: user identifier expressed in hexadecimal base;
• User_Id_Hash: hashed representation of the user identifier;
• User_Country: National geographic location of the user;
• User_State: Regional geographic location of the user.
2.1.2 Deduplication methods - comparisons with the lit-
erature
Members of the Mt. Gox community were among the first to explore the
leaked dataset. Supposedly they wanted to prove misbehavior of the ex-
change in the events that led to its bankruptcy on 28 February 2014. The
volunteers analyzed the structure of the dataset, tried to identify poten-
tial malicious users, and pointed out key issues to keep in mind4. I fol-
lowed their example, and replicated the steps adopted by Feder, Gandal,
Hamrick, and Moore (2018) and Gandal, Hamrick, et al. (2018).
The authors use two related methods to detect duplicates. The first
one (method Conservative) detects rows as duplicates if the following en-
tries are equal: user id, timestamp, buy/sell action, amount in BTC, amount
in Yen. The other method detects rows as duplicates if the following en-
tries are equal: user id, timestamp, buy/sell action, amount in BTC. The latter
3See https://bit.ly/34Wyb3h.
4See, for example: https://bit.ly/34WhQvo, https://bit.ly/2FtFtCJ,
https://bit.ly/3iWtBXB, https://bit.ly/3dt0gD4, and https://bit.ly/
3lQi8e9.
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is more aggressive because it removes a higher number of rows, hence
previous works refer to it as Aggressive.
However, these approaches also treat as duplicates unwanted legs,
and do not take into account the likely presence of metaorders in the
leaked dataset. Consider the case in which a user performs two ex-
actly equivalent trades at the same moment, with the only difference that
the complementary leg is executed by different trading partners: both
deduplication methods mentioned above remove one of the two exactly
equivalent legs. Thus, these methods reduce the dataset more than de-
sirable.
To prevent this behavior, I slightly changed the deduplication Aggres-
sive method, by adding the trade id value to the set of variables used
to detect duplicates as in Scaillet, Treccani, and Trevisan, 2017 (method
TradeId). As a result, rows are detected as duplicates if the following en-
tries are equal: trade id, user id, timestamp, buy/sell action, amount in BTC.
To compare the results, I also implemented another deduplication tech-
nique (method Pairs), based on the Aggressive method, but the legs of a
trade are not treated independently: rows are considered as duplicates
only if both legs are duplicates.
To clarify the differences among the different methods, a series of ex-
ample trades and the resulting deduplications are shown in the follow-
ing.
Original sample. Table 1 shows the original table. It also corresponds
to the deduplication results of method TradeId, meaning that in that spe-
cific case the TradeId method does not remove any duplicate. Consider
the following example: rows 937 and 939 show two equal legs, having
the same values for user id, timestamp, buy/sell action, amount in BTC,
amount in Yen; however, since the trade id marks them as distinct, they
are not treated as duplicates.
Conservative. Here, instead, row 939 is considered a duplicate of
row 937. To maintain the dataset coherent, both rows 939 and 938 are
removed. Row 935 is not a duplicate of row 933 because of the difference
in the value of ‘Money_JPY’. Table 2 shows the result.
Aggressive. In every trade User 388 is seller at the same date and
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Table 1: Original sample and result of TradeId deduplication method
Trade_Id Date User_Id Type Bitcoins Money_JPY
930 35837 11-04-04 14:23 2824 buy 10.0 586.89
931 35837 11-04-04 14:23 388 sell 10.0 586.89
932 35838 11-04-04 14:23 3111 buy 10.0 578.42
933 35838 11-04-04 14:23 388 sell 10.0 578.42
934 35839 11-04-04 14:23 2824 buy 10.0 570.20
935 35839 11-04-04 14:23 388 sell 10.0 570.20
936 35840 11-04-04 14:23 3111 buy 10.0 570.00
937 35840 11-04-04 14:23 388 sell 10.0 570.00
938 35841 11-04-04 14:23 1000 buy 10.0 570.00
939 35841 11-04-04 14:23 388 sell 10.0 570.00
Table 2: Result of Conservative deduplication technique
Trade_Id Date User_Id Type Bitcoins Money_JPY
930 35837 11-04-04 14:23 2824 buy 10.0 586.89
931 35837 11-04-04 14:23 388 sell 10.0 586.89
932 35838 11-04-04 14:23 3111 buy 10.0 578.42
933 35838 11-04-04 14:23 388 sell 10.0 578.42
934 35839 11-04-04 14:23 2824 buy 10.0 570.20
935 35839 11-04-04 14:23 388 sell 10.0 570.20
936 35840 11-04-04 14:23 3111 buy 10.0 570.00
937 35840 11-04-04 14:23 388 sell 10.0 570.00
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Table 3: Result of Aggressive deduplication method
Trade_Id Date User_Id Type Bitcoins Money_JPY
930 35837 11-04-04 14:23 2824 buy 10.0 586.89
931 35837 11-04-04 14:23 388 sell 10.0 586.89
quantity. Thus, independently on the partner, all are considered as du-
plicates of the trade at rows 930, 931. Results are shown in Table 3.
Pairs. Here, instead, we remove only trades where both legs of a trade
are duplicates according to the criterion user id, timestamp, buy/sell action,
amount in BTC. Note that Trade Id is not considered to detect duplicates.
As depicted in Table 4, pairs 934, 935 and 936, 937 are removed, while
pair 938, 939 is kept, given the presence of a different user w.r.t. previous
trades in the buy side.
Table 4: Result of Pairs deduplication method
Trade_Id Date User_Id Type Bitcoins Money_JPY
930 35837 11-04-04 14:23 2824 buy 10.0 586.89
931 35837 11-04-04 14:23 388 sell 10.0 586.89
932 35838 11-04-04 14:23 3111 buy 10.0 578.42
933 35838 11-04-04 14:23 388 sell 10.0 578.42
938 35841 11-04-04 14:23 1000 buy 10.0 570.00
939 35841 11-04-04 14:23 388 sell 10.0 570.00
I follow the approach introduced in Scaillet, Treccani, and Trevisan,
2017 and conduct the analyses using the TradeId deduplication method.
As a robustness check, I also repeat them using the Pairs method; results
are coherent.
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2.1.3 Identification of the redundant files and deduplica-
tion
I verify which files are redundant. The dataset includes two different ver-
sions for April 2011: the two differ by 41 rows, and only with respect to
the field ‘User_Id’: all these legs are reported as executed by user 634 in
the first, while this identifier was hidden (User_Id = ‘DELETED’) in the
latter. All the ‘Coinlab’ files from November 2012 to November 2013 con-
tain only duplicated rows when compared to the corresponding monthly
‘mtgox_japan’ ones. Instead, a set of rows in the weekly ‘mtgox_japan’
files apparently result as non-duplicates, all of them being performed
by user 634. However, upon closer inspection, it emerges that also these
rows are duplicated, if taking into account posthumous corrections to the
fields ‘Money’ and ‘User_Id’: in each of these instances, the user identi-
fier is systematically changed from 698630 to 634, and the values in the
‘Money’ field, seemingly random, are corrected to market values. Con-
sistently with the literature, I assume the rows with user ID 698630 to be
the original ones. These trades were likely not supported by a real trans-
fer of funds from an account to another, althought virtually executed:
thus, as noted by Gandal, Hamrick, et al., 2018 (p. 89) “no legitimate Mt.
Gox customer received the currency Markus supposedly paid to acquire
these claimed coins”5. However, the parties involved in these trades with
user 698630 were supposedly not aware of the underlying illicit activity;
for them, the trade had normally occurred6. Thus, for the purpose of my
analysis, it is correct to consider these trades as if they had been executed
at market prices.
Once merged, after discarding the redundant files, the dataset is com-
posed of 16,748,681 rows and 19 columns. Using the two deduplication
techniques described before (Pairs and TradeId), I control for the presence
of further duplicate trades in the remaining files. Note that, in this step,
the latter methodology does not reduce further the dataset.
5For further details, see also the online supplementary material https://bit.ly/
3jZDvcp of Gandal, Hamrick, et al., 2018.
6One can verify that these trades had a market impact, see e.g. in bitcoincharts.com
(https://bit.ly/39vT9tx): the large price variations are due to user 698630’s activity.
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2.2 Dataset sanity checks
Figure 4: Exchange rate of a sample of USD trades in the merged dataset
before the polishing procedures.
Figure 4 shows the computed exchange rates for a sample of trades,
extracted from the merged file, executed in USD. Many values appear
to be not related to market values. Given the relevance of this variable
for the analysis, and to guarantee high quality standards for the data
used, I perform additional sanity checks built on approaches used in the
literature to further polish the dataset. The reported values refer to the
TradeId deduplcation method:
• Last day trades are removed, due to the presence of several incon-
sistencies;
• 115,275 self-trades are removed7;
• rows with user ID ‘TIBANNE_LIMITED_HK’ and ‘THK’ are re-
moved (they do not represent trades; rather, these are redundant
7The figures reported are comparable with those found in Scaillet, Treccani, and Tre-
visan, 2017. The difference is due to the fact that, in their analysis, they discard all non
USD trades.
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Figure 5: Exchange rate of trades executed by user 698630 in March (left)
and June (right) 2013.
(a) (b)
Notes: the choice of the months is illustrative. Buy trades (upper panels) have random
exchange rates, while exchange rates of the sell trades (lower panels) are at the market
prices.
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rows representing the mediation of the platform among parties for
multi-currency trades);
• Around 136,000 trades (92,000 in USD) are systematically misre-
ported. All these are multi-currencies trades of the ‘Tibanne’ type.
The ‘Money’ entry is the same in the primary leg (the buy side) and
in the secondary leg (the sell side), thus the order of magnitude of
the error is given by the exchange rate between the two currencies.
I do not remove these legs as the correct data can be retrieved;
• 336,813 rows, all secondary legs belonging to multi-currency trades
based on the ‘THK’ method, are missing (the dataset reports twice
the primary leg). It is not possible to recover the data for these
missing legs;
• 31 trades with ‘DELETED’ user identifier or the field ‘Bitcoins’ = 0
are removed;
• I verify that the dates are expressed in the same time zone (UTC);
• following Gandal, Hamrick, et al., 2018 and anonymous contribu-
tions from the Mt. Gox users community, I identify two key users:
– The literature refers to the account 698630 as Markus, and sus-
pects pertain to the legality of its actions. It never paid fees,
and all the trades where it appears as a buyer have seemingly
random values in the ‘Money’ field (supposedly because the
virtual trades were not backed by real transactions: as a con-
sequence, the trading log mechanism would interpret incor-
rectly the void entry and would fill it by simply copying and
pasting the last ‘Money’ value previously transcribed in the
log). Figure 5 shows its trade pattern, distinguishing between
buy and sell legs. Notice that this account is strictly linked to
the one with user ID = 634, as described before; user 634, ac-
tive only in the first months of the dataset, seems to perform
licit trades.
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– The nickname Willy was given to 49 different accounts, bots
sharing the same trade pattern and controlled by the same en-
tity8: their ‘User_Country’ field is always marked as ‘??’; they
only perform buy actions; these accounts activate one by one,
once the previous has spent a definite round amount of dollars
(usually $2.5 millions).
While Markus is active from February 2013 to September 2013,
Willy’s bots become active a few hours after the last Markus’
trade, suggesting they are plausibly linked.
It is likely that the same person owned all these accounts (634,
698630, and the 49 bots).
• The field ‘User_Id’ for Markus trades performed by the account
‘698630’ is changed to 635 (after controlling that no user has user
identifier = 635), so that the accounts 698630 and 634 are sequen-
tially linked, but they can be treated as a single user; the field
‘User_Id’ for Willy’s bots is changed to 1000000, a number which is
not owned by any other user.
• I add a column that maps all the user identifiers in the dataset to
a consecutive sequence of integers, preserving the order but not
the numbers. Throughout the analysis I will use this mapping to
guarantee user’s anonymity;
• I add a column to retrieve multi-currency trades, where the entries
take the following values:
0. Standard trades;
1. Tibanne multi-currency trades;
2. THK multi-currency trades.
8https://bit.ly/34VCsUx.
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2.3 Comparisons with other sources of informa-
tion
2.3.1 The public Mt. Gox dataset
To further ensure the validity of the data, I compare the leaked log to a
dataset made public by Mt. Gox and used by Scaillet, Treccani, and Tre-
visan (2017) in their work. This dataset contains the history of trades ex-
ecuted in Mt. Gox, from its birth on 17 July 2010 to 17 December 2013, for
a total of 8,605,998 trades. The main difference with the leaked dataset is
that trades are not reported as a couple of legs, but as a single trade, thus
they do not contain information on the users who performed the buy and
sell actions; however, the trade identifiers follow the same scheme used
in the leaked dataset, allowing to merge the two datasets.
Besides general fields already included in the leaked log (such as the
trade identifier, the fiat money used, the volume traded, the exchange
rate, the date), the public dataset contains additional information on the
trades, specifying the typology of the order (possible values are ‘limit’;
‘market’; ‘limit,mixed_currency’; ‘market,mixed_currency’) and which
party initiated the trade (‘bid’ or ‘ask’). While there is no way to fully
verify the correctness of these datasets, the comparison with a second
source of information provides a solid robustness check.
I first verify that for each trade the amount of bitcoins traded correspond
exactly in the two datasets. The values related to the money traded, in-
stead, show some differences for around 310,000 legs. Data in the public
dataset are reported as exchange rates, thus the following comparisons
concern exchange rates. First, I find out that trades executed before 12
September 2013 in SEK and JPY are misreported in the public dataset by
a factor of 102, explaining the divergences for around 32,000 legs. Second,
around 135,000 multi-currency ‘Tibanne’ trades are wrongly transcribed
in the leaked log, as the two legs report the same fiat amount; the compar-
ison with the prices in the public dataset allows to correct them. Around
55,000 trades are transactions that involve small amounts of bitcoins (less
than 10−3 BTCs), and in 8,000 the difference between exchange rates is
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smaller than 1% - suggesting for both those groups that the differences
are due to different roundings. Among the remaining ‘unexplained’ legs
(around 80,000), the vast majority is related to trades executed by user
635 (around 23,000 trades) and few other users: the first four users alone
account for slightly less than 50,000 legs. Upon closer inspection, these
errors seem to be caused by the same mechanism explained above for the
Markus buy trades: the ‘Money’ field, when the value is void, is appar-
ently filled with the entry reported in the previous trade. E.g., an account
performed more than 2,500 nearly consecutive trades in day 2011-09-11,
the vast majority of which with random ‘Money’ values.
Figure 6 shows the results for the USD market after the cleaning pro-
cedures. Figure 7 shows the exchange rates for other markets (the choice
is arbitrary and for illustrative purposes): I plot the monthly BTCtoEUR
exchange rate for March 2012 on the left, and the BTCtoGBP rate for April
2013 on the right.
Figure 6: Exchange rate of a sample of USD trades in the merged dataset
after the polishing procedures and the comparison with the public dataset.
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Figure 7: Exchange rate of a sample of trades in EUR (March 2012) and in
GBP (April 2013).
(a) (b)
Notes: the choice of the reported months is purely illustrative. The colors represent
different types of trades: Tibane multi-currency trades (blue), THK mutli-currency
trades (orange), normal trades (green).
2.3.2 Volume comparison with Bitcoincharts data
To get a form of external validation, I compare the daily USD volumes
in the leaked dataset with the data made public by Bitcoincharts.com.
This website provides reliable data and is a benchmark for many studies
on the Bitcoin exchange platforms. The following plots compare USD
denominated volumes aggregated on a daily basis. They represent the
difference of volumes between the leaked and the bitcoincharts dataset,
normalized on the former. The lines represent the daily differences and
their 15 days centered moving average. Figure 8a shows the volume
difference after the deduplication procedure using the method ‘Trade Id’,
but before the cleaning procedure reported in Section 2.2.
The volumes differ only in the months were the ‘THK’ multi-currency
method is implemented. As argued before, the secondary legs of such
trades are missing. It is likely that some of them were in USD, plausi-
bly explaining the missing volumes. Thus, Figure 8a can be interpreted
as if no THK secondary leg were in USD; that is, as a ‘lower bound’ for
USD-denominated volumes traded. Viceversa, Figure 8b plots the vol-
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ume differences one would observe if all the secondary legs - of the THK
trades whose first leg is not in USD - were in USD. This can be considered
as an ‘upper bound’ to USD volumes traded. The plots suggest that this
intuition is correct and that the difference between the Mt. Gox dataset
and the Bitcoincharts data is due only to the missing multi-currency THK
secondary legs. Thus this plot also quantifies the cost in terms of infor-
mation loss due to the misreported sell side for such trades.
Figure 8: Volumes comparison with Bitcoincharts data.
(a) (b)
Notes: the comparison is before performing the dataset sanity checks, using the dedu-
plication method ‘TradeID’. Panel (a) reports the differences between the daily vol-
umes in the leaked dataset and the Bitcoincharts data; Panel (b) reports the ‘upper
bound’ of the USD traded volumes that would be observed if all the missing sec-
ondary THK legs were in USD.
Finally, I remove the primary legs of the ‘THK’ multy-currency trades,
to have a coherent dataset where all the reported trades have both the
buy and the sell side. In Figure 9 I compare how the volume differences
change when including (left) and excluding (right) the ‘THK’ trades, af-
ter implementing the sanity checks in Section 2.2. Note that most of the
‘THK’ removed trades were executed after April 2013.
2.3.3 Comparison with other results in the literature
Last, I identify the trading activity of the users Markus and Willy, and
I report the aggregated amount of bitcoins and fiat currency that they
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Figure 9: Volumes comparison with Bitcoincharts data (II).
(a) (b)
Notes: the comparison is after performing the dataset sanity checks, using the dedu-
plication method ‘TradeID’. Panel (a) reports the difference when the sell sides of
the THK trades are included; Panel (b) is without the THK trades. The differences
concern primarily the months after April 2013.
exchanged according to my deduplication approaches. I compare these
figures with the findings in Gandal, Hamrick, et al., 2018. The results
slightly change depending on the deduplication method used, but are
consistent with those found previously in the literature (see Table 5).
To conclude, this section proves that the results of my deduplication
methods are consistent with those implemented in previous analyses.
Several checks are performed to ensure the quality of the dataset, and
show that my procedure provides a high quality dataset which is consis-
tent with external sources of information largely accepted in the litera-
ture. Further, I merge the leaked dataset with public information on the
Mt. Gox trades, and I provide it in order to ensure reproducibility.
The final dataset I use is deduplicated using the TradeId methodol-
ogy, and all the primary legs of the THK trades, whose secondary leg is
missing, are excluded. It is composed of 14,875,192 rows, for a total of
7,437,596 trades. The vast majority of them are in USD (87.9%) and in
EUR (7.7%), and are executed by 125,755 users.
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Table 5: Aggregate information for the users Markus and Willy
Pairs without THK:
Bitcoins bought by Markus: 302,928.392
Bitcoins sold by Markus: 35,535.441
Dollars spent by Willy: 100,739,634.260
Bitcoins bought by Willy: 237,689.192
TradeId without THK:
Bitcoins bought by Markus: 306,339.336
Bitcoins sold by Markus: 35,867.176
Dollars spent by Willy: 102,710,284.814
Bitcoins bought by Willy: 242,794.122
Pairs with THK:
Bitcoins bought by Markus: 330,994.764
Bitcoins sold by Markus: 35,535.441
Dollars spent by Willy: 108,247,263.292
Bitcoins bought by Willy: 261,437.290
TradeId with THK:
Bitcoins bought by Markus: 335,897.702
Bitcoins sold by Markus: 35,867.176
Dollars spent by Willy: 110,376,397.492
Bitcoins bought by Willy: 266,984.786a
a If the 1,147.948 bitcoins traded by Willy in the last day (removed from the dataset) are
accounted for, I obtain exactly the amount found by Gandal et al.: 268,132.734 bitcoins.
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2.4 The Mt. Gox ecosystem
2.4.1 An economic overview
These paragraphs provide descriptive and qualitative findings on the
evolution in time of some interesting economic indicators of the Mt. Gox
ecosystem. Figure 10 shows the geographical distribution of the users
that performed at least one trade from November 2012 on (as this in-
formation is not available from trades executed previously). The most
represented country is US; Australia, China, Russia, and European coun-
tries also play a prominent role. Figures 11 and 12 show how the average
trade magnitude evolved in time. In Panel (11a) I plot the daily mean
amount of bitcoins per trade, in Panel (11b) the daily mean amount of
dollars exchanged per trade. The first decreases over time, as one would
intuitively expect given the large positive bitcoin price variation. It is
less straightforward, instead, to predict a priori the dynamics of the lat-
ter: Panel (b) shows that the mean amount of dollars exchanged per trade
increased constantly in time. Figure 12 adds further information by plot-
ting their respective quartiles.
Figure 10: Number of active users per country.
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Figure 11: Average traded volume, evolution in time.
(a) (b)
Notes: Panel (a) shows the daily evolution of the mean amount of bitcoins per trade,
while Panel (b) shows the mean amount of Dollars per trade (considering only trades
denominated in USD).
Figure 12: Average traded volume, evolution in time - quartiles.
(a) (b)
Notes: quartiles for (a) the amount of bitcoins per trade, and (b) the amount of Dollars
per trade (considering only trades denominated in USD).
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Figure 13: Heterogeneous behaviors and fat-tailed distributions: rank-
frequency plot for (a) the number of trades (Buy, Sell, Total) and (b) the
days of activity.
(a) (b)
Figure 13 provides some insight on the users’ heterogeneity; follow-
ing the procedure described in Newman (2005), I constructed the rank
frequency plot in Panel (13a) for the trades executed by each user, and in
Panel (13b) for the number of active days of each user. I do not report
the full analysis, but similar results hold for the distributions of Bitcoins
bought and sold by each user, as well as for the fiat money that they
bought and sold.
Finally, Figure 14 represents the ‘daily activity line’ for the first 1.000
users who traded inside the Mt. Gox platform: for each row representing
a user U, column values (that represent days) are white if U was active
during that day, and black if not active. The choice of the sample is illus-
trative.
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An essential feature of the dataset is that it includes the explicit trans-
action costs associated to the legs of each trade. Such additional costs
are relevant for the purpose of the analysis in that they affect the prof-
itabitlity of a trade, and consequently it is necessary to take them into
account also to identify potentially profitable arbitrage actions, which is
the primary purpose of the next chapters.
Due to the inconsistencies found in the leaked dataset and discussed
above, and to overcome the risk that they might affect also the data re-
garding the fees paid by the users, in this section I provide and discuss
a model that calculates the fees a user would theoretically pay given the
fee schedule published by Mt. Gox. Indeed, according to their official
posted scheme, the magnitude of the fees depends on the volume traded
by the user in the last month — i.e., most active users in the recent past
pay less.
Table 6: Mt. Gox posted fee schedule.
Volume (BTCs) Fees Volume (BTCs) Fees
0 to < 100 0.60% 10000 to < 25000 0.30%
100 to < 200 0.55% 25000 to < 50000 0.29%
200 to < 500 0.53% 50000 to < 100000 0.28%
500 to < 1000 0.50% 100000 to < 250000 0.27%
1000 to < 2000 0.46% 250000 to < 500000 0.26%
2000 to < 5000 0.43% > 500000 0.25%
5000 to < 10000 0.40% - -
Notes: discounts are based on the user’s trading volume over the last 720 hours.
Table 6 shows the fee schedule published by Mt. Gox; I could con-
firm that the scheme was valid at least from 16 October 2011 until mid-
February 20139. Discounts were based on the volume of bitcoins traded
by the user over the last 720 hours10 (that is, 30 days).




Figure 15: Empirical fee schedule
Notes: Fees paid per leg, expressed as the percentage of the value of the trade (y-axis).
According to Mt. Gox’s schedule, fees depend on the amount of bitcoins traded by
the user in the last 720 hours (on the x-axis). Color indicates the time of the trade.
The lines of the grid help to graphically delimit the volume bands corresponding to
different discount brackets. Two horizontal red lines help to identify the two time
windows when fees were fixed: 0.65% from 1 April 2011 to 23 June 2011, and 0.3%
from 24 June 2011 to 18 August 2011. Many legs (more than one million) pay no fees,
and a limited number of legs pays fees as low as 0.1 percent or less. In addition, in
some particular circumstances (e.g., Easter and Christmas holidays in 2011 and 2012),
fees were halved, thus explaining some of the values that do not correspond to the
official fee schedule. The plot shows a random sample of N = 100, 000 legs. Note
that a small fraction of trades (around 15,000 over the total of 7.5 million trades) have
fees equal or above 1% and are likely to correspond to misreported data. I explicitly
decided to plot only the legs between 0% and 0.8%.
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I first compare the posted and the real fee schedules. In the Mt. Gox
dataset, transaction costs are reported in two entries: by default bitcoin
buyers were charged with fees in bitcoin, while sellers with fees in fiat
money, but they could also choose how to pay them11. Thus, for each leg








where ‘BitcoinFee’ represents the fees paid on the amount of bitcoins
traded, while ‘MoneyFee’ represents the fees paid on the amount of fiat
money traded.
Figure 15 shows a sample (N = 100, 000) of the empirical fees, focus-
ing on the relationship between the actual transaction costs and the past
volume traded; each dot represents the fees paid on a leg of a trade. By
comparing the posted and the actual schedules, one can see that most of
the data points fall into the expected volume bands, although deviations
exist: first, from 0.40% to 0.20%, many points follow a pattern that cannot
be explained by the posted schedule; second, a non-negligible number of
dots falls below the threshold of 0.20%, suggesting the existence of priv-
ileged users, and a subset of legs is completely exempted from any kind
of fee: Figure 16 reports additional information on them.
For this reason, instead of reverse-engineering the posted schedule, I
take an empirical approach and fit a simple model that predicts the fees
a user would have to pay given his trading history. The fee model is
specified as:
Feei = β0 + β1 · LogVoli + β2 ·VolSmalli + β3 ·VolBigi
+ β4 · LogVoli ·VolSmalli + β5 · LogVoli ·VolBigi




The independent variables have the following meaning:
• LogVol, the natural logarithm of the volume traded in the last 720
hours by the user who submitted the leg associated to the fee;
• VolSmall, a dummy variable equal to 1 if the volume traded in the
last 720 hours is between 100 and 10,000 bitcoins;
• VolBig, a dummy variable equal to 1 if the volume traded in the last
720 hours exceeds 10,000 bitcoins. As it can be seen from Figure 15,
discount factors follow a linear trend with different slopes below
and above the 10,000 bitcoins threshold. This is the reason why I
introduced this dummy variable and the previous one, as well as
their interaction terms with the LogVol variable;
• T0, a dummy variable for trades executed between 1 April 2011
and 23 June 2011;
• T1, a dummy variable for trades executed between 24 June 2011
and 18 August 2011;
• Tholid, a dummy variable for trades executed on ‘special days’:
from 26 December 2011 to 1 January 2012, from 2 to 7 April 2012;
on 9 and 10 November 201212.
Table 7 reports the estimated coefficients and goodness-of-fit indi-
cators. In each specification, the constant term approximates the non-
discounted official fee of 0.6%, and the response variable is negatively
correlated with an increase of the volume traded in the past 720 hours;
as expected, when included in the model, T0 and T1 respectively in-
crease and decrease the constant term by a factor of around 0.16%, while
Tholidhas an even stronger negative effect (around -0.19%). Finally, again
in accordance with the expectations, both β4 and β5 are negative; the first
one is bigger in absolute terms, thus indicating a steeper variation of dis-
counts given the same variation in volume (as can be seen in Figure 15).




Table 7: Fee model for non-zero fees, coefficients fitted with OLS
Dependent variable: Fee as a percentage of the amount traded
Specification
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Intercept 0.638 0.640 0.557 0.559 0.561
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0001)
LogVol -0.030 -0.030 -0.001 -0.001
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
VolSmall -0.107 0.150 0.152
(0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0002)
VolBig -0.284 -0.201 -0.212
(0.0001) (0.0005) (0.0004)
LogVol ∗ VolSmall -0.037 -0.037
(0.0000) (0.0000)








R2 0.516 0.610 0.533 0.598 0.694
Obs. 13083547 13083547 13083547 13083547 13083547
Notes: All variables are significant at the 0.1% level. This is due to the high number
of observations; however, I emphasize that these results are intended not so much to
find significant effects as to predict fees. Observations consist of legs whose fees are
positive and their value is below 1%.
I chose a logarithmic model because the break points for the fee schedule
in Table 6 follow a logarithmic trend, and thus it was straightforward to
consider the estimation on logarithmic volumes. To strengthen the re-
sults, I explored an alternative model using linear volumes; I report the
results in Table 8.
The comparison of the two models shows that the overall pattern is
similar, but in the logarithmic models the coefficients can be interpreted
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with less decimal digits, and the parameters’ variations of signs are less
frequent; in addition to that, in linear models (1) to (3) the intercept is
smaller than expected (0.45%) and the interaction terms β4 and β5 are
close to zero, in contrast with what one would expect. Regarding the ex-
planatory power, the logarithmic model (1) outperforms the same model
with linear volume (R2 = 0.510 versus R2 = 0.097), as well as the estima-
tions (2) and (3). Model (4) and (5) have comparable explanatory power,
but also in that case the logarithmic model has higher R2.
Even though not directly comparable, in the work of Kim (2017) on
the cost advantage of Bitcoin over cross-border ATM transactions the
models for Bitcoin cross-border transaction costs achieve R-squared val-
ues in the order of 0.5 for the time period 2014-2015. Thus, it seems that
cryptocurrency fees can be explained with linear regressions at this order
of magnitude.
Finally, I propose a logit model (Table 9) to estimate the probability
that a leg pay zero fees given user-specific and time-related variables:
here the binary dependent variable is 1 if the trader paid some fee, and 0






= β0 + β1 · LogVoli + β2 · Bitcoinsi + β3 ·Datei+
+β4 ·AnomalousDaysi + β5 · EarlyAdoptersi+
+β6 ·AnomalousUsersi + β7 ·Matchersi+
+β8 ·Markusi + β9 ·Willyi + εi
(2.3)
and the independent variables have the following meaning:
• Bitcoins: the amount of bitcoins traded;
• Date: date of the trade execution;
• EarlyAdopters: dummy variable equal to 1 for the first 16, 000 user
IDs in sequential order;
• AnomalousDays: dummy variable equal to 1 for the days with an
anomalous presence of zero fees trades;
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Table 8: Fee model for non-zero fees, coefficients fitted with OLS (linear
alternative, not used)
Dependent variable: Fee as a percentage of the amount traded
Specification
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Intercept 0.454 0.456 0.469 0.559 0.560
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0001)
LinVol -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000





LinVol ∗ VolSmall -0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)








R2 0.103 0.197 0.144 0.585 0.682
Obs. 13083547 13083547 13083547 13083547 13083547
Notes: All variables are significant at 0.1% level. This is due to the high number of
observations; however, I emphasize that these results are intended not so much to
find significant effects as to predict fees. Observations consist of legs whose fees are
positive and their value is below 1%.
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Figure 16: Patterns of waived fees.
(a)
(b)
Notes: Panel (a) reports the distribution of the legs whose associated fees are zero, as a function
of time and user ID (the latter on a logarithmic scale, to focus on low IDs). Buy (red) and sell
(green) orders differ by color. Many interesting patterns emerge: first, two users with low ID did
not pay fees over extended time periods; moreover, they account for ∼ 1, 000, 000 zero-fee legs
over the total of ∼ 1, 700, 000 zero-fee legs. Second, during some days (especially on 19, 20, and
21 December 2011; 12, 13, and 14 April 2013; 28 and 29 November 2013) there were anomalous
increases in trade legs with zero fees. Possible explanations include special events, such as a
temporary downtime of Mt. Gox on 11 April 2013, and the exchange rate surpassing 1,000 $/BTC
for the first time on 27 November 2013. In both cases, the number of zero-fee trade legs increases
shortly afterwards. Panel (b) depicts the daily bitcoin volume traded and the exchange rate in
USD (the latter on a logarithmic scale). Observe from both panels that many users with low IDs
seem to have coordinately executed buy orders from August to around November 2012, and then
exclusively sell orders in the the days preceding the Bitcoin price peak. The plot shows a random
sample ofN = 200, 000 legs.
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Table 9: Fee model for zero fees, coefficients fitted with the logistic regres-
sion
Dependent variable: Dichotomous variable accounting for the presence of fees
Specification
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Intercept 5.104 4.429 1.670 3.246 3.257
(0.0033) (0.0046) (0.0019) (0.0034) (0.0073)


















pseudo−R2 0.157 0.228 0.109 0.472 0.676
Obs. 14875192 14875192 14875192 14875192 14875192
Notes: All variables are significant at 0.1% level. This is due to the high number of
observations; however, I emphasize that these results are intended not so much to
find significant effects as to predict fees.
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• AnomalousUsers: dummy variable equal to 1 for the users whose ID
is smaller than 16,000, as they performed an unusually high num-
ber of actions with zero fees;
• Matchers: dummy variable equal to 1 for the legs whose comple-
mentary leg was executed by one of the aforementioned ‘Anoma-
lous Users’;
• Willy: dummy variable for the User ID associated to Willy;
• Markus: dummy variable for the Markus’ User ID not associated to
manipulations;
Models (1) to (3) have very low pseudo-R2; the largest part of the ex-
planatory power of the model is associated with the variables that con-
tain information on the Users IDs. Coefficients β1, β2, and β3 are very
small, suggesting that their effect is significant but limited. As expected,
instead, the variables AnomalousDays and AnomalousUsers are associ-
ated with negative and high coefficients. The probability that fees are
paid decreases for the users defined as early adopters. Unexpectedly, the
variable Matchers is associated to higher probability that the order might




In this Chapter I mine the leaked history of trades on Mt. Gox to detect the trian-
gular arbitrage activity conducted within the platform. I implement an algorithm
to detect the arbitrage actions, then I identify the arbitrageurs and describe their
behavior: the availability of user identifiers per trade allows to observe the his-
torical record of each investor. I begin by showing that a considerable difference
appears between users when indicators of expertise are taken into account, e.g.
whether they conducted arbitrage in a single or in multiple markets. Using this
element as a proxy for trade ability, I find that arbitrage actions performed by non
expert users are on average non profitable when transaction costs are included (in
a mechanism whose dynamics recall the monetary illusion phenomenon), while
skilled investors conduct arbitrage at a positive and statistically significant pre-
mium. Next, I exploit within-user (across hours and markets) variation and doc-
ument that expert users make profits on arbitrage by reacting quickly to plausible
exogenous variations on the official exchange rates. As a robustness check, I com-
plement the analysis with further indicators of expertise, and I show that results
are consistent. A small subset of arbitrageurs is responsible for the vast major-
ity of the arbitrage actions and systematically yields higher profits: I argue that
such differences are chiefly due to a better ability of the latter in incorporating
information on the exchange rates volatility, which eventually results in a better
timing choice at small time scale intervals. The results support empirically the
financial literature stating that arbitrageurs are few and sophisticated users.
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3.1 Introduction
Arbitrage, the simultaneous purchase and sale of the same asset in two
different markets for a risk-free profit, is a key concept in economics and
finance. The concept is so important because the absence of arbitrage
opportunities is a necessary condition for market equilibrium (Harri-
son and Kreps, 1979). Intuitively, whenever an arbitrage opportunity
emerges, some arbitrageur will exploit it until the mechanism of sup-
ply and demand has eliminated the price difference. This ‘law of one
price’ makes the no-arbitrage principle a powerful solution concept in
financial theory. It is a common foundation of the Capital Asset Pricing
Model (Sharpe, 1964; Lintner, 1965; Mossin, 1966), the arbitrage pricing
theory (S. A. Ross, 1976), the theory of option pricing (R. C. Merton, 1973;
Black and Scholes, 1973), the efficient market hypothesis (Fama, 1970),
and many other theories.
In practice, arbitrage is never risk-free. Since purchase and sale are
not executed in an atomic1 transaction across markets, the arbitrageur
bears the risk of incomplete execution or concurrent price changes. More-
over, the asset traded in both markets may not be exactly the same, and
there may be political risk premia if the markets operate in different ju-
risdictions (Aliber, 1973). These risks, in addition to other certain trans-
action costs, impose a lower bound on the price difference needed for
profitable arbitrage. The orthodox economic response, in line with the
efficient market hypothesis, is to imagine that many small arbitrageurs
each take an infinitesimally small portion of the risk (and hence profit).
However, Shleifer and Vishny (1997) challenge exactly this view in their
landmark work on practical arbitrage in financial markets:
“[A]rbitrage is conducted by relatively few professional, highly
specialized investors who combine their knowledge with re-
sources of outside investors to take large positions.” (p. 36)
The authors support this claim by referring to the bounded rationality of
many investors, “millions of little traders are typically not the ones who
1Incidentally, this may change with decentralized exchanges on programmable cryp-
tocurrency platforms.
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have the knowledge and information to engage in arbitrage.” (p. 36)
While this is plausible and likely cross-checked by expert market par-
ticipants, the evidence remains anecdotal. Most surprising is the fact
that 20 years after these statements were published, I still could not find
any academic paper that provides an empirical answer to the question
‘Who are the arbitrageurs?’2, despite the topic being perceived as an is-
sue of compelling relevance in current research (Gromb and Vayanos,
2010). Indeed, in the best case scenario, a comprehensive answer to this
question may not only reconcile economic theory with the reality on fi-
nancial markets, but also refine the assumptions about arbitrageurs in
theoretical studies that derive optimal trading strategies in the presence
of arbitrageurs (Moallemi, Park, and Van Roy, 2012, and the works cited
therein), and ultimately contribute to understanding why persistent lim-
itations to arbitrage emerge.
In this work I seek to provide a partial answer from a very singu-
lar market, namely the exchange market between convertible currency
and cryptocurrency in the early years of Bitcoin, by mining the leaked
dataset of individual and identified trades from Mt. Gox. The choice of
market and time is opportunistic. Focusing on the triangular arbitrage
activity, I first quantify its magnitude within the Mt. Gox platform, and
then I introduce proxy measures for the trading ability of the investors,
to show that the expert users conduct more profitable actions, and are
more responsive to exogenous shocks on the official exchange rate: a sta-
tistically significant relation exists between the investors’ expertise and
the profitability of arbitrage. my results confirm the anecdotal evidence
that arbitrageurs are few and sophisticated users.
The contributions of this work are manifold. First, by investigating
the dynamics of the Mt. Gox platform, I enrich the existing literature that
focuses on the economic role of cryptocurrency exchanges in the Bitcoin
ecosystem (e.g., Moore, Christin, and Szurdi, 2018; Griffin and Shams,
2020). My analyses provide several insights on the Mt. Gox market struc-
ture and on its internal trading mechanisms, contributing in this sense
2Of course, I simply may have missed the relevant source and would be grateful for
pointers from readers.
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more broadly to a better understanding of the microstructure of the cryp-
tocurrency markets. Besides this, I provide a detailed estimation of the
explicit transaction costs borne by the Mt. Gox users when trading within
the platform (while authors previously mainly focused on the analysis
of the fees paid for transactions on the Bitcoin network; see e.g. Möser
and Böhme, 2015; Dimitri, 2019; Easley, O’Hara, and Basu, 2019). Fur-
ther, to preprocess the leaked dataset I propose my own deduplication
method, that grounds upon (and partially improves) existing methods
introduced in the literature (Scaillet, Treccani, and Trevisan, 2017; Feder,
Gandal, Hamrick, and Moore, 2018; Gandal, Hamrick, et al., 2018), and
whose validity is documented extensively by comparisons with external
sources of information.
Second, the availability of user-specific labels enables the design of
novel methodologies to investigate arbitrage, based on the analysis of
identified sequences of trades. Indeed, previous empirical research fo-
cuses mainly on assessing the validity of consolidated theories on arbi-
trage (e.g., Roll and S. Ross, 1980; Malkiel, 2003), or on detecting vio-
lations and anomalies arising in contrast with them (e.g., Lamont and
R. H. Thaler, 2003a); however, most of these works are based on ag-
gregate information and do not tackle the topic from a bottom up ap-
proach. Other studies do exploit transaction-level data, but lacking the
user identifiers, and thus focus primarily on inferring information on the
market (C. M. Lee and Ready, 1991) or on the type of trader, rather than
on the individuals features (C. M. Lee and Radhakrishna, 2000). The
work by Wang et al. (2021), closest to my investigation both in intentions
and method, shows clearly that the cryptocurrency ecosystem unveiled
unprecedented opportunities in quantitative finance analysis: the au-
thors identify the cyclic arbitrages executed in Decentralized Exchanges
(DEXs) within the Ethereum ecosystem. However, the pseudonimity
guaranteed by the Ethereum protocol limits the possibility to trace users
exactly. In my framework, instead, each leg of all trades is labeled by
a user identifier, allowing to trace the sequences of actions executed by
the same user and to identify potential links among them. Since in Mt.
Gox the bitcoins could be traded within the same exchange against dif-
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ferent fiat currencies, my method detects exactly the actions of arbitrage
as pairs of legs satisfying the textbook properties of arbitrage, that is, two
legs (from different trades) executed by the same user, in different cur-
rency markets, and within a reasonably small neighborhood of time and
volume. It is precisely in this sense that I intend the term ‘exactly’: the
matching legs are identified based on time delay and volume differences,
which are known, and conditional on being executed by the same user,
another condition which is known. This crucial aspect gives me the un-
precedented possibility to identify completely the triangular arbitrage ac-
tivity exploited within the platform, not as an aggregate but at the level
of the individual arbitrage actions executed. To the best of my knowl-
edge, this work represents the first attempt to use this approach in the
literature; thus, my work provides a contribution also by proposing new
algorithms for quantitative finance who exploit micro level information
and whose aim is to investigate the individual trading strategies. Note-
worthy, this method is also easily extendable to other contexts requiring
a pattern identification through user identifiers.
Third, and most importantly, by identifying and describing the char-
acteristics of the individual investors who conduct arbitrage in the pres-
ence of risk, my method provides empirical evidence that helps answer-
ing broader questions on the nature of arbitrage. The closest papers
I could find that investigate the user behavior in financial markets us-
ing user level information chiefly focus on the analysis of the individual
traders choices, in order to profile investors in terms of risk attitude (e.g.,
Clark-Murphy and Soutar, 2005; Kourtidis, Šević, and Chatzoglou, 2011;
De Bortoli et al., 2019). However, no previous study investigated exhaus-
tively the research questions that motivated my work. This paper thus
aims at filling, at least partially, an existing gap between the theoretical
description of the arbitrage activity and the practical evidence from real
markets. Once the arbitrage activity is identified, I analyse and describe
empirically, rather than anecdotally or using aggregate data, the individ-
ual trading patterns: I show that only a restricted group of users (N =
440) performs at least one arbitrage action, and an even smaller group of
sophisticated users is responsible for the vast majority of trades; the users
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in such subset are mostly active in multiple currency markets, rather
than in a single one, they conduct complex strategies (i.e., metaorders),
and consciously control their aggressiveness on the market (by prefer-
ring limit to market orders). Most of all, the arbitrage activity of such so-
phisticated investors is profitable, both on average and after controlling
for user fixed effects, though some of their actions yields losses. Cru-
cially, I acknowledge instead that the arbitrage activity attributable to
the non sophisticated users is on average non profitable when transac-
tion costs are included, and that it constitutes a small fraction of the total
arbitrage activity identified. This raises a relevant conceptual considera-
tion: while a strict definition of arbitrage foresees the execution of such
actions only for profit, arbitrageurs accept that they can incur losses, i.e.,
expected payoffs positive with probability smaller than one, even under
fundamentally riskless conditions (Kondor, 2009). However, in this con-
text the non expert users systematically incur losses when the transaction
costs are taken into account, and even if some of them are actually exe-
cuting actions on average positive, thus conducting correctly arbitrage
according to the textbook definition, their contribution is negligible in
terms of number and volume with respect to the total activity: arbitrage
is carried mostly by few and specialized users. I thus conclude that the
investors can be classified into in three categories, the non-arbitrageurs,
the non-expert arbitrageurs, and the expert ones, the latter two groups
being characterized by specific distinctive patterns which I describe in
detail.
I stress again the importance of the user identifiers for my analysis.
Not only the methodology is based on algorithms that exploit them to
capture pairs of legs likely forming arbitrage actions; their role is so es-
sential also as the devised identification strategy is based on the use of
user fixed effects, that allow to rule out the possibility that differences in
profitability might be influenced by unobservable user-specific ability.
In summary, in this paper I identify exactly the triangular arbitrage
activity and the users who conduct it, and I provide the first form of
empirical evidence to a relevant issue which up to now was only ac-
knowledged anecdotally: who are the arbitrageurs? The answer to this
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question is relevant in the literature and could help reducing the gap that
currently exists between theoretical and practical arbitrage. I point out
that my findings may be contingent to this specific market, and that it is
not trivial to extend such results to other financial markets, both for the
uniqueness of the exchange platform itself and for the specific features
that characterize the cryptocurrency market as a whole. Nonetheless, I
believe that the general picture I describe reflects well also the features
of practical arbitrage in a traditional financial market.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 3.2 I
provide some context on the cryptocurrency exchanges, and especially
on the Mt. Gox platform. In Section 3.3 I describe the methodology im-
plemented to identify the triangular arbitrage activity and to measure
its profitability; I then report descriptive statistics on the users’ trading
patterns heterogeneity. In Section 3.4 I further explore such differences
and provide preliminary evidence of the relationship between the user
trade ability, captured by user-specific proxies of expertise, and the prof-
itability of arbitrage. Next, in Section 3.5 I investigate the responsiveness
of arbitrageurs to plausible exogenous variations of the official exchange
rates, and show that the expert traders react better to sharp variations
(in terms of profitability of arbitrage). In Section 3.6 I discuss my find-
ings. Appendices A.1, A.2, A.3 provide additional robustness checks,
while Appendix A.4 outlines a description of the arbitrage activity on
the major currency market (i.e., the EUR/USD market) taken individu-
ally. Appendix A.5 reports supplemental figures and tables.
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3.2 Background
3.2.1 Arbitrage in cryptocurrency markets
Arbitrage is a founding and unifying concept in financial economics3. It
conveys a simple yet powerful message, with vast implications on the
theory of asset pricing: assuming that agents are rational and prefer
more to less, the no-arbitrage condition states that a portfolio yielding
non negative payoffs must have a non negative cost. Excluding the case
with zero prices, this statement is equivalent to say that a unique vector
of strictly positive state prices, defining unambiguously the price of all
assets, indeed exists. When this condition is not met, then there must
be a portfolio yielding non negative payoffs without requiring any ini-
tial investment - that is, a profitable and riskless investment, which is
precisely the definition of arbitrage opportunity (S. Ross, 1976; S. Ross,
1978; Varian, 1987; Dybvig and S. Ross, 1989).
A more recent stream of research reports however evidence that mar-
ket anomalies arise in the form of persistent mispricings (Lawrence Har-
ris and Gurel, 1986; Froot and Dabora, 1999; Lamont and R. H. Thaler,
2003b), despite the presence of sophisticated investors seeking to exploit
such opportunities: arbitrage entails risks and costs and de facto it is of-
ten limited. E.g., in De Long et al. (1990) irrational noise traders can oper-
ate on an optimistic or pessimistic bias, creating a risk that prevents arbi-
trageurs from exploiting mispricings and causing price divergences from
fundamental values even in the absence of fundamental risk; Shleifer and
Vishny (1997) show that when arbitrageurs operate in a principal agency
relationship, principals may mistakenly evaluate the arbitrageurs on the
base of their performance and refuse to provide the required capital, es-
pecially in the extreme circumstances where additional capital would be
3In the words of S. Ross (1978), “it is surprising how much of what is central to modern
finance is based solely on the arbitrage principles embodied in the basic valuation theorem”
(p. 471). Many of the most influential works in finance ground on and contributed to the
development and formalization of this fundamental concept. E.g., Modigliani and M. H.
Miller, 1958; Black and Scholes, 1973; R. C. Merton, 1973; S. A. Ross, 1976; S. Ross, 1978;
Cox and S. A. Ross, 1976; Cox, S. A. Ross, and Rubinstein, 1979; Harrison and Kreps, 1979;
Harrison and Pliska, 1981; Kreps, 1981; Delbaen and Schachermayer, 1994.
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most needed. R. Merton (1987) points out that markets are not friction-
less and investors need to account for additional costs (in capital require-
ments, entry, strategy implementation, non-istantaneous diffusion of in-
formation)4.
The nascent cryptocurrency market represents a promising area of re-
search in this sense, as its innovative and unconventional market design
provides an alternative standpoint to assess the validity of established
methods and theory from traditional finance. Bitcoin, the most promi-
nent cryptocurrency in terms of market capitalization5, is a decentral-
ized system which records transfers between parties denominated in bit-
coin (units of cryptocurrency) in a public ledger. By contrast, exchanges
are centralized entities in the Bitcoin ecosystem that provide interfaces
to conventional payment systems by allowing its users to trade units
of cryptocurrency against fiat money (Böhme et al., 2015). Typical ex-
changes manage and match orders in a private limit order book, and up-
date their customers’ account balances in cryptocurrency or fiat money
when trades are executed. As a result, exchanges are the place where
price formation occurs. Trades on exchanges are kept in a private ledger
and have no effect on the public ledger unless users withdraw cryp-
tocurrency from the exchange to a wallet under their own control. Most
exchanges publish aggregate information about prices and volume, but
concerns about data quality exist since few cryptocurrency exchanges are
regulated and audited by the standards of conventional financial mar-
kets (Underwood, 2018; Anderson et al., 2018).
I describe here two strategies to exploit arbitrage that are relevant
for the cryptocurrency markets and for my context: arbitrage across ex-
changes and within the same exchange. In the first case, intuitively, an
arbitrageur observes a price difference between two exchanges, buys a
bitcoin at the cheaper place, then transfers it to the more expensive place,
where the bitcoin is sold for a profit. The transfer of bitcoins between
exchanges would be observable in the public ledger and could be as-
4A survey covering the literature on the limits of arbitrage can be found in Barberis and
R. Thaler (2003) and in Gromb and Vayanos (2010).
5Around 700 billion $ at the time of writing (according to Coinmarketcap.com https:
//bit.ly/3iXhZnj).
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sociated in time with differences in published prices, thereby generating
evidence for arbitrage. Indeed, the first approach I devised to detect arbi-
trage involved the identification of user identities in the Bitcoin network
(see, e.g., Meiklejohn et al. (2013)) and the analysis of the on-chain bit-
coin flows between exchanges and their users. However, bitcoin trans-
actions are too slow and (at times) too costly for this strategy. Instead,
arbitrageurs must maintain a stock of both bitcoins and fiat money in
accounts at each exchange in order to react quickly to price differences.
The funds can be balanced at a lower frequency and not necessarily cor-
related with observable price differences. Therefore, while arbitrage op-
portunities are measurable from published data, there is no way to iden-
tify arbitrage transactions or arbitrageurs from the public ledger, and in
this regard cryptocurrency exchanges do not offer researchers any ad-
vantage over foreign exchange markets. This fact was already mentioned
in the first attempt to study arbitrage in Bitcoin (Petrov and Schufla,
2013). Interestingly, this term paper documents that market participants
actively explored arbitrage opportunities in spring 20136 by pointing to
two websites that track suitable price differences (see Figure 37 in Ap-
pendix A.5), and one open source software trading bot that exploits ar-
bitrage opportunities. In the simplest case, this strategy of arbitrage re-
quires an investor to open accounts at two exchanges; consequently, to
identify arbitrage activity, information from the private ledgers of both
the two exchanges involved is needed.
Besides this form of two-point arbitrage, the second relevant strategy
is triangular arbitrage: most of the cryptocurrency exchanges offer the
possibility to trade bitcoins (or other cryptoassets) against more than one
fiat currency. Using bitcoin as a vehicle currency, investors can compare
the implied relative price of traditional currencies to the official exchange
rate and look for the presence of mispricings. I restrict my analysis to the
second strategy, as this form of arbitrage has the advantage that informa-
tion required to detect the arbitrage activity is entirely contained in the
private ledger of a single exchange.
6See also, e.g., https://bit.ly/2GXhSer and https://bit.ly/2FwHNJk for
anecdotal evidence.
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3.2.2 Relation to Prior Work
Figure 17: Related work in temporal and market context

















H. Dong and W. Dong, 2015
Smith, 2016
Badev and M. Chen, 2014
Yu and Zhang, 2018
Pichl and Kaizoji, 2017
Krückeberg and Scholz, 2020
Reynolds et al., 2018
Pieters and Vivanco, 2015
Pieters and Vivanco, 2017
Nan and Kaizoji, 2019
Hirano et al., 2018
Bistarelli et al., 2019
Kroeger and Sarkar, 2017
Makarov and Schoar, 2020
Hattori and Ishida, 2018
Shynkevich, 2020
S. Lee, El Meslmani, and Switzer, 2020
Hautsch, Scheuch, and Voigt, 2018
Notes: Bitcoin price in USD on log scale. Black shaded works focus on triangular
arbitrage. The gray ones study other forms of arbitrage within the Bitcoin ecosystem.
The body of prior works applying financial econometrics to time se-
ries data from cryptocurrency exchanges is vast and not easy to navi-
gate7. When interpreting it, it is important to keep in mind that most
studies use rather short and often non-overlapping samples. The ma-
turing market for cryptocurrencies has exhibited extraordinary volatility
as it transitioned through several epochs. Consequently, the time-series
contain multiple structural breaks, which make it hard, if not impossible,
to draw conclusions that generalize to the cryptocurrency as a whole. To
illustrate this, I depict in Figure 17 the sample periods of the works dis-
cussed in the following, along with the bitcoin price in USD on a loga-
7e. g., Glaser et al., 2014; Garcia et al., 2014; Brandvold et al., 2015; Yermack, 2015; Che-
ung, Roca, and Su, 2015; Ciaian, Rajcaniova, and Kancs, 2016; Athey et al., 2016; Bouri,
Azzi, and Dyhrberg, 2016; Katsiampa, 2017; Wheatley et al., 2018; Dyhrberg, Foley, and
Svec, 2018.
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rithmic scale: this accounts best for the order of magnitude differences
between epochs. I restrict my review to focused studies of arbitrage
opportunities and the exploration of market imperfections. The latter
are relevant for my method because they inform about transaction costs,
which constrain the exploitability of apparent arbitrage opportunities.
Triangular arbitrage in the Bitcoin ecosystem has been widely inves-
tigated by several authors: the early years of Bitcoin trading, which are
relevant for my work, are covered by H. Dong and W. Dong (2015) and
Smith (2016). The former test the bitcoin market for the presence of
triangular arbitrage opportunities between the main cryptocurrency ex-
changes and the spot currency markets, and exploit price decomposition
methods to study to what extent bitcoin behaves as a currency or as a
financial asset. They find evidence of persistent price deviations, and
conclude that the observed arbitrage stickiness can be explained only if
users treat bitcoin as a financial asset rather than as a currency. The lat-
ter focuses on Mt. Gox aggregate data, and besides showing that shocks
in that market do not affect rates in conventional venues, the author ex-
ploits the implied exchange rates in the market to conclude that bitcoin
has gold-like (rather than currency-like) properties. He also suggests
that there must exist a group of investors who enforce price convergence
through their activity, given the degree of efficiency observed in the mar-
ket. Pichl and Kaizoji (2017) and Reynolds et al. (2018) study triangular
arbitrage in a similar epoch, between 2013 and 2017: they both exploit
data from Bitcoincharts.com against daily currency spot rates, and find
evidence of unexploited arbitrage opportunities. The former investigate
triangular arbitrage without considering transaction costs and find un-
exploited opportunities especially in the Chinese market, while the lat-
ter report that in the bitcoin exchanges in exam the persistent mispricings
arise only when Bitcoin is used as a vehicle currency, while no deviations
from parity arise when considering the rate implied between traditional
fiat currencies. Pieters and Vivanco (2015) observe that, from January to
December 2014, there are triangular arbitrage opportunities between dif-
ferent exchanges on the USD and EUR markets. As a noteworthy detail,
they remark that the exchange rate for the Argentinian pesos (ARS) on
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Local Bitcoins, a peer-to-peer exchange, is closer to the ARS black mar-
ket exchange rate than to the official one. Related to that, Makarov and
Schoar (2020) and Yu and Zhang (2018) report evidence of unexploited
arbitrage opportunities and suggest that capital controls played an es-
sential role in causing market frictions. Hirano et al. (2018) deploy ma-
chine learning techniques to test the Efficient Market Hypothesis in the
Bitcoin market, showing that information inefficiencies arise in the form
of triangular arbitrage opportunities, especially in minor currency mar-
kets. Finally, Nan and Kaizoji (2019) analyse triangular arbitrage on the
EUR/USD/BTC currency markets against the EUR/USD FX spot mar-
ket using FX futures contracts to hedge risk, and show that arbitrage is a
competitive strategy.
Beside this, also arbitrage on the same rate but across markets (two-
point arbitrage) is well investigated. Empirical studies obtain similar
conclusions on the presence of arbitrage opportunities and agree that
price deviations, even in different time epochs, emerge and are persis-
tent (Badev and M. Chen, 2014; Pieters and Vivanco, 2017; Kroeger and
Sarkar, 2017; Krückeberg and Scholz, 2020); the evidence of mispric-
ings across markets is found also in works proposing theoretical models
on arbitrage which are fitted on empirical data (Hautsch, Scheuch, and
Voigt, 2018; Bistarelli et al., 2019). Other recent studies focus instead on
the nascent futures market for Bitcoin: Hattori and Ishida (2018), Shynke-
vich (2020), and S. Lee, El Meslmani, and Switzer (2020) obtain partially
contrasting findings on the efficiency of such markets (specifically, the
first two sources find evidence of efficiency in the markets; the disagree-
ment with the tenor of most other literature can be attributed to the time
window and the fact that the futures market operates in a single geo-
graphical area). For completeness, I mention that other studies inves-
tigate more broadly arbitrage in the cryptocurrency market (e.g., Gan-
dal and Halaburda, 2014; Fischer, Krauss, and Deinert, 2019; Leung and
Nguyen, 2019; Crépellière and Zeisberger, 2020).
In summary, based on heterogeneous methods and studying differ-
ent periods in time with data of different frequency, the literature pretty
consistently reports unexploited arbitrage opportunities in cryptocur-
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rency markets. This does not imply that arbitrage does not happen, but
might rather indicate that the costs and risks of arbitrageurs are under-
estimated. Anecdotal evidence from forums, the existence of web-based
arbitrage tools, and code repositories for trading bots indicate that arbi-
trage does happen (Petrov and Schufla, 2013).
3.2.3 The Mt. Gox exchange and the leaked data set
All the above-reviewed studies have in common that they analyze ag-
gregated price (and sometimes volume) time series. My approach differs
in that I use individual-level data from the internal ledger of a major
exchange, Mt. Gox. The availability of such micro-information is of re-
markable relevance: it allows to isolate trends specific to focused groups
of traders, as e.g. the arbitrageurs.
Mt. Gox played a prominent role during the early years of Bitcoin:
established in 2010, it was the first cryptocurrency exchange and domi-
nated market with around 80-90% of total trading volume until late 2012.
It was structured as an order-driven market based on a continuous two
sided auction, and formally without any designated specialists. The first
competitors entered the market within a short time delay: Bitstamp and
BTC-e in mid-2011, BTC China at the end of 2011. Other exchange ser-
vices entered the market in the following months, and most of them were
shut down after a brief period of activity (Moore and Christin, 2013;
Ceruleo, 2014).
Since the beginning of Spring 2013, a series of events gradually un-
dermined the Mt. Gox credibility8, and customers started experiencing
delays when withdrawing fiat money9. Consequently, the volume traded
811 March 2013: Mt. Gox temporarily suspends bitcoin deposits after hard fork. https:
//bit.ly/2GWPklj;
11 April 2013: Mt. Gox went down after unexpected increase in the trading activ-
ity. https://bit.ly/3lEuSUW; 2 May 2013: Coinlab files a lawsuit against Mt. Gox
https://bit.ly/3duT755; 14 May 2013: the Department of Homeland Security is-
sues a seizure warrant for an account owned by a Mt. Gox’s U.S. subsidiary. https:
//bit.ly/3k0yhwV; 5 August 2013: Mt. Gox announces significant losses due to cred-
iting deposits. https://bit.ly/317TA8n.
918 April 2013: users point out withdrawal delays. https://bit.ly/3lHAyO7; 4
July 2013: Mt. Gox resumes withdrawals halted on 20 June. https://bit.ly/3doQxxH,
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in Mt. Gox decreased significantly in the following months, and the bit-
coins started to be traded at a large premium in Mt. Gox10: in Spring
2013 the competitors of Mt. Gox had already gained a consistent share of
the market, pushing Mt. Gox to just under 60% in the summer of 2013.
(See Figure 2 in Chapter 1 for market share over time.) The exchange
stopped withdraws at once on 7 February 2014, and filed for bankruptcy
two weeks later. The former CEO was arrested after criminal charges of
fraud and embezzlement in 2015, and found guilty of falsifying data in
2019. Exchange closure is a common phenomenon in the cryptocurrency
space, and a source of concern for investors, as witnessed by the survival
analysis of 80 exchanges in Moore, Christin, and Szurdi (2018).
The main dataset was leaked to the public in 2014 as a series of CSV
files. They contain around 7.5 million trades executed in between 1 April
2011 and 30 November 2013; each trade is composed of two buy and
sell legs, reported as separate rows; some information is trade-specific
(trade identifier, date of execution, amount of bitcoins exchanged), while
other variables are leg-specific (buy or sell type, user identifier, trans-
action costs paid); further information on the variables is provided in
Chapter 2. The vast majority (87.9%) of trades are in USD, followed by
EUR (7.7%)11. Figure 18 visualizes selected indicators on how Mt. Gox’s
user base evolved over time, reaching a total of more than 125,000 at
the end of 2013. The plots outline intuitively that the peaks of interest
towards the cryptoasset (Panel a) and of activity within in the market
(Panel b) correspond with periods of exponential growth of the bitcoin
price; Panel c sketches the presence of trading patterns across investors
who entered in the market in similar epochs: early users tended to oper-
ate in the market as sellers, while those that entered from August 2011 to
late 2012 are in large part buyers.
I highlight a relevant point for my analysis: whilst the dataset covers
a longer period of time, I restrict my sample by excluding the trades exe-
https://bit.ly/3lEvPfY.
10See https://bit.ly/2FshVy6.
11From September 2011 on, users could trade bitcoins also in exchange for EUR, CAD,
GBP, CHF, RUB, AUD, SEK, DKK, HKD, PLN, CNY, SGD, TBH, NZD, JPY (https://
bit.ly/314a5Cg).
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cuted after March 2013, due to the increasing difficulties reported by the
users from April 2013 on in managing withdrawal operations and to the
other facts documented above. The total users active from April 2011 to
March 2013 are approximately 72,000, and the trades are around 5.5 mil-
lion. Note also that the sample is further restricted, as possibility to trade
in currencies other than USD was introduced in September 2011: thus,
as Figure 18 shows, the time window considered also coincides with an
epoch of constant activity within the exchange platform, and with linear
growth rate of the new registered users.
The dataset has been widely analyzed by a number of prior works,
which explore research questions that fall apart from arbitrage: e.g., the
presence of metaorder executions (Donier and Bonart, 2015), unusual
price jumps in the BTC/USD exchange rate (Scaillet, Treccani, and Tre-
visan, 2017), the effects of distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks on
the trading activity (Feder, Gandal, Hamrick, and Moore, 2018), the im-
pact of suspicious activity in the Mt. Gox exchange that likely engaged
price manipulation (Gandal, Hamrick, et al., 2018, and W. Chen et al.,
2019, the latter through a network science approach), and herding be-
havior (Haryanto, Subroto, and Ulpah, 2019).
In summary, the dataset is well researched and largely accepted. This,
along with my own comparisons to external aggregate information re-
ported in Chapter 2, support its validity and authenticity (and addresses
the concerns that may arise to a cautious reader as the source of the
dataset is anonymous and there is no way to utterly verify its correct-
ness)12. Moreover, according to The Guardian13, several members of the
bitcoin community claimed to have found their own transactions in the
dataset. Finally, facts established in the court case against the former Mt.
Gox CEO seem to explain patterns in the dataset14.
I rest on the work of Gandal, Hamrick, et al. (2018), Feder, Gandal,
12Comparisons refer to the data published by Bitcoincharts.com. In addition, as in Scail-
let, Treccani, and Trevisan (2017), I match my data with an aggregated dataset published
by Mt. Gox. The advantage is twofold: I further assess the validity of the leaked dataset,
and I collect additional trade-specific information contained only in the latter dataset, i.e.,
which legs are aggressive (market) orders. Further details are discussed in the Appendix.
13https://bit.ly/2Iu77Rk
14This statement is based on personal communication. I have not read the Japanese files.
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Notes: Panel (a) shows the growth of registered users in relation to the bitcoin price
(the latter on a logarithmic scale). Panel (b) shows the number of daily active users.
The brown vertical line indicates the date of introduction of the multi-currency trad-
ing; the gray shaded area represents the area excluded by the analysis. Panel (c)
shows a scatterplot where each dot represents a user position on the x-axis by the
first day of activity on Mt. Gox and on the y-axis by the total number of trades; color
indicates the fraction of buy actions.
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Hamrick, and Moore (2018), and Scaillet, Treccani, and Trevisan (2017) to
pre-process and clean the original leaked dataset. This stage chiefly con-
sists in finding duplicate rows and in identifying (and correcting, when
possible) misreported data. The details are described in Chapter 2. It
is worth noting that my aggregation technique differs from the above
reference in that I aggregate the trades belonging to the same user oc-
curring within the same second. Put it differently, I assume that such
actions belong to the same executed order, in compliance with the oper-
ating principle of the Mt. Gox filling mechanism15. Order speed analyses
on other cryptocurrency exchanges reveal that a one-second time scale is
suitable to measure order execution delays16; traditional financial mar-
kets show much shorter latencies (see, e.g., Budish, Cramton, and Shim,
2015; Hasbrouck and Saar, 2013; A. A. Kirilenko and Lamacie, 2015).
Finally, a comment on research ethics and data privacy stands to rea-
son. The internal ledger of Mt. Gox contains data that, in principle, can
be linked to natural persons by matching it with other records. More-
over, the users appearing in this dataset had no expectation that their
individual trades will become public. I therefore take utmost care that
none of my analyses singles out users that have not been singled out in
other work (which I always document with a proper citation). Specifi-
cally, I map all user identifiers in the dataset to a consecutive sequence of
integers, preserving the order but not the numbers. Therefore, user iden-
tifiers in my figures should not be directly related to identifiers in the
data source. Moreover, I do not possess additional data which would al-
low linking records to natural persons, nor am I aware of a source where
this data could be gathered. Therefore, the harm caused by my study is
minimal while there are clear benefits in shedding light into a fundamen-
tal question in finance. Readers seeking to replicate the general methods
described here are advised to make similar considerations before work-
ing with the data.
15https://bit.ly/33YCxaG.
16See https://bit.ly/3iRJBdu. Tests show that the time required to add limit or-
ders and execute market orders are comparable, and that execution delays last on average
from 10ms to 100/200ms, with skewed tails; a non-negligible amount of trades exists whose
latency approaches the second level.
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Figure 19: Algorithm to identify the arbitrage actions. Legs executed by























Notes: Each dot represents a leg executed by the illustrative user i, who buys and sells
bitcoins (Buy, Sell) against three different currencies (USD, EUR, GBP), as a function
of time on the x-axis and volume on the y-axis. The legs are compared only when
they are in a small enough neighborhood of time and volume, defined by ∆T and
∆Q. There are three candidate groups of legs: I exclude the legs in the neighborhood
of [t1, q1], since both are buy legs, and of [t3, q3], since the investor trades against the
same currency; only the green actions in the neighborhood of [t2, q2] form a potential
arbitrage action, which is characterized by the values δT and δQ, respectively smaller
or equal than ∆T and ∆Q and non-negative by construction. Note that the red dot
in the neighborhood of [t2, q2] is excluded as it collides with both the two other legs.
Note also that a leg can form a single arbitrage action, and if there is more than a
matching leg, the closest in time is chosen.
3.3 Identification and description of the arbitrage
activity
3.3.1 Arbitrage actions
By definition, triangular arbitrage opportunities in currency markets arise
when the exchange rate implied by the ratio of two fiat currencies quoted
against a third vehicle currency (in my context, bitcoin) diverges from the
official exchange rate. Thus, an investor seeking to exploit such oppor-
tunities needs access to at least two currency markets quoted against the
same third currency: Mt. Gox users were granted the possibility to trade
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within the same platform in multiple fiat-to-bitcoin markets, and were
entitled to have only one personal account at a time.17 Bearing in mind
that all the legs are labelled by individual identifiers, this setting is ideal
to study triangular arbitrage at the micro (individual) level. I thus imple-
ment an algorithm to identify arbitrage actions, as described in Figure 19:
it is possible to identify a potential arbitrage action in the form of a pair of
(buy, sell) legs executed in two separate trades by the same investor us-
ing different currencies, and the identification of such arbitrage actions
is exact - though conditional on the choice of a boundary for the maxi-
mum time delay and volume difference between the pair of legs. That is,
the triangular arbitrage activity can be observed completely within the
private log of one exchange alone.
I focus on the investors that traded bitcoins against more than one fiat
currency — only 3,825, out of 71,808; around 1,600,000 legs in the leaked
dataset are attributable to them. A subgroup (N = 307) exchanged bit-
coins for more than two fiat currencies, being involved in around 800,000
legs. For each leg executed by this group of users I look for potential
matches that form arbitrage actions in a neighborhood of time and vol-
ume±∆T and±∆Q: I explore the Mt. Gox log searching for pairs of buy
and sell legs that move a nearly equivalent amount of bitcoins, executed
(almost) simultaneously by the same user in two separate trades, and ex-
changed for different fiat currencies — hence in different fiat-to-bitcoin
currency markets. I create a data set with all the potential18 triangular
arbitrage actions, irrespective of the currency market they refer to.
In Figure 20 I illustrate how such actions distribute in the space delim-
ited by ±∆T and ±∆Q. I present two different cases: in Panel a, where
∆T = 30 seconds and ∆Q = 1%, the number of actions detected is N =
4,464; in Panel b, ∆T = 300s, ∆Q = 10%, and N = 6,62919. Some interest-
17See https://bit.ly/2Fu1Rfp and https://bit.ly/3j0EkAl.
18Even if these actions respect all the textbook properties of arbitrage, and it is hard to
elaborate alternative trading strategies explaining such patterns, I cannot utterly exclude
that part of them are false positives. I assume them to be true positives and relax from now
on the term potential; further details are given in Section 3.6.
19Figure 38 in Appendix A.5 shows how the arbitrage actions increase for larger values
of ∆T and ∆Q. Table 10 defines formally the parameters ∆T and ∆Q, as well as the
action-specific variables δT and δQ.
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Figure 20: Distribution of the arbitrage actions by δT and δQ, given the
boundaries ∆T and ∆Q.
(a) ∆T = 30s, ∆Q = 1% (b) ∆T = 300s, ∆Q = 10%
Notes: each arbitrage action is characterized by a δT and a δQ representing the dis-
tance in volume and time between the two legs composing such action. By construc-
tion, they are respectively smaller than ∆T and ∆Q. Both panels report the num-
ber of actions in logarithmic scale, as a function of their δT (x-axis) and δQ (y-axis);
Panel a focuses on the smaller interval [∆T = 30s, ∆Q = 1%], Panel b on [∆T = 300s,
∆Q = 10%],
ing insights come along from this graphical analysis. In particular, as one
can see, a large percentage of the trades is observed within small inter-
vals, as the density of actions has a marked peak in the proximity of δT
= 0s and δQ = 0%. This does not come unexpectedly, and it matches the
textbook definition according to which arbitrage is performed through
simultaneous actions involving almost equivalent securities. However,
this has also interesting practical implications, as it suggests that likely
such precision was achieved via automated trading.
While most of the arbitrage occurred within a tight interval [∆T,∆Q],
I hold a conservative approach and scrutinize in the baseline analysis all
the actions occurring within the intervals [∆T = 300s,∆Q = 10%], i.e.
as depicted in Panel 20b (as a robustness check, in Appendix A.1 I pro-
vide the findings obtained on different intervals of [∆T,∆Q]). The vast
majority of the 6,629 identified arbitrage actions are performed in the
GBP/USD and the EUR/USD markets (respectively 32.2% and 29.1%),
followed by EUR/GBP (14.4%), AUD/USD (7.5%), and AUD/GBP (4.7%).
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3.3.2 Profitability of the arbitrage actions
Each arbitrage action, which is conducted on a specific fiat-to-fiat cur-
rency market, entails some profits (or losses) for the investor, depending
on the spread between the exchange rate implied by the same action and






where OffER is the hourly official rate20 and ImpER is the implied
one. To compare them, by construction I use the direct quotation with
the currency of the buy leg acting as the (fixed) foreign currency. That is,
OffER = CURBtoCURS ,
where CURB is the fiat currency used to trade bitcoins on the buy side,








Noteworthy, the leaked log includes information on the explicit trans-
action costs incurred by the Mt. Gox users (i.e., the fees associated to
each leg of all trades21). Although additionally implicit costs may (and
are likely to) exist, this feature of the dataset is especially important, as it
allows to account for the costs that directly affect the profitability of the
arbitrage activity. Thus, in the baseline investigation I adjust the actual
profitability by incorporating the leg-specific fees in the prices paid to
trade bitcoins, as described formally in Table 10, which provides a recap
20I use the hourly open prices of the official exchange rates published on https://www.
histdata.com/ . This dataset lacks information for few minor currencies (CNY, THB,
NOK, RUB): as a consequence, I could not calculate the associated profits for 35 arbitrage
actions, which are excluded from the analyses where this data is required. E.g., user 5121X
in Figure 22d conducted 796 arbitrage actions, but I can calculate the profitability only for
782 of them.
21Payable in bitcoins or in fiat currency, and sometimes partly in bitcoin and partly in fiat
currency. Users could configure how to pay fees: see https://bit.ly/34Wyb3h.
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of the main variables described in the last sections. However, as a robust-
ness check, I consider two additional ways to account for the explicit fees
(i.e., on a first scenario I exclude them, on another I estimate the fees a
user would expect to pay given the official Mt. Gox schedule) which are
discussed in Appendix A.2.
The average arbitrage action is worthy of a profit which is 0.42% of
the hourly official rate between the two fiat currencies. The average
amount of bitcoins traded are equivalent to 52 USD (see Panel A of Ta-
ble 11 and Table 31 for summary statistics).
3.3.3 A preliminary inspection of the data
Figure 21: Profitability of the arbitrage actions. Users grouped by the num-
ber of currency markets exploited for arbitrage.
(a) (b)
Notes: The plot on the left reports the actions executed by arbitrageurs that exploited a
single market. Viceversa, the plot on the right refers to the arbitrageurs who operated
on multiple markets. The y-axis reports the profitability of the actions (including
fees), depicted as dots, and the x-axis shows their evolution and deployment in time.
Note that a negligible number of values may exceed the threshold [-5%,5%] on the
y-axis. I do not show them (here and in the following plots) to focus on the area of
interest.
The structure of micro-data I collect allows to uncover a number of
patterns regarding the behavior and nature of the arbitrageurs. Notwe-
orthy, in disagreement with theory, I note that arbitrageurs are few — the
set of 6,629 identified arbitrage actions is executed by a total of 440 users
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(roughly 0.6% of the total users). Furthermore, the arbitrageurs’ behav-
ior seems to show a heterogeneous pattern. First, a majority of 395 arbi-
trageurs explored the presence of opportunities on a single implied fiat-
to-fiat currency market — i.e., they exchanged bitcoins for exactly two
fiat currencies22. Others (N = 45) traded in multiple fiat-to-fiat markets,
by exchanging bitcoins for at least three fiat currencies. Remarkable dif-
ferences appear when comparing the two groups: Figure 21 reports the
arbitrage activity of the users who exploited a single market — Panel (a)
— and multiple markets — Panel (b). Each dot is an arbitrage action
whose x-coordinate is the time of execution and whose y-coordinate is
the associated percentage profit/loss. Actions above the gray line are
profitable, while actions that lie below determined losses for the users; a
dashed line outlines the average profitability. The plots provide graph-
ical evidence that the arbitrage actions executed by users in the latter
group are on average more profitable and positive, while the ones in the
former are on average negative. Further evidence of such differences is
provided by Panels B and C of Table 11, that respectively refer to users
who exploited single and multiple markets, and report additional rele-
vant information specific to individual actions, such as the profitability
with alternative measurements of the explicit transaction costs, the time
delay or the volume difference between the buy and sell sides. They
show that the actions executed by users who exploited single markets
are on average non profitable, unless fees are excluded, while those con-
ducted by users who exploited multiple markets are always on average
profitable. The expected fees instead overestimate the real fees paid for
both groups, and the differences between the actual fees paid and the
expected fees are larger for the ’Multiple’ group. Moreover, the actions
in that group are more precise (δT and δQ are on average closer to zero)
and, interestingly, are smaller in terms of moved volumes, both consid-
ering the amount of bitcoins and of fiat currency. A possible explanation,
which I recall below, is that such users exploit more complex strategies
22All arbitrage actions involve two fiat currencies traded against bitcoins. Thus, arbitrage
actions always refer to a specific fiat-to-fiat currency market. From now on I will imply this
concept.
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and split orders to reduce the overall market impact.
Second, from Table 11 it emerges also that most of the arbitrage ac-
tivity is conducted by the users who exploited multiple markets (N =
5,906 against N = 723). Indeed, the three most active users performed
32.8%, 12%, and 10.4% of the total actions, and all of them were active
in multiple currency markets. Among those who executed arbitrage on
a single currency market, only 11 users performed 10 or more actions,
and the most active one performed just 27 actions. Table 12 provides fur-
ther information on the number of actions executed by the two groups of
users.
Third, arbitrageurs that operate on multiple markets are also more
acquainted with sophisticated algorithms, such as metaorders. I follow
Donier and Bonart (2015) and define as metaorder a group of at least 5
arbitrage actions executed by the same user in the same market (and in
the same ’buy/sell direction’), so that the delay between each sequential
action never exceeds 60 seconds23. As illustrated in Table 13, only 13
arbitrageurs executed metaorders, which are typically composed of less
than 10 actions — each delayed of around 20 seconds — and moved an
average amount of bitcoins equivalent to few hundreds of dollars. Only
5 users performed more than 5 metaorders, and all of them exploited
multiple currency markets and executed more than 100 arbitrage actions.
Fourth, arbitrageurs that operate on multiple markets are less likely to
behave aggressively. I follow Scaillet, Treccani, and Trevisan (2017) and
define the aggressive bids and asks respectively as the buy or sell legs
that initiate the market orders. Thus an aggressive arbitrage action is an
action with at least one aggressive leg. Table 14 shows that aggressive
orders have been used only by users who executed less than 30 actions;
on average, they are not profitable.
Noteworthy, clustering the arbitrage actions executed by the same
users unfolds interesting insights, and provides further evidence that
such differences map into heterogeneous patterns of profitability of ar-
23The two parameters are arbitrary. Nevertheless, it is not my main purpose to exactly
identify metaorders; rather, I use this measure as an indicator to verify which users exploit
these strategies more systematically. As a robustness check, I repeat the procedure increas-
ing the minimum number of actions and the time delay, and the differences are negligible.
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Figure 22: Profitability and trading patterns across arbitrageurs
(a) (b)
(c) (d)
Notes: the panels report the two most active users in a single currency market (above)
and in multiple markets (below). The y-axis indicates the profitability of the actions,
depicted as dots, and the x-axis shows their evolution and deployment in time. The
different colors correspond to actions conducted in different currency markets. I do
not report the legend for the two plots below as the number of markets is too high
(15 and 37). I hide the last unit of each user identifier to preserve the anonymity. A
negligible number of values may exceed the threshold [-5%,5%] on the y-axis.
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bitrage. In Figure 22, for instance, I illustrate graphically the trading pat-
tern of the most active users in a single currency market (Panels a and b)
and in multiple markets (Panels c and d)24. The dots indicate the prof-
its/losses (y-axis) across time (x-axis) on arbitrage actions. Differences in
profits are considerable. While users in (a) and (b) systematically incur
in losses when trading (as dots lie below the gray line), the others typi-
cally obtain profits by executing far more complex trading patterns. It is
also worth remarking important differences between their strategies, e.g.
when comparing users 18X and 5121X. Trades performed by the first are
concentrated in few weeks (around July 2012); its actions appear as con-
sequential and related and are likely to being part of one or a sequence of
metaorders. The trading pattern of the latter is steady and spans across
a longer period of time. Both strategies are profitable, non-trivial and
likely executed via algorithmic trading.
3.4 Trade ability and profitability of arbitrage
In this paper I hypothesize that arbitrage profitability is a function of the
user’s trade ability. As laid out in the previous section, my most pre-
ferred indicator for trade ability is arbitrage on multiple markets (which
I complement with three other variables — number of actions, execution
of metaorders and of aggressive orders25). Indeed, it is relatively simple
to conduct arbitrage exploring opportunities on a single currency mar-
ket. Evidence suggests that most of the users attempt to do arbitrage in
this form (and non-systematically, i.e., in few and dispersed trials, on av-
erage non profitable). Few users explore instead more than one market
looking for arbitrage opportunities. This activity is in fact far from trivial
and requires skills and expertise: users active in multiple markets must
set up complex — and likely automated — strategies in order to handle
24For completeness, I provide the trading patterns of other traders in 39 Appendix A.5.
Furthermore, Figure 26 shows intuitively that a relationship between the variables intro-
duced above and a profitable execution of the arbitrage activity indeed exists.
25To further explore the relationship between these variables, I perform a PCA, whose
results are reported in Table 15. Table 32 shows instead the Pearson correlation across the
main variables of our model.
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Figure 23: Days passed between the first arbitrage action of a user and the
first one in a new market.
Notes: the graph refers only to the arbitrageurs active on multiple markets. For about
70% of users only 0 to 14 days passed between the first arbitrage action and the first
one in another currency market (first bin).
funds in different fiat currencies and to correctly incorporate the increas-
ing amount of disposable information on price variations (the potential
number of markets to observe grows non-linearly with the number of
currencies used). A further sign of expertise is that operating in multi-
ple markets leads to risk reduction through diversification. Descriptive
evidence provided above suggests also that users that make arbitrage
through multiple markets obtain on average higher profits. This conclu-
sion is potentially threatened by two facts. First, trade ability may not
be fixed but may increase with trading. Second, the correlation between
trade ability and profits may be affected by an omitted variables bias. In
this section, I take these two aspects into my analysis.
3.4.1 Learning-by-doing and trade ability
The validity of my analysis relies on the fact that arbitrage through trad-
ing on multiple markets is a sign of trade ability that a user holds before
starting operating on Mt. Gox. Thus my analysis fails to capture the link
between expertise and profits if, for example, a user does arbitrage on a
single market for long and only after a period of training the user starts
arbitraging using other currencies. In Figure 23 I show that such scenario
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is unlikely to hold in my context. The plot illustrates the distribution of
arbitrageurs active in multiple markets across days passed between the
first arbitrage action of a user and the first one in a new market. As one
can see, the distribution is concentrated in the first bin which gathers
arbitrageurs that operate on a new market within 14 days since its first
arbitrage action. This bin collects about 70% of them.
In sum, for the vast majority of arbitrageurs the time passed between
their first arbitrage action and the first one in a new currency market is
short — less than 15 days for 70% of them and a month for about 80%.
I therefore conclude that in my context investors sophistication unlikely
changed considerably over time. Nonetheless, for robustness I also repli-
cate my analysis excluding users if time delay between the first arbitrage
action and the first one in a new market is large, i.e., I remove those that
do not fall within the first bin (see Tables 27, 28, 29 in Appendix A.3).
3.4.2 Regression analysis
The difference in profits recorded by users that operate on a single mar-
ket and users that operate on multiple markets is likely to be biased. For
one thing, the latter group may invest a considerable larger amount of
money on arbitrage than the former group of arbitrageurs. As the ex-
pected profit from trading is larger one may expect that also effort does.
For another, profitability may stem from a specific feature of a market
or on specific shocks that operate on a single time frame — e.g., exter-
nal events affecting the volatile Bitcoin ecosystem, sharp price variations
and high volatility, and also internal structural changes within Mt. Gox.
A more rigorous way to investigate such difference in profit between
the two groups is to estimate the following regression:
Spreadi,j,p,t = β0+β1Trade Abilityj+β2 USDi,j,p,t+θp+φt+εi,j,p,t, (3.1)
i indicates arbitrage actions, j users, p the pair of currencies identifying a
dyad, and t hours. Residuals, εi,j,p,t, are clustered at user-level to account
for redundant information across actions made by the same user.
The outcome, Spreadi,j,p,t, is the distance in price between the im-
plied and the official exchange rate of an arbitrage action i performed by
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a user j, on the hour t, using a dyad of currencies p. As described in Sec-
tion 3.3.2, it is reported as a percentage, and by construction the action
is profitable when the former is larger than the latter. The explanatory
variable of interest in Trade Abilityj is a variable conveying information
on the expertise of the user j who conducted the action i. The coefficient
of interest is thus β1, the conditional difference in profits between expert
and non expert users (whose profits are captured by the constant, β0).
Eq. 3.1 also controls for the volume of the trades, expressed in dollars
(and divided by 10,000). This variable is preferred to the volume of bit-
coins traded as the the latter is subject to high price volatility in time. To
construct this variable, prices of the actions not in USD are converted to
allow comparisons across currency markets. Most importantly, I include
a set of currency pair (dyad) fixed effects, θp, that allow to compare arbi-
trage actions operated using the same couple of currencies. I also intro-
duce hourly time fixed effects, φt. As I have explained in Section 3.2, Mt.
Gox operated at the outset of the bitcoin uptake, was the first exchange
platform with a significant relevance, and it was hit by several shocks.
Time fixed effects allow to absorb any potential shocks occurred on the
market. Besides this, by comparing arbitrage actions filled in the very
same hour, I likely capture contingent conditions of the market strictly
related to risk, such as liquidity, volatility, depth of the market, that oth-
erwise would be hard to capture given the ‘two-leg’ (and ‘two-currency’)
structure of the arbitrage actions considered in the analysis.26
In Table 16 I present my estimations results where trade ability is
proxied by the dummy variable D(Currencies), equal to 0 if the user
conducted arbitrage in a single currency market, and 1 if arbitrage is
conducted in multiple markets. Overall, these estimations are statisti-
cally significant and corroborate the hypothesis that sophisticated arbi-
trageurs trade on average at a positive premium, relative to less sophis-
ticated users. Namely, column (1) reports the estimate of the correlation
between profitability and expertise; in columns (2) and (3) I add sepa-
rately time and dyad fixed effects; in column (4) I add both fixed effects in
26I selected this time scale as a result of a trade-off between granularity and feasibility of
the analyses (a smaller scale would be too demanding for a FE-based analysis).
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the regression. Some observations are relaxed when including the fixed
effects, either because in some hours one single trade was executed, or
because a trade is the only one executed in a minor market.
The effect is also economically relevant. Focusing on column (4), I
find that the average sophisticated user traded at a premium of 1.292%,
relative to the unsophisticated arbitrageurs — a difference which is slightly
above a standard deviation in profitability. Finally, it is worth noting
that the constant term is systematically negatively estimated across the
four specifications. This result is of particular interest if compared to Ta-
ble 24: once I repeat this analysis without considering the transaction
costs, the constant term is non-negative (not significant). My interpre-
tation is that the non sophisticated users do not account correctly such
costs, in a mechanism akin to the one originating the monetary illusion
phenomenon (Shafir, Diamond, and Tversky, 1997), and thus incur in
unprofitable activity. Figure 24 provides an illustrative example for two
different time windows: each action is reported twice, once without the
transaction costs (and slightly transparent) and once including the fees
paid. Red dots represent the actions executed by investors who executed
arbitrage in a single market, while the blue ones are executed by expert
investors active in many markets. The x-axis is the time of execution of
the action, the y-axis is the profit/loss. All these arbitrage actions are
affected by the transaction costs, which reduce the yielded profits. How-
ever, in the case of the non expert users, not only the actions are in general
less profitable, they become even unprofitable once the transaction costs
are included, both when they are similar across users (Panel 24b), and
when they vary across them (Panel 24a).
Table 17 employs alternative explanatory variables for trade ability
described in Section 3.3.3. Column (4) of Table 16 is reported in col-
umn (1), for easiness of comparison. Column (2) reports estimations
of β1 when trade ability is proxied by the logarithm of the number of
currencies used; in (3) I explore the effect of the logarithmic number
of arbitrage actions executed by the user on the profitability of the ac-
tion. Both estimations are positive and statistically significant. In col-
umn (4) trade ability is proxied by the dummy variable D(Metaorder),
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Figure 24: The ’monetary illusion’ effect.
(a) Date: 27 October 2012, h.14 (b) Date: 24 March 2013, h.19
Notes: The plots show the arbitrage activity in two different illustrative time win-
dows. Each action is reported twice, once including and once excluding the transac-
tion costs (the former is transparent, in order to distinguish them). The y-axis reports
the profits/losses, and the x-axis the date of execution. In both cases the non expert
users (in red) conduct less profitable activity: once the fees are included, their actions
become even unprofitable.
which is equal to 1 for all the actions conducted by users that executed
at least one metaorder. Similarly, in column (5) I use dummy variable
D(Aggressive) to indicate whether the user executed or not at least one
aggressive action. I stress that both the latter two variables report user-
specific and not action-specific information. When trade ability is prox-
ied by D(Metaorder) the sophisticated users are more profitable, but the
estimation is less precise; instead, I find that profit reduced significantly
when the arbitrage activity is conducted by users who executed at least
one aggressive arbitrage action.27 Finally, column (6) shows the relation-
ship between profits and the scores of the first component obtained with
the principal component analysis. Also in this case, the β1 coefficient is
positive and statistically significant. Specifically, I estimate that an arbi-
trageur with a trade ability score which is a standard deviation above the
mean obtained a premium which is around half of the standard deviation
in profits (i.e., 0.224×2.831.26 ).
27To better interpret the magnitude of β1 in Table 31 I report summary statistics for the
variables employed.
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3.5 Trade ability and responsiveness in arbitrage
The evidence documented thus far suggests that expert users are more
likely to make profits on arbitrage relative to non experts. In this section
I move on and show that profits stem from a better ability of the former
in responding to quick fluctuations which makes arbitrage more (or less)
profitable.
A typical profitable situation in financial markets arises when large,
unexpected deviations occur in fundamental values. Because of struc-
tural frictions, adjustments across markets are not automatic, giving rise
to opportunities in conducting arbitrage operations. I exploit this fact in
my analysis and reconstruct, from the hourly evolution of the official ex-
change rate in a market, the percent variation in the exchange rate with
respect to the previous hour (see Table 10). The variable ∆Rp,t takes a
higher value when the official exchange rate, on a pair of currencies p,
observed in the hour t, fluctuates more relative to the previous hour. It is
therefore worth remarking that ∆Rp,t varies both across currency mar-
kets and time but not within.
The advantage in using this strategy is twofold. First, the exploitation
of these temporary opportunities is typically not obvious but requires
expertise and/or the execution of automated orders. Hence, when vari-
ation in the exchange rate is relatively prominent than usual times it is
likely that expert users take advantage of them and make profits. Sec-
ond, as users who trade in Mt. Gox are small, their actions are unlikely
to affect such deviations. It is therefore plausible to assume that users
are exchange rate takers and deviations in the official exchange rate ex-
ogenous.
I employ this variable ∆Rp,t on the right-hand side of my regression
and interact it with trade ability to test whether profits obtained by expert
arbitrageurs are larger when fluctuations in the exchange rates are larger.
This is written as follows:
Spreadi,j,p,t =β1(Trade Abilityj ×∆Rp,t) + β2∆Rp,t+
β3 USDi,j,p,t + αj + θp + φt + εi,j,p,t.
(3.2)
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As one can see, my main variable of interest in Eq. 3.2 is now time
variant. This allows to employ a set of user fixed effects, αj , which permit
to absorb any sort of heterogeneity that one may expect across users.
This includes education, financial literacy, and other unobservables that
are likely to correlate with my measure of trade ability. The inclusion
of αj also implies that my chief variation in the identification of β1 is
the variation across hours (within a user). β1 can now be interpreted as
the difference in profit, between expert and non expert users, following
a 1 per cent increase in the rate of change of the official exchange rate.
β2 captures the effect of a 1 per cent increase in the rate of change of
the official exchange rate on the arbitrage profits made by non expert
users. These effects are additionally identified by including daily time
fixed effects, φt, and currency dyad fixed effects, θp, and by controlling
for the USD equivalent amount of bitcoin traded, USDi,j,p,t. Standard
errors are clustered at user-level as above.
Table 18 reports estimations using different proxies of trade ability. In
columns (1-2) I use the variable D(Currencies). I then repeat the analy-
ses by using alternative proxies, namelyLog(Currencies) (3-4), the log of
the number of actions (5-6), the execution of metaorders (7-8) or aggres-
sive actions (9-10), and finally the scores from the principal component
analysis reported in Table 15 (11-12). Overall, I find that an increase in
the rate of change of the official exchange rate generates a higher profit
for arbitrage made by expert users, even when user fixed effects are in-
cluded (columns 2, 4, 6, 8, 10, 12). However, β1 is not statistically sig-
nificant in columns (2) and (6), perhaps due to the fact that the inclusion
of user fixed effects is particularly demanding: as I showed in Table 12,
many of the users active in a single market executed just one action. This
leads to the exclusion of a large number of observations from this group,
making more difficult to obtain stable and statistically significant results.
Finally, the result for column (10) — relative to the aggressiveness of the
actions — goes against my expectations, but the coefficient is not statisti-
cally significant. In support of this analysis I highlight that when I resize
the sample as explained in Section A.1 by reducing the boundaries on
time and volume, ∆T and ∆Q, I obtain similar results with higher sta-
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tistical power (see Table 23). Additional robustness checks that further
validate my results are reported in Appendices A.1, A.2, and A.3.
In summary, these findings indicate that sophisticated investors are
able to take into account and exploit in their favor quick changes in the
official exchange rate better than non expert users, and that this ability
leads to higher profits. For example, looking at the effect reported in
column (12) of Table 18, I estimate that an arbitrageur with a trade abil-
ity score which is a standard deviation above the mean obtained a profit
which is 1.347% following a 1 per cent increase in the rate of change of
the official exchange rate (i.e., 0.476 × 2.83); note that this premium ac-
counts for more that a standard deviation of the dependent variable. The
illustrative examples depicted in Figure 25 provide graphic support and
show the arbitrage dynamics at a small time scale: I report the actions
executed on the same market, i.e., the EUR/USD one, for four different
hour time windows (9 July 2012 h.14, 24 January 2013 h.23, 19 March
2013 h.21, 25 March 2013 h.18 respectively in Panels 25a, 25b, 25c, 25d).
Each dot is an arbitrage action, whose y-axis is the profit/loss, and the x-
axis is the time of execution. Following the convention introduced above,
the blue ones represent the actions executed by the expert users who ex-
ploited multiple markets, while the non experts are in red. The gray line
represents the absolute value of the minute-level variation of the official
rate. The value annotated in proximity of each plot is the specific value
of the rate variation in this minute, and it is introduced for the ease of
comparison. Note that the value of the rate variation is multiplied by
100. The plots show that users react differently in the presence of ex-
change rate fluctuations, and are more or less able to turn such changes
into their favor. Consider for instance Panel 25c: the expert user con-
ducts arbitrage in a time window with smaller volatility, and its activity
is more profitable. A similar pattern appears in Panel 25d, while in Pan-
els 25a and 25b the differences in volatility are smaller. However, also in
these cases, non expert users are less able to exploit in a profitable way
the variation of the official rate. My interpretation, indeed, is that the ex-
pert arbitrageurs are more able with respect to the others to react to price
deviations, and thus are also more profitable. In conclusion, thus, I hy-
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pothesize that such differences stem from the experts’ ability in incorpo-
rating information in their strategies (perhaps using APIs, and/or auto-
mated trading algorithms); conversely, as low sophisticated arbitrageurs
do not incorporate this information correctly, their actions are negatively
affected by variations in the official exchange rates. In operative terms,
this ability in better capturing information results in a greater expertise
at the moment of choosing when conducting the arbitrage actions: the
timing of execution at the micro scale is a salient element which deter-
mines a crucial difference between a profitable and a non profitable ac-
tion. Thus, ultimately, the differences between the two groups result in
a better choice, time-wise, that yields higher profits to the expert users
with respect to the non expert ones.
3.5.1 Classification of the arbitrageurs
Thus far I focused on the differences that arise at the level of the arbitrage
activity. I first distinguished between non-arbitrageurs and arbitrageurs,
and then I investigated the experitse-based differences across users in
the latter group. Figure 26 shows intuitively the relationship between
the indicators used to proxy expertise and the successful (on average)
execution of the arbitrage activity: each dot represents a specific user’s
average profitability of actions (y-axis) against the number of actions ex-
ecuted (x-axis). The color determines which users exploited one or many
currency markets, and the size is proportional to the percentage of ar-
bitrage actions performed through metaorders. I propose here a coarse
and illustrative classification, based on the level of expertise, to catego-
rize the arbitrageurs as belonging to the group of skilled or not skilled
users, and I briefly describe their overall trading activity (thus including
also non-arbitrage trades).
I classify as experts those for which at least three out of the four indi-
cators discussed above are true: executed arbitrage in multiple markets
(indicator D(Currencies) = 1), conducted a high number of actions (i.e.,
Actions ≥ 10), executed metaorders (D(Metaorder) = 1), and did not
conduct aggressive arbitrage (D(Aggressive) = 1). Only 23 out of 440
111
Figure 25: Illustrative examples of within hours dynamics.
(a) Date: 9 July 2012, H. 14 (b) Date: 24 January 2013, H. 23
(c) Date: 19 March 2013, H. 21 (d) Date: 25 March 2013, H. 18
Notes: each panel reports two plots, vertically stacked, for the same time window.
The plots include only actions executed in the EUR/USD market. The actions are
dots whose y-axis is the profit/loss, and the x-axis is the date of execution. Red ones
are executed by non experts, blue ones by experts. The gray line in the plots below
is the percentage variation of the exchange rate with respect to the previous minute
(multiplied by 100), and the labels report its value at the minute of execution of each
action. The gray line in the plots above is instead the difference between the implied
rate and the official rate (at the minute level). The labels corresponding to each action
determine the direction of the trade, that is, whether the investor bought bitcoins with
EUR and received USD (EUR,USD) or viceversa (USD,EUR).
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Figure 26: Users actions: average profits as a function of the number of
actions executed.
Notes: each dot indicates on the x-axis the number of actions executed by a given user,
and on the y-axis the average profits; the blue color is for the users that executed
arbitrage actions on multiple markets, while those who exploited a single market
are in red; dots whose size is increased correspond to users that executed metaorders,
and the size is proportional to the percentage of activity executed through metaorders
over the total number of arbitrage actions.
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fall within this categorization. Table 19 reports a comparison of the over-
all trading behavior (which thus includes also the trades not involved in
arbitrage activity) of the different categories identified: non-arbitrageurs
in columns (a) and (b), arbitrageurs (c), and expert arbitrageurs (f); for
completeness I also provide information on the investors who conducted
arbitrage in single (d) and multiple (e) markets. Major differences arise
across the groups. The characteristics of all the users who traded in Mt.
Gox (N = 71,808) are described in column (a); by construction, the ex-
pert arbitrageurs in column (e) performed at least 4 trades, thus in col-
umn (b) I consider only investors that performed at least 4 actions to bal-
ance the comparison. On average, the set of arbitrageurs (c) performed
more trades, moved higher volumes of Bitcoins and of fiat currencies,
and were active for longer periods of time with respect to the averages
on all the users. This difference is evident also in the subgroup (d), and
is even more pronounced for subgroups in (e) and (f). Interestingly, the
fiat currency moved per trade is comparable across all the groups con-
sidered, but smaller both for the arbitrageurs in (e) and (f). This aspect
could be partly related to the use of algorithmic trading, and/or the prac-
tice of splitting orders to reduce market impact. The User IDs are sim-
ilar, meaning that on average the users of the different groups entered




The findings in the behavioral finance literature challenge the conven-
tional economic interpretation of theoretical arbitrage that would fore-
see, in the presence of risk, the intervention of many small traders with
homogeneous expectations, not subject to capital constraints, and risk-
neutral towards a small enough exposure on the market. Practitioners
are well aware that this description is far from reality: arbitrageurs are
few, sophisticated, and specialized traders. However, the evidence of
this statement still remains anecdotal, and no empirical study exists to
describe who are the arbitrageurs. In this work I investigate the Mt. Gox
leaked dataset, in order to provide empirical evidence that some of its
customers indeed conducted triangular arbitrage activity, as well as an
explanation to the observed dynamics. By these means, I try and answer
to some open questions on the nature of arbitrage, and on the users who
conduct it.
First, I identify the set of potential arbitrage actions, consisting of
about 6,600 pairs of buy and sell legs, providing evidence that arbitrage
was indeed conducted within the Mt. Gox platform. Coherently with
the theory, in the vast majority of cases these pairs are almost simulta-
neous and involve the same or nearly equivalent security (in terms of
volumes of bitcoins moved). The most interesting results concern the
characteristics of the investors involved in arbitrage. Out of more than
70,000 users that traded through the Mt. Gox platform in the time win-
dow considered, only less than 4,000 traded bitcoins against more than
one currency, thus greatly reducing the set of potential arbitrageurs, and
just 440 of them are responsible for at least one detected arbitrage action.
Major differences across users arise even within this group, if I account
for indicators approximating the user expertise. In particular, I focus on
the distinction between the arbitrageurs who performed arbitrage only
on a single currency market and those who conducted it on multiple cur-
rency markets, assuming that it is a good proxy of a trader’s expertise:
all the members of the former group performed few actions, while the
latter, even though the minority, are responsible for the vast majority of
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actions. They often follow complex trading patterns, including strategies
that entail splitting orders into smaller ones to reduce market impact, and
operate taking into account the penalizing effect that an excessive aggres-
siveness would have on their trades. Indeed, the findings are consistent
with a scenario in which many uninformed traders move prices far from
the fundamental value, and the arbitrageurs absorb the demand shocks
by providing liquidity on the market.
I devise a model to quantify the effect of the ability on the profitabil-
ity of the arbitrage actions: the results show that the actions executed by
skilled users are significantly more profitable, while those performed by
the non skilled ones are on average non profitable when transaction costs
are included. Most of all, the differential effect between non expert and
expert users in the presence of large movements of the official exchange
rate is positive and statistically significant: the latter are more respon-
sive to exogenous shocks on the official exchange rate. As the essential
property of arbitrage is the advantageous exploitation of the mispricing of
an asset, my findings support the claim that arbitrage is performed by a
small number of professional investors.
The results are consistent with the anecdotal evidence that arbitrageurs
are few and sophisticated users; however, external validity might be a
concern, even in the light of the peculiarities of the Mt. Gox ecosys-
tem. For instance, according to the model described by Shleifer and
Vishny (1997), in the conventional financial markets the arbitrageurs ex-
ploit their knowledge operating on someone else’s funds, thus taking
large positions in an agency relationship, where the interplay of capital
and risk play a prominent role. In the Mt. Gox market, the average arbi-
trage action is small (less than a hundred of dollars): I hypothesize that
in this context the agency relationship does not take place, and the ar-
bitrageurs are not operating on behalf of someone else. Rather, they are
likely investing their own - more limited - funds. This difference could
be explained by the fact that I am considering a niche market at its early
stages: at the time, the bitcoin market was relatively unknown to the ma-
jor financial investors. An alternative explanation for the small dimen-
sion of the average trade is that expert users implemented also complex
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strategies involving splitting orders.
The recent findings by Wang et al. (2021) partially mitigate the po-
tential concerns on the external validity. Indeed, they study cyclic arbi-
trage across decentralized exchanges (DEXs) in the second most promi-
nent cryptocurrency after Bitcoin, Ethereum. The market shows relevant
differences, as it is based on the use of smart contracts28, and because
the investigation was conducted on a very different time epoch: they
observe almost 300,000 arbitrage cycles between May 2020 and January
2021, a sign that the market has become much more mature with time.
Most interestingly for my purposes, they notice relevant differences be-
tween two groups of users, those who exploit private smart contracts
and those who conduct arbitrage using public protocols, the former ex-
perimenting a much higher success rate (62% against 28.4%). Creating
private private smart contracts is complex and requires deep knowledge
of the Ethereum ecosystem, in order not to incur large losses: this finding,
obtained for a different cryptocurrency and in a very different epoch, is
strictly related to my study and consistent with it, thus further support-
ing the validity of my investigation.
Some other limitations to this work stand out: a valid objection is
that all these actions could be false positives. It is impossible to prove
undoubtedly that the actions are arbitrage, unless a direct proof is pro-
vided by the Mt. Gox users (I thus encourage the Mt. Gox arbitrageurs
among the readers to contact me and share their comments). However,
some major elements emerge in support of my hypothesis. First, it is
hard to find alternative explanations to the existence of several pairs of
trades executed according to patterns so specific such as those I described
throughout the paper. Second, I explicitly consider several variants and
controls in my regressions, in order to rule out alternative hypotheses.
Third, the fact that many actions - predominantly profitable - are ascrib-
able to few large users is in my opinion another meaningful factor.
Another limitation is that I implicitly assume that I am providing an
‘upper bound’ to the total triangular arbitrage activity: assuming that the
identified actions are true positives, then my algorithm ideally detects all
28See XXXX for an introduction on the concept of smart contract.
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triangular arbitrage activity. However, this is likely not true: it is possible
that some arbitrage actions have a more complex structure than just be-
ing composed of two buy/sell legs (e.g., they might involve many cycles
and/or several currencies), and that the aggregation method described
in Section 3.2 to emulate the Mt. Gox internal matching mechanism is
not thoroughly accurate. Thus, even though I believe my procedure is
a good approximation, I acknowledge that I might be estimating imper-
fectly the total number of arbitrage actions. Furthermore, I select the
arbitrage actions in a reasonably small neighborhood of time and vol-
ume, but I do not ground my choice on a theoretical support; rather, I
base it on empirical evidence. For this reason, I adopt a conservative sce-
nario with larger boundaries, and I report additional estimations both on
a less conservative scenario and on a case with even larger thresholds in
Appendix A.1. I do not investigate the effect of the arbitrage activity in
enforcing the ‘law of one price’: an interesting development of the cur-
rent work would be to inspect whether, and to what extent, the arbitrage
activity had an effect on the market efficiency.
Finally, the analysis focuses on a single exchange platform: on the
one side it is an advantage, as all information required to detect arbi-
trage activity is entirely contained in the private ledger. On the other
side, triangular arbitrage only aligns prices in one market, whereas an
essential function of arbitrage is its function of ‘information carrier’ be-
tween markets. So, while the evidence might be stronger for triangular







Action composed of two legs executed by the same user in
different trades using different currencies. The time delay
and volume difference cannot exceed a threshold [∆T,∆Q].
Each arbitrage action is obtained by merging a buy and sell
leg.
ArbitrageAction = (LegBuy, LegSell) (3.3)
∆T Maximum time delay allowed (e.g., 300 seconds in the base-
line analysis)
∆Q Maximum volume difference allowed (e.g., 10% in the base-
line analysis)
δT Time delay between LegB and LegS , expressed in seconds.
By definition smaller or equal to ∆T :
δT = |TB − TS | ≤ ∆T (3.4)
δQ Volume difference (Bitcoins traded) between LegB and
LegS , expressed as a percentage. By definition smaller or
equal to ∆Q:
δQ =
|V olB − V olS |
(V olB + V olS)/2
· 100 ≤ ∆Q (3.5)
Official
exchange rate By convention, each arbitrage action is compared to the of-
ficial exchange rate in the following way:
OffER = CURBtoCURS (3.6)
that is, if the buy leg of an arbitrage action is performed in
EUR and the Sell one is in USD, then I consider the official
exchange rate EURtoUSD. If the Buy side is in USD, and the
Sell one in EUR, then it is compared to the e.r. USDtoEUR.
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Dyad Pair of currencies that defines the fiat-to-fiat currency mar-
ket to which the arbitrage action belongs. E.g., the dyad
(EUR,USD) refers to actions whose currencies are CURB =




The implied exchange rate is calculated by comparing the

















The pedices B and S refer to the buy and sell side; f and b
indicate respectively if the term Fee is denominated in fiat
or in bitcoins.
Profit (Spread) Spread between the implied and the official rate divided by
the official rate, expressed as a percentage. By construction,





Aggressive Arbitrage action composed by at least one aggressive leg
(that is, a leg that initiated a market order).
Equiv. $ Value of a trade expressed in dollars. I use this variable to
indicate the value of a trade since the bitcoin value is not
stable in time.
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Metaorder Metaorders are identified as sequences of at least 5 arbi-
trage actions executed by the same user, in the same mar-
ket, and such that the time passed between each action is
less than one minute. Note: I partly follow the methodol-
ogy described in Donier and Bonart (2015), with some dif-
ferences: the authors consider a larger time delta (one hour)
bewteen each action, and contrary to them I use an arbi-
trary parameter (N=5) to define the minimum length of a
metaorder. While I do not provide the results here, I varied
the two thresholds and noticed that the differences are neg-
ligible for my purposes, and this setting reduces the false
positives classification.
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Table 11: Descriptive statistics of the arbitrage actions
Panel A: all arbitrage actions (N = 6629)
Mean St.D. Min 25% 50% 75% Max
Profits, fees, % 0.42 1.26 -11.35 0.075 0.621 1.096 18.16
P., exp. fees, % 0.28 1.22 -7.46 -0.191 0.375 0.982 18.24
P., no fees, % 1.05 1.21 -6.40 0.490 1.110 1.696 19.60
Bitcoins 4.12 12.56 0.00 0.039 0.807 3.261 334.14
’Equiv. $’ 52.54 169.63 0.00 0.359 7.400 41.424 4666.66
δT (s) 29.04 59.09 0 0 1 24 300
δQ (%) 1.30 2.46 0.00 0.000 0.215 0.863 9.99
Panel B: actions of users who exploited single markets (N = 723)
Profits, fees, % -1.00 1.96 -11.35 -2.191 -0.933 0.118 18.16
P., exp. fees, %p -0.95 1.91 -7.46 -2.161 -0.891 0.172 18.24
P., no fees, % 0.11 1.91 -6.40 -1.135 0.134 1.275 19.60
Bitcoins 7.89 21.16 0.00 0.253 2.000 7.472 288.35
’Equiv. $’ 118.06 340.25 0.00 4.014 27.299 95.708 4666.66
δT (s) 59.95 68.21 0 13 34 86 297
δQ (%) 1.04 1.77 0.00 0.461 0.602 0.602 9.82
Panel C: actions of users who exploited multiple markets (N = 5906)
Profits, fees, % 0.59 1.02 -7.40 0.208 0.688 1.128 10.13
P., exp. fees, %p 0.42 1.02 -7.34 -0.009 0.448 1.019 10.15
P., no fees, % 1.16 1.04 -6.28 0.577 1.178 1.719 10.79
Bitcoins 3.66 10.97 0.00 0.030 0.606 2.995 334.14
’Equiv. $’ 44.52 132.48 0.00 0.318 5.767 35.087 3862.71
δT (s) 25.26 56.74 0 0 1 16 300
δQ (%) 1.34 2.53 0.00 0.000 0.000 0.928 9.99
Notes: actions identified at ∆T = 300s and ∆Q = 10%. Panel A describes the main
features of all the arbitrage actions, while Panel B reports the statistics for the subset
of actions (N = 723) executed by users that performed arbitrage in a single currency
market. Panel C refers to those executed by investors active in multiple markets (N =
5,906).
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Table 12: Statistics on the number of actions executed by the arbitrageurs.
Mean Std Min 25% 50% 75% 90% 95% Max
Group Single (N = 395) 1 2 1 1 1 2 2 5 27
Group Multiple (N = 45) 131 366 2 4 11 28 392 690 2175
Notes: I split the users in two groups, that is, those who performed arbitrage on a
Single and on Multiple markets. The statistics describe the mean, standard deviation,
minimum, maximum, and percentiles of the number of actions performed by the
two subgroups of users. Note that, by construction, the users in the group Multiple
performed at least two arbitrage actions; thus, they are involved in at least four trades.
Similarly, users in the group Single conducted at least two trades.










18X 54.07 91 12.92 13.33 52.54 369.38
1245X 80.00 2 6.00 23.83 7.43 97.73
1964X 44.10 11 7.82 26.73 35.81 178.17
2173X 18.52 1 5.00 14.00 40.00 234.55
2286X 35.71 1 5.00 26.25 5.00 297.55
2717X 3.45 1 5.00 47.00 0.59 6.45
2940X 91.30 1 21.00 17.75 2.36 25.80
3174X 63.28 40 10.60 29.22 30.81 346.89
4156X 29.00 7 8.29 28.46 9.97 70.54
4325X 22.73 1 5.00 29.50 55.00 1118.86
4901X 56.06 1 37.00 11.36 16.55 162.88
5121X 29.40 26 9.00 15.51 1.32 35.86
6688X 20.97 2 6.50 20.07 7.36 242.74
Notes: for each user (rows), I identify the sequences of actions with the character-
istics of metaorders. Only the 13 users reported here performed metaorders. Per-
centage indicates the number of actions that are part of metaorders over the total
number of arbitrage actions executed by the user; the second column represents the
number of metaorders identified. The other columns describe average values on the
metaorders executed by each user and respectively report the average number of ac-
tions that compose a metaorder, the average time delay between the actions in the
same metaorder, the mean volume of a metaorder expressed in dollars and in bit-
coins. User identifiers are anonymized.
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Table 14: Descriptive statistics of the aggressive arbitrage actions (N = 313).
Mean St.d. Min 25% 50% 75% Max
Arbitrage actions (N) 6.572 8.223 1.000 1.000 2.00 11.0 28.000
Spread (%) -1.106 1.434 -5.354 -2.13 -0.975 -0.058 2.243
Currenciesd (dummy) 0.278 0.449 0.000 0.000 0.00 1.0 1.000
Notes: out of N = 6,629 arbitrage actions, just N = 313 are aggressive actions, that is,
arbitrage actions in which at least one of the two legs of the arbitrage action is an
aggressive order. They are executed by users who performed few arbitrage actions
(1st row: 6.57 on average, and maximum 28); on average they are not profitable (2nd
row), and they are executed primarily by users active only on single markets (3rd
row).
Table 15: Principal Component analysis.
D(Currencies) Log(Actions) D(Metaorder) D(Aggressive) Expl. variance, %
PC1 0.54 0.63 0.53 -0.15 53.38
Notes: the sample is the set of users (N = 440). I consider the four main indicators
that I exploit in Section 3.5: the dummy variable that classifies users who exploited
single or multiple markets, D(Currencies); the logarithm of the actions executed,
Log(Actions); whether the action is part of a metaorder (D(Metaorder)) or aggres-
sive (D(Aggressive)). Values are standardized by constructing their z-score. The
table shows the loadings of all the variables (columns) for the first principal compo-
nents (row). The last column reports the explained variance of the component.
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Table 16: Relationship between trade ability and profits
Dep. var.: Spread (with fees)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
D(Currencies) 1.6180∗∗∗ 1.5791∗∗∗ 1.2421∗∗∗ 1.2917∗∗∗
(0.1900) (0.1943) (0.1584) (0.1659)
Equiv. $ 3.4652∗∗ 2.6151∗ 0.6556 0.1912
(1.7532) (1.5862) (1.2465) (1.1280)
Constant -1.0420∗∗∗ -0.9985∗∗∗ -0.6141∗∗∗ -0.6506∗∗∗
(0.1593) (0.1775) (0.1500) (0.1604)
Time FE N N Y Y
Dyad FE N Y N Y
N 6594 6582 5307 5284
R-squared 0.16 0.20 0.68 0.69
Notes: the Table reports OLS estimates of the relationship between the dependent
variable Spread, that captures the profitability of an arbitrage action, and the vari-
able D(Currencies), which is a proxy of the user trade ability, equal to 1 if the user
conducted arbitrage in multiple markets, and 0 otherwise. I consider four different
specifications of the model: (1) without including fixed effects, (2) with dyad fixed
effects, (3) with time fixed effects, (4) with both. All columns include an additional
control for the amount of volume traded, expressed in USD (and divided by 10,000).
I report only the overallR2. Errors are clustered at the user-level to account for intra-
class correlation. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05,
∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 17: Relationship between trade ability and profits, alternative proxies
Dep. var.: Spread (with fees)













Equiv. $ 0.1912 0.1525 1.2060 0.0733 0.3375 0.8175
(1.1280) (1.2621) (1.3191) (1.3384) (1.1244) (1.3500)
Constant -0.6506∗∗∗ -1.0453 -1.4603∗∗∗ 0.3359∗∗ 0.6113∗∗∗ -1.0717∗∗∗
(0.1604) (0.7807) (0.4143) (0.1614) (0.0424) (0.3593)
Time FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Dyad FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
N 5284 5284 5284 5284 5284 5284
R-squared 0.69 0.69 0.72 0.67 0.69 0.70
Notes: the Table reports OLS estimates of the relationship between the dependent
variable Spread and alternative proxies of the user trade ability: (1) D(Currencies)
provides a baseline reference by repeating column (4) of Table 16; (2) Log(Currencies)
is the logarithm of the number of currency markets exploited by the user; (3)
Log(Actions) is the logarithm of the number of arbitrage actions executed by the user;
(4) and (5), D(Metaorder) and D(Aggressive), are respectively dummy variables that
indicate whether the user conducted metaorders or aggressive actions. (6) PC1 is the
score of each variable obtained by performing a PC analysis as explained in Table 15.
All columns include time and dyad fixed effects, as well as an additional control for
the amount of volume traded, expressed in USD (and divided by 10,000). I report
only the overall R2. Errors are clustered at the user-level to account for intra-class
correlation. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗
p < 0.01
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Table 18: Dependent variable: Spread, with fees. Interaction between expertise and daily rate variation. Coefficients
fitted with OLS.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Int. D(Currencies) 6.905∗∗∗ 1.442
(1.139) (5.314)
Int. Log(Currencies) 3.213∗∗ 1.703∗∗
(1.528) (0.723)
Int. Log(Actions) 1.427∗∗∗ 0.150
(0.202) (0.409)
Int. D(Metaorder) 3.693∗∗ 2.228∗∗∗
(1.600) (0.821)
Int. D(Aggressive) -6.786∗∗∗ 3.593
(1.595) (3.461)
Int. PC1 1.048∗∗∗ 0.476∗∗
(0.159) (0.211)
DeltaER -5.441∗∗∗ -0.742 -4.744∗∗ -2.426 -7.060∗∗∗ -0.258 -2.341∗ -1.045 0.168 0.617 -5.791∗∗∗ -2.810∗
(1.196) (5.279) (2.125) (1.590) (1.320) (2.423) (1.241) (0.854) (0.526) (0.956) (1.187) (1.546)
Equiv. $ 1.150 -0.732 0.732 -0.861 2.128 -0.751 0.766 -0.804 0.824 -0.741 2.225 -0.812
(1.700) (0.833) (1.762) (0.878) (1.815) (0.827) (1.647) (0.871) (1.896) (0.838) (1.800) (0.866)
User FE N Y N Y N Y N Y N Y N Y
Time FE N Y N Y N Y N Y N Y N Y
Dyad FE N Y N Y N Y N Y N Y N Y
N 6594 5142 6594 5142 6594 5142 6594 5142 6594 5142 6594 5142
R-squared 0.05 0.75 0.02 0.75 0.07 0.75 0.02 0.75 0.02 0.75 0.06 0.75
Standard errors in parentheses ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Errors are clustered at user-level to account for intra-class correlation.
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Table 19: Comparison of identified arbitrageurs to non-arbitrageurs
All users Users with Arbitrageurs
≥ 4 trades All Single Multiple Classified
N 71, 808 47, 201 440 395 45 23
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f)
Total trades mean 77.79 117.41 2,077.13 600.88 14,707.27 28,173.13
50% 7 15 83 66 842 2,451
Arbitrage actions mean 0.09 0.14 15.33 1.85 130.73 251.65
50% 0 0 1 1 11 27
Currencies mean 1.06 1.09 2.50 2.18 5.22 4.22
50% 1 1 2 2 4 3
USD trades mean 70.63 106.71 1,639.35 468.48 11,656.73 22,643.09
50% 4 11 39.5 31 420 974
EUR trades mean 3.51 5.28 216.04 101.55 1,195.58 2,134.96
50% 0 0 6 3 57 420
Buy trades mean 38.37 57.73 961.54 258.11 6,979.78 13,340.83
50% 4 8 32 26 345 1,294
Sell trades mean 39.42 59.68 1,115.59 342.77 7,727.49 14,832.30
50% 1 4 45 38 531 1261
Bitcoins bought mean 532.96 803.79 6,332.91 2,339.71 40,496.94 77,816.93
50% 18.2 46.2 146.7 123.7 904.3 3917.4
Bitcoins sold mean 532.96 807.55 7,046.89 3,062.71 41,133.74 78,812.37
50% 2.0 13.6 186.7 164.4 878.7 4,157.9
’$’ sent mean 6,000.03 9,028.33 84,535.25 30,326.24 548,323.41 1,044,742.87
50% 237.7 554.6 1,943.0 1,479.7 15,144.1 48,984.1
’$’ received mean 6,000.08 9,075.14 91,647.19 38,076.37 549,975.38 1,046,048.90
50% 31.3 200.4 2614.5 2010.8 15147.7 33674.9
’$’ per trade mean 158.94 149.97 131.75 134.09 111.75 91.57
50% 67.1 67.7 64.5 67.5 52.1 54.7
Active days mean 10.23 14.86 55.17 48.20 114.80 190.65
50% 3 6 23 20 55 171
Active hours mean 20.67 30.69 237.14 145.38 1,022.20 1,790.96
50% 4 8 38 34 200 598
Trades per day mean 3.16 4.09 10.75 6.43 47.64 79.97
50% 2 2.5 3.9 3.4 12.1 20.3
Trades per hmy mean 2.17 2.62 3.18 2.80 6.43 7.97
50% 1.5 1.9 2.3 2.1 3.9 4.8
User ID mean 35,903.50 32,745.60 33,816.86 33,726.13 34,593.13 31,252.04
50% 3590X 3175X 3133X0 3117X 3899X 2763X
Notes: (I) on the meaning of ‘$’. To make the results comparable, I converted in USD
the value of the trades denominated in different fiat currencies. (II) The user ID is a
sequential value that does not correspond to the one originally reported in the leaked
dataset; the unit is hidden to preserve anonymity.
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Chapter 4
Two-point arbitrage in the
Bitcoin ecosystem
In this Chapter I identify the investors who performed two-point arbitrage across
exchange platforms in the Bitcoin ecosystem. I investigate a time period ranging
from April 2011 to March 2013, and focus on the activity in USD between Mt.
Gox and two other cryptocurrency exchanges, BTC-e and Bitstamp. This choice
is subordinated to the availability of the dataset containing the history of trades
executed within the Mt. Gox platform: each leg of all trades is labeled by a user-
specific identifier, allowing to reconstruct the sequence of actions executed by
each investor. I match these sequences to ‘ideal’ sequences of arbitrage trades,
considering the price differences between exchanges and a user-specific estimate
of transaction costs. The latter involves the fee model described in Chapter 2
inspired by the posted fee schedules and fitted to empirical data. The subset
of investors whose actual series matches the ideal series best are potential arbi-
trageurs: out of around 72,000 users, I identify 1,441 potential arbitrageurs with
all two counterpart exchanges. I cross-compare their activity within the Mt. Gox
platform to the history of trades in the anonymized logs of the counterpart ex-
changes, and construct a second metric that indicates if matches (equivalent and
simultaneous trades) are found. I post-filter the first estimation and further re-
duce the set of detected users to 10 arbitrageurs with Bitstamp and 45 with BTC-e,
for a total of 49. A comparison of aggregate statistics between arbitrageurs and
non-arbitrageurs is given and discussed.
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4.1 Introduction
Bitcoin is a communication protocol that facilitates the execution of value-
based transactions by preserving the user anonymity, and concurrently
solving the double-spending problem for a purely digital currency, bit-
coin, without resorting to a third party (Nakamoto, 2008a). It provides
pseudonymous users (Androulaki et al., 2013) with a virtual infrastruc-
ture to broadcast transactions, based on a decentralized peer-to-peer com-
munication network (Ron and Shamir, 2013), and relies on the activity of
miners, a subgroup of users who are rewarded in bitcoins - conditional
to performing a computational intensive task, the Proof of Work (PoW) -
to secure the system and ensure the validity of the proposed transactions
(Kroll, Davey, and Felten, 2013; Eyal and Sirer, 2014). This mechanism
eases the achievement of consensus across untrusted participants over
the state of the system - that is, the agreement on who owns and has the
authority to spend an amount of the valuable digital currency, bitcoin - in
a decentralized fashion (Barber et al., 2012; Bonneau et al., 2015; Garay,
Kiayias, and Leonardos, 2015). Precisely this feature led the academic
community, along with practitioners, to envisage in it a potentially dis-
ruptive technology (Catalini and Gans, 2016).
Whilst its design principle is non-trivial, requires deep technological
skills to avoid operational errors and exposes users to non-conventional
risks, Bitcoin started attracting soon the attention of investors not neces-
sarily exposed to such technological knowledge, as an investment asset
rather than as an alternative payment system (Glaser et al., 2014; Yer-
mack, 2015). Exchange platforms, which are centralized intermediary
services that facilitate the trading of bitcoins against conventional pay-
ment systems (Böhme et al., 2015), gained consideration and attention
precisely for this reason, as they reduce the barriers to entry into the Bit-
coin ecosystem. They rely upon trading mechanisms adopted from tradi-
tional finance, and behave similarly to traditional banks (Anderson et al.,
2018). They act de facto as intermediaries between the Bitcoin network
of users and the traditional finance system.
Such exchanges have a relevant role in the Bitcoin ecosystem in terms
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of volumes moved (Lischke and Fabian, 2016), and ultimately are the
place where the price formation mechanism takes place. Noteworthy,
the internal dynamics of different bitcoin exchanges are not directly re-
lated. An essential question is how such exchange-specific information
is broadcast across different platforms, and to what extent prices in other
venues embody it: the founding financial concept of market efficiency
foresees that in an efficient market the asset price incorporates all rele-
vant information (Fama, 1970). The concept of market efficiency is strictly
connected to that of arbitrage, that is, in its simplest form, the simultane-
ous purchase and sale of the same asset in two markets at different prices
(S. Ross, 1976, and S. Ross, 1978): in an efficient market, the asset is cor-
rectly priced in each trading venue, and arbitrage opportunities do not
exist. Should they arise, according to theory they would immediately
be wiped out by arbitrageurs ready to exploit such risk-free opportu-
nities of profit. In this sense, arbitrageurs perform the important task
of ‘information carriers’ across exchanges. However, evidence suggests
that bitcoin prices do diverge across markets, reflecting local information
asymmetries (Urquhart, 2016; Cheah et al., 2018). Furthermore, a recent
stream of literature shows that arbitrage in practice is de facto limited in
many circumstances (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997), and recognizes the im-
portance of better understandig who are abitrageurs in practice (Gromb
and Vayanos, 2010). Identifying empirically the presence of arbitrageurs
who exploit price deviations across trading venues would be a proof of
its efficiency, and describing their individual behaviour at the micro level
could help to understand and possibly reduce the gap that persists be-
tween theory and practice: to the best of my knowledge, this aspect is
still unexplored in the financial literature at the user-specific level.
This analysis goes precisely into that direction. I seek to provide evi-
dence of the existence of arbitrage across the Bitcoin exchange platforms,
and I investigate to what extent such mechanism, that ensures the mar-
ket efficiency in traditional financial markets, is conducted also in the
nascent and less regulated context of the Bitcoin ecosystem. I exploit
the Mt. Gox leaked dataset that contains all the internal trades executed
from April 2011 to November 2013 in the Mt. Gox exchange platform
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and focus on the investors that performed arbitrage across Mt. Gox and
two other markets of the Bitcoin ecosystem, namely BTC-e and Bitstamp.
Most importantly, I tackle the topic through a bottom-up approach and
try to identify cross-exchange arbitrage activity at the individual level:
the novelty of the approach resides in the fact that the leaked dataset al-
lows to exploit the user identifiers associated to each leg of a trade to re-
construct the sequence of trades performed by each investor. The method-
ology consists essentially in a double comparison of the user-specific se-
quences with the price deviations across exchanges and with the logs of
anonymized trades conducted in BTC-e and Bitstamp, in order to quan-
tify to what extent each users’ trading sequences were consistent with
arbitrage activity.
In this sense, this work must be intended as the conceptual extension
of the analyses conducted in Chapter 3, that focus on the description of
the triangular arbitrage activity within the same exchange platform, that
is, Mt. Gox. The reported findings suggest that from 2011 to early 2013
triangular arbitrage in Mt. Gox was indeed conducted; in accordance
with the anecdotal evidence, the identified arbitrageurs are few and ex-
pert users that perform many trades, conduct complex strategies - likely
executing metaorders and exploiting automated trading - and whose ac-
tions are significantly more profitable with respect to those performed
by non experts. I ground this work on these findings and investigate if
and how price information propagates across exchanges through the ac-
tivity of investors looking for mispricings in the Bitcoin markets; once
identified, I describe the arbitrageurs’ main features.
This analysis brings a methodological contribution by introducing
new algorithms for the analysis of financial markets. To the best of my
knowledge, no other study developed tools to identify individual arbi-
trageurs trading across platforms. It is important to note that this method
is based on the contingent structure of the available data: while the user
identifiers for the trades in Mt. Gox are known, the datasets of the BTC-e
and Bitstamp exchanges are ledgers of anonymized trades. I thus con-
tribute to an unexplored field by proposing a methodology valid for
this specific data structure; other algorithms would be required if user
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identifiers were available for both exchanges, and further differences
would arise in case it was possible to link the identifiers across exchanges
(if user-specific identifiers are not available for any of the exchanges in
exam, the only possible strategy is to analyse aggregate data).
If the proposed methodology is accepted, this work contributes also
to the study of the financial markets by shedding some light on the in-
dividual behavior of users involved in arbitrage. Understanding the in-
sights of practical arbitrage in contrast with the theoretical assumptions
is a not fully answered - though relevant - question (Gromb and Vayanos,
2010); to the best of my knowledge, this work is the first describing the
trading behavior of arbitrageurs between exchanges at the individual
level. I find that arbitrageurs are very few users, are likely sophisticated,
perform more trades and move more volume than the average user.
I also provide a substantial contribution to the growing area of re-
search on the cryptocurrency markets, and more in general on cryptoe-
conomics by providing evidence that - to some extent - the mechanisms
that ensure market efficiency in traditional financial markets are put into
practice also in cryptocurrency markets. Second, I shed some light on
the internal dynamics of such markets, and especially of the Mt. Gox
platform, who played a prominent role at the early stages of the Bitcoin
ecosystem. Finally, I document the history of fees paid in the three stud-
ied exchanges from 2011 to 2013.
Ultimately, hereby I extend and complete the findings reported in
Chapter 3. The analysis on triangular arbitrage exploits a richer dataset
(all relevant information relates to trades executed within Mt. Gox, thus
arbitrage actions can be identified exactly), and evidence is stronger and
more robust with respect to this analysis. However, the results obtained
on two-point arbitrage refer to the role of arbitrageurs as information
carriers across exchanges, and are in some sense more general.
This Chapter mainly documents a data science approach to the prob-
lem. On a high level, the pipeline consists of three stages: pre-processing,
identification of potential arbitrageurs, and elimination of false positives.
Each stage poses specific challenges, which I document and propose so-
lutions for. In Section 4.2 I provide some brief context, and describe
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the data and the analytical approach. The most interesting parts of the
work concern the definition of the metrics and the post-filtering stage
(Section 4.3): first, I discuss the matching algorithm, that compares the
sequences of users’ actions with the price deviations across exchanges,
along with the resulting similarity metrics (Section 4.3.1); then, I define a
second indicator based on the identification of trades executed in a small
neighborhood of time and volume (mirror trades) into the counterpart
exchanges, which I call co-execution metric. Finally, I implement the
post-filtering procedure by cross-comparing the two metrics, to remove
the false positives (Section 4.3.2). I report the results on the set of iden-
tified arbitrageurs for the two counterpart exchanges in Section 4.3.3. In
Section 4.4 I comment the results. Additional information is reported in
the Appendix Section.
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4.2 Background and analytical approach
4.2.1 The early stages of the Bitcoin ecosystem
The adoption of Bitcoin at its early stages1 was mainly driven by the
interest towards decentralization, enhanced privacy, and for its ‘cypher-
punk’ libertarian values (De Filippi, 2014, and 2018). The anonymity
provided by Bitcoin, combined with its digital nature, made of it the pre-
ferred method of payment for illicit activities on online black markets:
an emblematic example is the case of Silk Road, an online marketplace
dedicated to the commerce of illegal goods and services (Christin, 2013;
Foley, Karlsen, and Putnin, š, 2019). Besides this, Bitcoin has been largely
associated also to other illicit activities such as thefts, frauds, and money
laundering (Möser, Böhme, and Breuker, 2013; Vasek and Moore, 2015;
Yin and Vatrapu, 2017). The study by Foley, Karlsen, and Putnin, š, 2019
reveals that, up to 2017, around 46% of all the bitcoin transactions were
associated to illicit activity, and that a significant fraction of its value can
be attributed to the involvement in illicit activities.
Bitcoin at its early stages was widely used also for gambling (Möser
and Böhme, 2015): the most notable example is the one of SatoshiDice,
a website allowing players to bet on the result of the virtual launch of a
dice with a bitcoin-based rewarding mechanism. Interestingly, the num-
ber of transactions on the network associated to gambling amount to
almost 48% in the first four years of existence of Bitcoin, and are very
small in volume (Lischke and Fabian, 2016). According to the authors,
the largest transactions in volume are instead associated to the exchange
services. Indeed, the last relevant use case of Bitcoin in its first years was
as an investment asset traded in the exchange services: the most relevant
in terms of liquidity and adoption was Mt. Gox, who started its activi-
ties in 2010 and dominated the market until 2013, before being filed for
bankruptcy in February 2014 (Moore, Christin, and Szurdi, 2018).
1There is no precise classification for the different epochs of the Bitcoin ecosystem; how-
ever, the literature commonly refers to the early stages as the time window that precedes
the failure of the exchange platform Mt. Gox, due to the importance that this event had
within the Bitcoin ecosystem. See, e.g., Figure 2.
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4.2.2 The Bitcoin exchange services
The Bitcoin design originally envisages two primary ways to obtain bit-
coins: by conducting the mining activity, or by accepting bitcoins as a
method of payment (Antonopoulos, 2017). In both cases, users must be
active nodes of the network and possess sufficient technological skills to
manage and run a dedicated software. Furthermore, the protocol itself
exposes users to high risks, if mishandled (Conti et al., 2018), and the
network itself can be subject to attacks and malicious activity (Benjamin
Johnson et al., 2014; Vasek and Moore, 2015). Handling bitcoins correctly
is non-trivial and several barriers to entry exist: especially at the early
stages, the adoption of Bitcoin was confined to a limited number of users
with a good knowledge and understanding of the Bitcoin design princi-
ples and mechanisms.
Currency exchanges are an alternative method to get hold of bitcoins
that reduce the barriers to entry by limiting the technological and switch-
ing costs: they are trading platforms that provide users with an online
interface to trade bitcoins (and other cryptocurrencies) against fiat cur-
rencies (Böhme et al., 2015). Most of them adopt the trading mechanisms
of the traditional equity markets, where traders submit buy and sell or-
ders and the exchange clears trades, providing the service for a fee. In
general, they are organized as order-driven markets with two sided con-
tinuous auctions; users do not need to resort to brokerage services, and
rather trade directly among them.
The most prominent Bitcoin trading platforms for the epoch I con-
sider are Mt. Gox, Bitsamp, BTC-e, and BTC China. While the latter was
active mostly on the Chinese market (and for this reason is out of the
scope of this work), the first two entered the market allowing to trade
Bitcoins for USD in mid-2011. Figure 42 in Appendix B.1 shows the daily
number of trades executed in the three exchanges taken in exam, and for
the whole time window Mt. Gox was by far the largest exchange.
A key feature characterizes such platforms: in the original design, a
transaction is conducted across owners of a Bitcoin wallet (i.e., nodes of
the Bitcoin network) and stored on the public ledger (Decker and Watten-
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hofer, 2013). Exchanges platforms instead are in all respects centralized
services, as they hold in escrow the customers’ funds, maintain and up-
date the balances on a private ledger, and charge the trades with fees (in
this regard such entities operate as a traditional trading platform, as the
investors buy and sell an asset through an intermediary that maintains
the online structure). An important consequence is that the trading op-
erations are internal to the node and not transcribed on the blockchain,
i.e., are executed off-chain (Anderson et al., 2018). To perform arbitrage
across exchange platforms, in the presence of price differences, an in-
vestor could perform two simultaneous operations of withdrawal and
deposit on the Bitcoin network, from different exchanges, to balance the
position and make profit without risk; this operation is costly in terms
of time (on average, a block is added every ten minutes, and it is good
practice to wait for a few blocks to be added before considering verified
the transaction), and exposes the trader to risks common to all arbitrage
activity and specific to Bitcoin’s design. The optimal strategy is instead
to maintain a stock of both bitcoins and fiat money in accounts at each
exchange, in order to react quickly to price differences (Petrov and Schu-
fla, 2013). As a consequence, arbitrage is not observable on the public
ledger; rather, evidence is embedded in the private ledgers held by the
exchanges.
Notably, similar issues to those described in Subsection 4.2.1, as well
as new and unconventional risks, pertain to the exchange platforms:
exit scams (i.e., platforms that cease operations abruptly without refund-
ing customers: see Moore and Christin, 2013; Vasek and Moore, 2015),
price manipulation (Gandal, Hamrick, et al., 2018) and trading strate-
gies otherwise illegal in traditional financial markets, hacks and DDoS
attacks (Feder, Gandal, Hamrick, and Moore, 2018) are common phe-
nomena to the Bitcoin exchange platforms. A report by the Bitwise com-
pany (Hougan et al., 2019) shows that several exchange platforms appar-
ently report suspiciously inflated volumes, and according to their find-
ings likely only few exchanges have actual volume and operate trans-
parently (interestingly, they claim that once the fraudulent platforms are
filtered out, the BTC market is smaller, more ordered and more regulated
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Figure 27: Related work on two-point arbitrage.

















Badev and M. Chen, 2014
Krückeberg and Scholz, 2020
Pieters and Vivanco, 2017
Bistarelli et al., 2019
Kroeger and Sarkar, 2017
Makarov and Schoar, 2020
Hautsch, Scheuch, and Voigt, 2018
than is commonly thought). Showing that arbitrage across exchanges ex-
ists would be of the utmost importance, even more so in the light of the
aforementioned challenges and risks associated to cryptocurrencies ex-
change platforms.
4.2.3 Market efficiency and arbitrage across bitcoin exchange
platforms
A stream of literature investigates the efficient market hypothesis on Bit-
coin. Urquhart (2016) studies the returns on Bitcoin price by using ag-
gregate data from several exchange platforms from August 2010 to July
2016, and concludes that it is not efficient by performing five different
tests. Nonetheless, he shows that the efficiency increases from 2013 on-
wards. This claim is challenged by Nadarajah and Chu (2017): they find
that the odd integer power of the Bitcoin returns indeed respect the EMH
for the same time window. Cheah et al. (2018) study the long-memory
interdependence acoross Bitcoin markets: markets are fractionally coin-
tegrated, inefficiencies are persistent and leave profit opportunities to
investors. Similar results on long-memory interdependency are found in
Bariviera (2017) and Kristoufek (2018), especially for the first years of the
Bitcoin existence. The findings in Tiwari et al. (2018) are instead consis-
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tent with those in Nadarajah and Chu (2017). In summary, the literature
that studies the efficiency of the Bitcoin market agrees that in the epoch I
investigate (that is, until 2013) the market was not efficient, while a posi-
tive trend can be identified in the subsequent epochs.
Besides this, several previous works investigated the magnitude of
arbitrage across the Bitcoin exchange platforms2; all the analyses are con-
ducted on aggregate information published by the exchanges, and none
of them investigated the market at the micro (individual) level. Badev
and M. Chen (2014) focus on a time window comparable to the one in
exam in this paper. They investigate two-point arbitrage between ex-
changes, but the most remarkable price differences reported fall into the
period when the Mt. Gox exchange collapsed, and thus are beyond my
sample. The best explanation for these differences is the counter-party
risk of the tumbling exchange, rather than unexploited arbitrage oppor-
tunities. Krückeberg and Scholz (2020), who study a rather long dataset,
show that arbitrage opportunities across exchanges are left unexploited,
and some predictable patterns can be identified; they attribute the cause
to the lack of capital and sophistication, rather than to the lack of finan-
cial tools. Pieters and Vivanco (2017) explain international inconsisten-
cies in the price of Bitcoin with the regulatory environment towards cryp-
tocurrencies: markets with tighter regulation, which is approximated by
the level of customer identification required to open an account in the
exchanges, seem to charge a risk premium. Bistarelli et al. (2019) pro-
pose a theoretical model which is fitted on empirical data. They pro-
pose a model based on the identification of common risk factors across
markets that allows for small deviations to exist (and further confirm
their assumptions with an empirical analysis). The work by Kroeger and
Sarkar (2017), albeit incomplete at the time of writing, is probably closest
to this analysis. The authors show that even after accounting for both
explicit (fees) and implicit (illiquidity and volatility) transaction costs,
2See Chapter 3 and the works cited therein for a review of the literature on triangular
arbitrage (H. Dong and W. Dong, 2015; Pieters and Vivanco, 2015; Smith, 2016; Pichl and
Kaizoji, 2017; Reynolds et al., 2018; Yu and Zhang, 2018; Hirano et al., 2018; Nan and
Kaizoji, 2019) and on the Bitcoin futures (Hattori and Ishida, 2018; Shynkevich, 2020; S.
Lee, El Meslmani, and Switzer, 2020).
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arbitrage opportunities pertain between exchanges. In particular, bit-
coins are traded at a consistently lower price on one exchange, BTC-e.
Makarov and Schoar (2020) investigate the role of capital controls to ex-
plain the observed market frictions between 2017 and early 2018. Finally,
Hautsch, Scheuch, and Voigt, 2018 focus on a short time window from
April to September 2018. Their main contribution is to derive theoretical
bounds to arbitrage, which could arise as a consequence of the settlement
time needed for arbitrage strategies that require bitcoin transfers across
exchanges.
4.2.4 Data and Analytical approach
Figure 28 shows the analytical pipeline of the approach in detail. It is
based on two data sources: the main one, the leaked internal log of files
of the Mt. Gox exchange platform, and the logs of anonymized trades
conducted in the two other relevant exchanges in the EUR and USD cur-
rency market for BTC-e, and USD for Bitstamp. The latter are obtained
from the Bitcoincharts.com Market API3. I use them in the raw format
to detect the mirror trades (that is, equivalent trades in a small neigh-
borhood of time and volume) in the counterpart exchanges, and in the
aggregate form at the hour level to obtain the open high low close vol-
ume (OHLCV) series to compare the mispricings between Mt. Gox and
the counterpart exchanges.
The pre-processing stage involves the data cleaning of the Mt. Gox
files and is discussed in Chapter 2. As in Chapter 3, I aggregate the trades
belonging to the same user that occurred within the same second to ac-
count for the matching mechanism of the Mt. Gox platform’s order book
clearing algorithm, and I limit the analysis to the time period preceding
April 2013 for the increased difficulties faced by the users in withdraw-
ing money from their accounts (as a consequence, bitcoins started to be
traded at a large premium in Mt. Gox: this is clearly visible in Figure 29,
that shows the bitcoin USD price difference between Mt. Gox and the
two counterpart exchanges, as a percentage of the Mt. Gox price, at the
3https://bit.ly/2H52exr. This link and the following were all accessed on 14 Oc-
tober 2020.
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Figure 28: Overview of the analytical approach.




























Notes: approach for the identification of arbitrage across exchanges. The pre-
processing stage for the leaked dataset is common both to two-point and triangular
arbitrage analysis and is described in Chapter 2.
hourly level from August 2011 to November 2013). Since I consider these
events to mark the transition through different epochs, and the premium
paid in Mt. Gox would likely bias the estimations, I decided to limit the
analysis by excluding the trades conducted from April 2013 on. I end up
considering a dataset of around 5.5 mln cleared orders, from April 2011
to the end of March 2013.
To understand the intuition underlying the metrics definition and the
post-filtering stages, it is important to highlight that the internal ledger of
one exchange does not allow to identify two-point arbitrage on the level
of individual (pairs of) trades. However, the findings in Chapter 3 sug-
gest that the arbitrageurs are users who perform arbitrage consistently
over a longer period of time: under this assumption, it is possible to
identify the users in the Mt. Gox dataset whose sequence of actions can
be plausibly explained with arbitrage exploiting the differences in pub-
lished prices between Mt. Gox and any counterpart exchange. The high-
level idea of the approach is to generate an ‘ideal’ series of arbitrage ac-
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tions for each counterpart of Mt. Gox from aggregate information. This
ideal series is then matched against the actual trades of each user in the
Mt. Gox dataset. The set of users with the highest similarity between
ideal and actual trades are likely arbitrageurs. Whilst this approach is
based on longitudinal similarity metric and is biased against users who
execute few trades, which are excluded by the analysis, the results in
Chapter 3 ensure also that the loss of information is marginal for the
purposes of this analysis.
This step, alone, doesn’t allow to exclude alternative explanations for
the series of actions performed by those users. By definition of two-point
arbitrage, an investor conducts two trades, one in Mt. Gox and one in the
counterpart exchange: so, for each user and for each action I verify the
existence of concurrent trades (or mirror trades) in the counterpart ex-
changes, and I construct a second indicator (co-execution metrics) on the
share of actions with a mirror trade per each user. This approach allows
to identify and remove the false positives: the post-filtering stage, that
consists in cross-comparing the two metrics, further reduces the afore-
mentioned group of potential arbitrageurs and leads eventually to the
identification of the final set of arbitrageurs. The latter two stages are
described in detail in the next paragraphs.
4.3 Method and Results
In this section I describe the algorithms exploited to identify the subset
of arbitrageurs based on their sequence of actions. To do so, I first pro-
vide a measure of the explicit transaction costs paid by the users to trade
within Mt. Gox: according to the official posted schedule, the investors
would pay a fee ranging from 0.65% to 0.25% based on their individual
history of volume traded. Notably, the dataset contains information on
the fees paid by the user per each trade. However, I rely on the model
described in Chapter 2, as inconsistencies between the fee schedule and
the observed data exist4, and I base the analysis on the estimated explicit
4A small fraction of legs are associated to fees higher than 1% of the trades but, most
importantly, more than 1,000,000 legs pay zero fees. To keep a conservative approach, I
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transaction costs paid by the users to perform a trade. Second, since two-
point arbitrage requires two trades, one on Mt. Gox and a second one on
another exchange, it is necessary to include an estimate of the fees that
the investor would pay on the counterpart exchange. Relying on each
counterpart’s posted fees at the time of the analysis5, I add a transac-
tion cost of 0.2% of the amount traded when the counterpart exchange is
BTC-e. Since Bitstamp applied a fee schedule similar to Mt. Gox, based
on the volume traded in the last 30 days, but ranging from 0.5% to 0.2%
and having different bands, I add a term corresponding to the fee paid in
Mt. Gox, but rescaled proportionally to Bitstamp’s fee range. Figure 28
in Chapter 1 reports a detailed representation of how such costs changed
over time.
4.3.1 Matching and Similarity Metric
Figure 29: Price differences between Mt. Gox compared to Bitstamp and
BTC-e, as a percentage of the Mt. Gox price, in USD.
The fee estimation provides an approximation of the expected trans-




action costs, which vary across users and time. This assumption is es-
sential, as the individual fees affect how the same arbitrage opportunity
is perceived by different users: an identical mis-pricing can appear as an
unexploited arbitrage opportunity for an investor who pays low enough
fees, and a costly operation for a trader that pays higher fees (it is less
clear and hard to determine, instead, what are the hidden costs that the
investors face). The next step of the analysis consists in defining a heuris-
tic approach to identify the users who are likely to be arbitrageurs: I
match the sequence of actions executed by each real user, together with
the associated fees paid, against an ideal sequence of optimal actions
made by a ‘perfect arbitrageur’; thus, I introduce a similarity metric to
classify investors in potential arbitrageurs and non-arbitrageurs. The
comparison of the mispricings is based on hourly frequency, therefore
I first aggregate the price time series for the two counterpart exchanges
and compare it with Mt. Gox hourly prices, as Figure 29 shows.
The matching procedure works as follows. First, I describe the ra-
tional behavior of an ideal arbitrageur within Mt. Gox, with respect to
each observable hourly mispricing between Mt. Gox and a counterpart
exchange E. For every time interval, the optimal response of an ideal
arbitrageur is drawn from the set of actions A = {Buy (B), Sell (S), Hold
(H)}: without transaction costs, should the prices be higher in Mt. Gox,
an active arbitrageur would sell in Mt. Gox (and buy in E). Viceversa,
he/she would buy in Mt. Gox when prices are lower. If there is no mis-
pricing, the best action is to hold (in practice, without transaction costs,
this never happens). I construct then a sequence of hourly ideal response
actions (B,S,H) to price changes between Mt. Gox and E. The magnitude
of the mispricing allows to measure also the associated maximum trans-
action costs that would entail zero profits in each hour. The information
contained in this ideal sequence is common to each user and publicly
available.
Second, I aggregate user actions at the hour level. When a user sub-
mits more than one trade in the same hour, I define the hourly prevalent
action as Buy if the difference between the amount of bitcoins bought and
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Figure 30: Illustrative example of the matching heuristic.
Time:
Ideal Series:
h0 h1 h2 . . . hi . . . hn




















(B,0.4) NA (B,0.4) NA NA (S,0.3) (S,0.4)
Notes: at each point in time ht the buy/sell action that an ideal arbitrageur would ex-
ecute given the mis-pricing is known and public, as well as the value ft for the magni-
tude of the arbitrage opportunity. FU,i represents the fee paid and varies across time
and users. The last row shows the tuples (Prevalent Action, Fee) for a representative
user U. Now, for this illustrative example, suppose that all the values fi are bigger
than 0.5%, except f2 = 0.3%. Once individual fees are included, some of the f values
might turn out to be too small for the user to be exploited as arbitrage opportunities,
because the fees exceed the size of the mis-pricing. E.g. in this case, even though the
ideal and actual action at time h2 correspond, the fee exceeds the price differences: an
ideal arbitrageur would then ‘Hold’ (H); so, this action is counted as ‘non-arbitrageur
like’ for user U. NA stands for Not Active, meaning that in this time window the
user did not make any trade; green tuples are classified as ‘arbitrageurs-like’, while
red tuples as ‘non arbitrageurs-like’.
sold is positive, and as Sell if negative6. Matching takes place only on the
hours in which the user is active7. I do not make any deduction on the
‘arbitrageur-like’ behavior of a user during times of inactivity.
6I exclude the (rare) cases in which the difference is equal to zero. Fees are aggregated
by computing the mean value for trades within the same hour.
7Note also that the matching algorithm only compares time-periods in which both the
user action and the price difference between Mt. Gox and the counterpart exchange are
available. E.g., Bitstamp data are available only from September 2011 onwards.
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Third, I compare the hourly series of actions of each user to the ideal
one, updated so as to account for his/her individual expected fees. The
intuition is that, to execute arbitrage, the user observes in each time inter-
val the publicly available information on price deviations and maximum
transaction costs, and then he/she incorporates the private information
on the fee expected to pay given the personal history of volume traded.
Thus, given the user-specific expected fees, he/she derives the individual
ideal best action: once such costs are accounted for, the same arbitrage
opportunities appear profitable (or unprofitable) to a different degree for
each user.
The matching algorithm compares the user sequence to his/her in-
dividual ideal sequence of actions: an action is considered as ‘arbitrage-
like’ if it corresponds to the one that an ideal arbitrageur would perform
in the same time window, and if concurrently the user-specific expected
transaction costs do not exceed the size of the mis-pricing. If the expected
transaction costs are too large, then the action would be not profitable.
Figure 30 shows an illustrative example of the matching procedure for
an illustrative user U.
As a result of the matching algorithm, only a fraction of each user
‘hourly actions’ correspond to potential two-point arbitrage actions. For
each user I compute then the fraction of ‘arbitrage-like’ actions that cor-
respond to potential two-point arbitrage with respect to the counterpart
exchange E. I rank the users based on this parameter in descending
order. I repeat these steps for each counterpart exchange, considering
the price time series denominated in USD. Figure 31 shows two lines,
one per exchange, each dot representing the users ranked in descend-
ing order, based on the share of ‘arbitrage-like’ actions. Note that, for
each counterpart exchange, actions are matched independently: a user
ranked nth in a counterpart exchange might be ranked mth in another,
and a user can be classified as potential arbitrageur in no exchange as
well as in both exchanges. As stated in Section 4.2.4, I assume that arbi-
trageurs are users who perform arbitrage consistently over a long period
of time; thus, for each counterpart exchange, I take into account only
the users for which the matching occurs on more than 100 hours. Users
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Figure 31: Share of trades that correspond to two-point arbitrage actions
with another exchange, per user.
Notes: trades are evaluated independently for the counterpart exchanges Bitstamp
and BTC-e; users whose share is above 0.33 are treated as potential arbitrageurs.
The analysis is performed for users for which the matching occurs on more than 100
hours.
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whose share of ‘arbitrage-like’ actions is above 0.33 are classified as po-
tential arbitrageurs (see Appendix B.1 for further details on the choice
of the parameters). On a total of 71,808 users, 70,367 are always clas-
sified as non-arbitrageurs, while 1,441 investors are detected as poten-
tial arbitrageurs on at least one exchange. The set of users identified
on Bitstamp is smaller with respect to BTC-e (around 750 potential ar-
bitrageurs against around 1400): the dominance of BTC-e is due to the
fact that, throughout the whole time window, bitcoins are traded at a
slightly lower price in BTC-e. Both lines follow a sigmoid trend; in Bit-
stamp, with respect to BTC-e, it is possible to notice a steeper decline of
the users whose fraction of arbitrage-like actions is high.
4.3.2 Post-filtering and results
The potential arbitrageurs identified with this method are likely an over-
estimation of the true set of investors that performed arbitrage; most im-
portantly, the algorithm just described relies on assumptions which im-
ply that their sequences of actions could be explained with arbitrage, but
it doesn’t allow to rule out the possible alternative hypotheses on the de-
tected users’ trading behavior. I implement a second procedure to over-
come these issues and to control for the presence of false positives; as a
result, I further narrow down the set of identified potential arbitrageurs.
By definition of two-point arbitrage, whenever an arbitrageur pur-
sues his/her strategy, one would expect to observe two trades, executed
by the same investor, to buy (sell) bitcoins in Mt. Gox and simultane-
ously sell (buy) the same amount in the counterpart exchange. However,
while the Mt. Gox trades are labelled at the user level, the logs of the
counterpart exchanges are anonymized. Thus, I cannot identify exactly
the arbitrage actions across exchanges by comparing the user identifiers,
and the absence of user identifiers implies also that is not possible to infer
the direction of the action (whether buy or sell) executed in the counter-
part exchange. The most informative approach is thus to verify for which
trades a concurrent trade in the counterpart exchange does exist: exploit-
ing again the assumption that arbitrageurs are investors that performed
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Figure 32: Identification of the mirror trades.









Notes: for each trade executed at time T0 and volume Q0 by user U in Mt. Gox (left),
I verify whether there exists or not a trade in a neighborhood ±∆T and ±∆Q in
the counterpart exchange E (right). They gray shaded area represents the region of
values [T,Q] accepted to count a trade in E as a mirror trade for (T0, Q0) in Mt. Gox.
To identify exactly an arbitrage action, additional information on the orders executed
in the counterpart exchanges would be needed: as their logs are anonymized, I do
not have access to the user identifier; additionally, the direction (whether a buy or
sell) of the order in the counterpart exchange is not known.
arbitrage for long periods of time, I can construct a second indicator that
measures, for each user, the share of actions in Mt. Gox with a mirror
trade on the counterpart exchange. This co-execution metric gives addi-
tional information on the probability that an investor is an arbitrageur.
Furthermore, it obviates a drawback of the similarity metric introduced
before, which compares price differences at hourly level, while this step
is more oriented towards a high-frequency approach. Note that, while
one would expect to find a high number of mirror actions for the users
identified as potential arbitrageurs, there’s no reason to think that there
should be any kind of relationship, for the non-arbitrageur users, among
the execution timings of trades in Mt. Gox and in the counterpart ex-
changes.
I consider again only the set of users whose sequence of trades match
for at least 100 time intervals. For each of their trades I check for the
presence of a mirror trade in the counterpart exchange, that is, a trade in
a reasonably small neighborhood of time and volume, ±∆T and ±∆Q.
Figure 32 shows the intuition behind this step. Consistently with the
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Figure 33: Share of actions with a mirror trade in the counterpart exchange.
(a) more restrictive scenario: ∆T = 30s and ∆Q = 1%
(b) less restrictive scenario: ∆T = 300s and ∆Q = 10%
Notes: left: Bitstamp, right: BTC-e. Users ranked in descending order. The matching
occurred on at least 100 hours for all the users reported in the plots. Panel (a) reports
the results for the more restrictive scenario, panel (b) for the less restrictive one. Users
are represented on two different lines (yellow: non-arbitrageurs, blue: potential arbi-
trageurs), to qualitatively inspect the differences between the two groups. The x-axis
spans from 0 to 1 (the number of users in the two groups is normalized, so that dis-
tributions are easier to compare): each plot includes a subplot that focuses on the 5%
of arbitrageurs and non-arbitrageurs with the highest share of mirror trades.
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Figure 34: Post-filtering procedure.
(a) more restrictive scenario: ∆T = 30s and ∆Q = 1%
(b) less restrictive scenario: ∆T = 300s and ∆Q = 10%
Notes: I plot a dot per each user for which the matching occurs on more than 100
hours. The x-axis is the share of arbitrage-like actions, and the y-axis is the share of
actions with a mirror trade in the counterpart exchange (left: Bitstamp, right: BTC-e).
Again, Panel (a) reports the results for the more restrictive scenario, and Panel (b) for
the looser one.
151
empirical evidence reported in Chapter 3, I consider two different cases:
a more restrictive scenario with ∆T = 30s and ∆Q = 1%, and a less
restrictive one with ∆T = 300s, ∆Q = 10%.
All plots in Figure 33 report only the users for which the matching
occurred on at least 100 hours. As described above, the classification as
potential or non arbitrageur on one counterpart exchange is independent
with respect to the classification in the other. Panel (a) reports the results
for ∆T = 30s and ∆Q = 1%. Users are ranked in descending order,
based on the share of actions that have a mirror trade in the counterpart
exchange (Bitstamp on the left, BTC-e on the right). In each plot the blue
line represents the set of potential arbitrageurs with respect to the coun-
terpart exchange, and the yellow one shows the set of non-arbitrageur
users. The number of users in the two groups is normalized (the x-axis
spans from 0 to 1), so that distributions are easier to compare. Each plot
contains a subplot that focuses on the 5% of users with the highest share,
both for the group of arbitrageurs and for the group of non-arbitrageurs.
The vast majority of the users have values equal or close to 0 in both
sets. All the (few) users with a high share of mirror trades are in the set
of the potential arbitrageurs. The results are similar in the two counter-
part exchanges. Panel (b) repeats the same analysis in a less restrictive
scenario (∆T = 300s and ∆Q = 10%). The general results obtained in
the previous case are valid also in this scenario. The users with a high
share of mirror actions are few and belong to the group of potential arbi-
trageurs; the behavior of the users in the tail slightly differs: in both plots
in Panel (b) the share of actions with a mirror trade grows up faster. It is
likely that this effect is attributable to noise.
4.3.3 Identification of the arbitrageurs
To post-filter the group of potential arbitrageurs, I cross-compare the two
metrics for each user in the analysis; I show the results in Figure 34, again
both for ∆T = 30s, ∆Q = 1% (top) and for ∆T = 300s, ∆Q = 10% (bot-
tom). The plots on the left concern Bitstamp, those on the right BTC-e.
Each dot represents a user, defined by the share of arbitrage-like actions
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(x-axis) and the share of mirror actions in the counterpart exchange (y-
axis). The plots show that, especially for the more restrictive scenario,
the limited number of users with a high share of mirror trades also have
a high share of arbitrage-like actions. In particular, two different users
stand out when compared to the others, one in Bitstamp and one in BTC-
e: I refer to them as UBitstamp and UBTCe. I describe their trading behav-
ior in Table 20. In addition to that, I provide a description in Table 20 of a
wider group of users with at least 30% of mirror actions and at least 30%
of arbitrage-like actions in the less restrictive scenario, which I classify
as arbitrageurs. The choice of these two thresholds is arbitrary and is
discussed in Appendix B.1. The plots in Figure 34 show that the identifi-
cation procedure is more sensitive to the measure of the share of mirror
trades.
I identify 49 arbitrageurs in total, 10 between Mt. Gox and Bitstamp,
and 45 between Mt. Gox and BTC-e. Six of them are detected as arbi-
trageurs against both Bitstamp and BTC-e. Table 20 describes the trading
behaviors of the users detected as arbitrageurs. Column (e), that reports
the descriptive statistics for the users active for more than 100 hours, is
a benchmark for the comparison of UBitstamp (column (a)), UBTCe (col-
umn (b)), and the users with at least 30% of mirror actions and at least
30% of arbitrage-like actions with respect to BTC-e and Bitstamp (respec-
tively columns (c) and (d)). Column (f) shows the results for the whole
sample of users. UBitstamp and UBTCe are more active in terms of num-
ber of trades, Bitcoins, and fiat money traded, when compared to the
full sample of users (column (f)), while they are comparable to the set of
users described by column (e). The difference with respect to the set in
(f) can be explained as the analysis structurally excludes the users with
few transactions. It is less trivial instead to determine the reasons why
the differences with group (e) are smaller.
The second relevant finding is that only a small group of users are
identified as arbitrageurs. Both elements are in accordance with the as-
sertion that arbitrageurs are few and expert investors ‘with the knowl-
edge and information to engage in arbitrage’ (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997).
Focusing on the two groups in columns (c) and (d), the first noticeable
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pattern is that the characteristics of those in BTC-e, column (c), and Bit-
stamp, column (d), are quite different, with the latter being composed
of users more active both in terms of quantity of trades performed and
of volumes moved. The identified arbitrageurs in Bitstamp and BTC-e
performed on average less trades (both Buy and Sell) and moved less
money with respect to users in (e). Interestingly, all the users described
by (c), (d) and (e) tended to be more sellers than buyers of Bitcoins. Un-
expectedly, both groups of arbitrageurs alternated buy and sell actions
less often than group (e); the user identifier of (e) is higher, suggesting
that these users on average entered the market earlier with respect to the
users described in the other columns. While the behavior of the identi-
fied arbitrageurs is definitely different with respect to that of the whole
sample of users (column (f)), it is less straightforward to find a trading
pattern that differentiates them from the other investors active for long
periods of time (column (e)).
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Table 20: Comparison of identified arbitrageurs to non-arbitrageurs
Users with> 100 hours of activity All users
Identified arbitrageurs All
UBTC−e UBitstamp BTC-e Bitstamp
N of users (45) (10) (2, 039) (71, 808)
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f)
Total trades mean 1,203 5,970 942.8 1,458.3 1,908.5 77.8
50% 549 515.5 523 7
USD trades mean 1,203 5,970 940.6 1,458.3 1,827.2 70.6
50% 549 515.5 513 4
Buy trades mean 381 1,596 365.5 683.0 896.5 38.4
50% 188 305 222 4
Sell trades mean 822 4,374 577.3 775.3 1,012 39.4
50% 317 211 288 1
Changes of State mean 84 305 202.9 136.9 373.7 15.2
50% 103 76.5 109 0
Bitcoins bought mean 154.7 4,101.6 936.3 2,967.7 12,031.2 533
50% 258 1,386.3 1,425.5 18.2
Bitcoins sold mean 260.7 18,974.8 1,417.4 4,269.4 13,160 533
50% 420.4 1,254.2 1,869 2
‘$’ sent mean 8,550 46,728.6 31,171.0 68,245.6 121,683.7 6,000
50% 6,202.4 40,165.2 13,593.6 237.7
‘$’ received mean 14,292.1 231,780.8 37,717.8 81,536.3 130,316.9 6,000
50% 11,170.9 46,029.4 18,285.7 31.3
‘$’ per trade mean 19 46.7 73.9 185.0 149.5 158.9
50% 34.5 72.4 66.8 67.1
Active hours mean 167 1,307 261.8 324.4 387.1 20.7
50% 211 131 188 4
Active days mean 45 309 83.0 85.5 119.9 10.2
50% 71 50.5 92 3
Trades per hour mean 7.2 4.6 3.2 3.6 3.3 2.2
50% 2.4 3.4 2.5 1.5
Trades per day mean 26.7 19.3 14.5 16.7 12.7 3.2
50% 8.7 11.0 6.1 2
User ID mean 52,34X 31,20X 35,829.0 32,306.1 19,593.1 35,903.5
50% 3559X 33,40X 18,11X 35,90X
Notes: A note on the meaning of ‘$’. Some users in columns (e) and (f) made transac-
tions in fiat currency other than USD. Thus, to make results comparable, I converted
in USD the value of the trades denominated in different fiat currencies. Note also
that the user ID is a sequential value that does not correspond to the one originally
reported in the leaked dataset.
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4.4 Discussion
The aim of this work is to mine Mt. Gox’s internal ledger in order to
identify users who likely carried out two-point arbitrage between Mt.
Gox and two other Bitcoin exchanges, Bitstamp and BTC-e. To do so, I
pre-process the data sources following related work. I then exploit the
fee model introduced in Chapter 1 to estimate user-specific transaction
costs, and I define a similarity metric to compare users’ actual trades
to the actions of an ‘ideal arbitrageur’, given the individual transaction
costs and the price differences between Mt. Gox and the two counterpart
exchanges. I introduce a second indicator that measures, for each user,
how many trades in Mt. Gox have a mirror trade (that is, a trade in a
small neighborhood of volume and time), on a counterpart exchange.
I leverage these two metrics to identify a set of users that I classify as
arbitrageurs between Mt. Gox and the counterpart exchanges.
The paper contributes to the literature on Bitcoin and cryptocurren-
cies by shedding light on the internal dynamics of the Mt. Gox ecosys-
tem, and in particular on the actual fee scheme paid by the users in Mt.
Gox (and in the counterpart exchanges) from April 2011 to November
2013. Most of all, I devise a heuristic approach to detect arbitrageurs
across exchanges and I describe their trading behavior, giving a contribu-
tion on the financial literature related to the identification of arbitrageurs:
to the best of my knowledge, there is no empirical study investigating the
arbitrage activity across trading venues through a micro level approach.
As far as I know, this work represents the first attempt to fill this gap
in the literature, and the empirical evidence in support of the thesis that
arbitrageurs are ‘few professional, highly specialized investors’ (Shleifer
and Vishny, 1997, p. 36), is limited thus far to the contribution in Chap-
ter 3.
Assuming that the devised strategy actually detects correctly the arbi-
trageurs, a further extension of the work would consist in quantitatively
determining the impact of the arbitrageurs’ actions on the spreads be-
tween prices in Mt. Gox and in the counterpart exchanges. As Figure 29
shows, after a first phase characterized by high volatility, prices tended
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to converge from around April 2012 to around March 2013. A relevant
related research question would be to investigate whether the detected
users had a role in reducing the spread during this epoch and in achiev-
ing higher market efficiency.
Some open problems remain to be solved. For instance, I am aware
that the proposed method needs to be validated and requires further ro-
bustness checks: the heuristics rely on the choice of partially arbitrary pa-
rameters which are not fully supported by formal statistical methods nor
by theoretical argumentations. Besides this, a general limitation of this
approach and dataset is that it is not possible to observe the individual
behavior on the counterpart exchanges. Only the access to this informa-
tion, or an explicit proof from the same users that performed arbitrage,
would strengthen the evidence that what is being identified is actually
two-point arbitrage. As a consequence, rather than individual arbitrage
actions, I identify trading strategies plausibly consistent with arbitrage,
introducing a bias towards users who conducted mostly arbitrage in their
trading activity, and penalizing those who concurrently conducted arbi-
trage and other strategies. E.g., a user who conducted arbitrage only for a
limited time window before moving to other strategies may not be clas-
sified as arbitrageur. This bias is caused by the introduction of a cutoff,
which is however necessary to reduce the number of false positives with
low scores for the devised metrics. Furthermore, this longitudinal simi-
larity metric is biased against users with few transactions: this restricts
the ability to comprehensively answer the question if the arbitrageurs
are a few big players or many small investors. This research question is
better addressed in Chapter 3. However, as discussed above, the empir-
ical evidence reported therein shows that the vast majority of triangular
arbitrage actions are executed by few large users. The loss of information
due to the exclusion of users who executed few trades thus seems to be
marginal.
Another drawback is that it is not trivial to interpret arbitrage with
more than one counterpart exchange involved for the same user because
an investor could engage in two-point arbitrage between pairs of ex-
changes not including Mt. Gox. In this regard, a possible way forward
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could be to compose ideal series with actions involving two-point arbi-
trage between all pairs of exchanges and consider actions that do not
involve Mt. Gox as censored data points. However, in the time window
considered Mt. Gox was by far the largest platform in terms of volumes
traded: it is likely that all arbitrage activity had to be executed through
Mt. Gox.
Even when all of these open problems are addressed, the external
validity remains a concern. Can one learn anything substantial about ar-
bitrage activity across trading venues in conventional financial markets
from a nascent niche market that requires technical sophistication and
willingness to accept unusual risks? This question must be asked for the
early years of Bitcoin as well as the emerging markets in the crypto-token
ecosystem. For example, a very recent related work studying automated
arbitrage on Ethereum’s decentralized token exchanges reports sizable
opportunities, which are routinely exploited by a range of competing
trading bots (Daian et al., 2019). However, the external validity is further
compromised by an observer effect: apparently, the race was triggered
by a blog post and the release of proof-of-concept code for a trading bot




In the previous Chapters I described the methodologies that I devised to
identify the investors that conducted triangular and two-point arbitrage
within the Mt. Gox exchange platform between April 2011 and March
2013.
The main contribution of my thesis is that it is the first comprehen-
sive empirical study of the arbitrageurs at the individual level: to the
best of my knowledge, the previous empirical academic literature either
provided studies at the aggregate level or anecdotal evidence regarding
the arbitrageurs at the micro level; in addition, the theoretical description
of the arbitrageurs in traditional finance is far from the one provided by
the practitioners, and many recent studies show that de facto limits to ar-
bitrage exist, taking the form of persistent mispricings. Shedding some
light on the true behaviour and trading patterns of the arbitrageurs is a
compelling issue for the current research in behavioural finance (Gromb
and Vayanos, 2010). In the best case scenario, answering extensively to
the question ‘who are the arbitrageurs?’ could help refine the assump-
tions for the theoretical studies that derive optimal trading strategies in
the presence of arbitrageurs; a better understanding of the underlying
decision-making processes at the individual level could become a key
factor to further investigate the causes of the limits to arbitrage. In this
case, such investigations could have significant impact also on real mar-
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kets, leading to an overall reduction of the market inefficiencies.
In this sense, my study is a pioneering work in this stream of litera-
ture, as it identifies for the first time the users who conducted arbitrage
in a financial market, and it provides empirical evidence of their trade
patterns. In contrast with the assumptions typical of the traditional the-
oretical finance, and coherently with more recent studies in behavioural
finance (e.g. Shleifer and Vishny, 1997), the main finding of my work is
that the arbitrageurs are indeed few and skilled investors.
Nonetheless, I am aware of the potential limitations of this analysis,
as it is not trivial to prove the validity of these results in other financial
markets. Such external validation is made even more complex by the
specificity of the empirical setting: I focus on the Bitcoin market, which
is poorly regulated, subject to high unconventional risks, and I consider
a time period that corresponds to the early stages of the Bitcoin adoption.
This choice is opportunistic, in the sense that I exploit the Mt. Gox leaked
dataset for its unique richness: the trades are recorded in the private
ledger and are labelled by user identifiers, making possible to reconstruct
the sequences of individual actions, and exploit this essential feature to
identify the arbitrage activity.
I envisaged and devised two different approaches to identify the two
main types of arbitrage conducted in cryptocurrency markets, that is, ar-
bitrage within a single cryptocurrency market (triangular), and arbitrage
across multiple currency markets (two-point). Each method poses spe-
cific challenges, which I document and propose solutions for.
Chapter 2 provides a twofold contribution to the field of cryptoeco-
nomics by enriching the literature on the cryptocurrency exchange plat-
forms. First, I supply a polished version of the Mt. Gox leaked dataset. I
preprocess it by removing duplicate rows, and I correct misreported en-
tries; then I merge it with additional information published by the Mt.
Gox website itself. I provide a data cleaning procedure that relies on and
improves upon the existing ones, and I show that my polished dataset
is consistent with the ones obtained by Scaillet, Treccani, and Trevisan,
2017, Feder, Gandal, Hamrick, and Moore, 2018, and Gandal, Hamrick,
et al., 2018. The comparison with the data provided by Bitcoincharts.com
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confirms the validity of the proposed deduplication technique. Second, I
provide and discuss a model to account for the explicit transaction costs
borne by the users. I show that the fees a user would expect to pay given
their history of volume traded are consistent with the official fee schedule
reported by the exchange platform, and I provide possible explanations
for the trades that are associated with zero fees. Indeed, most of them are
executed by few users or are executed in specific time windows. Besides
this, I provide a clear scheme for the fees paid by the users in the most
relevant exchanges active in the Bitcoin ecosystem from 2011 to 2013 (Mt.
Gox, Bitstamp, BTC-e).
The most relevant results are reported in Chapter 3, where I describe
the methodology used to identify the triangular arbitrage executed within
the Mt. Gox platform. The exceptional granularity of the leaked dataset
allows to identify exactly the triangular arbitrage actions: indeed, users
were allowed to trade within the same platform in multiple fiat-to-bitcoin
markets, and were entitled to have only one personal account at a time.
This, along with the availability of user labels associated to the legs of
all trades, enables to match the pairs of (buy,sell) legs that satisfy the
textbook properties of arbitrage: that is, two legs executed by the same
investor, executed in two separate trades (different trade ID), using dif-
ferent currencies, and such that the time delay, δT , and the volume differ-
ence, δQ, are smaller than (or equal) the maximum boundaries ∆T and
∆Q.
Thus, the triangular arbitrage activity can be observed completely
within the private dataset of one exchange alone. By imposing a con-
servative boundary (∆T = 300s and ∆Q = 10%), I identify N = 6,629 ac-
tions, executed by N = 440 users. Most of the actions have values of δT ≈
0s and δQ ≈ 0%. This does not come unexpectedly, and it matches the
textbook definition according to which arbitrage is performed through
simultaneous actions involving almost equivalent securities. The arbi-
trage activity is distributed heterogeneously across the investors who
conducted it: few users are responsible for the majority of actions. In-
terestingly, such large users always exploit multiple fiat-to-fiat markets
(i.e., they execute arbitrage using bitcoins as the vehicle currency against
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more than two fiat currencies); a fraction of their arbitrage actions is
often executed in the form of metaorders; they only use limit orders
and never trade aggressively (which lets hypothesize that they indepen-
dently formed similar estimations of the price execution risk associated
to market orders and of the execution risk associated to limit orders). In
summary, their trade patterns are complex, and I assume that these four
variables are a proxy of expertise. I define the profitability of an arbi-
trage action as the percentage difference between the implied exchange
rate and the official rate (by construction the action is profitable if the for-
mer is larger than the latter). Indeed I show that, whatever the measure
of expertise considered, the arbitrage actions executed by expert users
are more profitable, with respect to those executed by non expert users,
which are on average non profitable when the explicit transaction costs
are accounted for. The premium is statistically significant: as an example,
for the dummy variable D(Currency), which is equal to 0 when the user
executed arbitrage actions only in a single fiat-to-fiat market and 1 oth-
erwise, the premium between experts and non experts amounts roughly
to 1.5%. In addition, I show that when within-user (across hours and
markets) variation is exploited the expert users who conduct arbitrage
in multiple markets make profits by reacting quickly to plausible exoge-
nous variations on the official exchange rates. The better ability in in-
corporating information from the markets on volatility and the correct
calculation of the transaction costs, which ultimately result in a better
timing choice of the skilled users at a small scale level, are in my inter-
pretation the most relevant factors that explain the differences in profits
between sophisticated and non sophisticated users.
The main findings of this Chapter try to provide an answer to some
aspects of the important question ’who are the arbitrageurs?’. They con-
cern the identification of the triangular arbitrage activity, the description
of the arbitrageurs’ characteristics and of their trade patterns, and the
design of an identification strategy showing that significant differences
arise across expert and non expert users. All these aspects can contribute
significantly to the field of behavioural finance, and could help reducing
the gap between the theoretical and practical description of arbitrage.
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First of all, the devised methodology identifies a non-negligible number
of actions that are coherently explainable as arbitrage activity, while it is
hard to find alternative explanations for their execution. Even in the case
that some of them are false positives, or that my method does not detect
correctly all the actions (e.g., due to the boundaries ∆T and ∆Q), the
analysis provides evidence that the triangular arbitrage was indeed con-
ducted within Mt. Gox even at the earliest stages of the Bitcoin ecosys-
tem. Second, I provide extensive proof that the arbitrageurs are few (only
440 out of around 72,000 are involved in arbitrage), and that the activity
of the sophisticated ones is systematically more profitable. To identify
the arbitrage activity, I introduced new algorithms suitable to investigate
the financial markets when user identifiers are available and the indi-
vidual sequences of actions can be reconstructed. Also this aspect rep-
resents a methodological contribution to the literature: to the best of my
knowledge, no other study developed similar tools, and such methodol-
ogy can be easily extended to any (non) financial market. The results are
also relevant for the field of cryptoeconomics and of the cryptocurrency
exchanges, as they bring evidence that established and relevant mecha-
nisms that guarantee the market efficiency in traditional finance do ap-
ply even to the Bitcoin ecosystem, despite being a nascent and poorly
regulated market, whose design principles are unconventional and com-
plex. Clearly, this does not mean that the market is completely efficient
and that all opportunities are exploited. This question goes beyond the
scope of my work. Evaluating to what extent the existing opportunities
of arbitrage are exploited could be subject of further research.
Chapter 4 extends the analysis to the arbitrage across exchange plat-
forms trading bitcoins against fiat currencies (Mt. Gox, Bitstamp, BTC-e).
In this case it is not possible to identify exactly the arbitrage activity, as
the trades in the Mt. Gox counterpart exchanges are not labelled at the
user level. Thus, I adopt a different methodology, based on comparing
the individual sequence of actions of each user to the ideal sequence of
actions an ideal arbitrageur would perform, given the mispricings be-
tween the two exchanges and the individual estimation of the transaction
costs. I find that only around 1,400 investors are potential arbitrageurs.
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It is worth noting that, unlike in Chapter 3, in this case it is harder to
rule out alternative possible explanations to the observed sequences of
actions; thus, I post-filter the set of potential arbitrageurs by measuring,
for each potential arbitrageur, the share of actions in Mt. Gox for which
it is possible to find a similar trade (small time delay and volume dif-
ference) in the counterpart exchange. This fraction will be high for an
arbitrageur and low for a non-arbitrageur, and thus is intended to re-
move the false positives detected in the first step of the procedure. The
final identification relies on the cross-comparison of the two metrics, that
reduces the number of identified arbitrageurs to 10 with Bitstamp and 45
with BTC-e.
Considerations similar to those reported for the methodology devised
for the triangular arbitrage apply also for the one implemented in this
Chapter: the new algorithms introduced represent a methodological con-
tribution to the literature on the quantitative analysis of the financial
markets. The most important finding is that this analysis confirms the
results found in Chapter 3, and it represents a contribution ascribable to
the field of behavioral finance: the post-filtering stage greatly reduces
the number of users classified as arbitrageurs, which are few (N = 49)
and take positions larger than the average user. However, this method-
ology exploits less rich datasets, and the users who executed less than ten
trades are excluded in the analysis by construction. This limits the pos-
sibility to comprehensively answer, in this scenario, the question if the
arbitrageurs are a few big players or many small investors, as it is not
possible to provide information for the latter group. Nonetheless, the
findings in Chapter 3 suggest that this loss of information has a limited
impact on the analysis. The second relevant aspect is that, though the ev-
idence is less strong, this analysis is more general and implies that some
investors conduct the important function of ‘information carriers’ across
exchanges, certifying also in this case the existence of the mechanisms
that ensure the efficiency in traditional markets.
A final remarkable observation stands from a comparison of the groups
of arbitrageurs identified with the two methodologies: interestingly, none
of the arbitrageurs who executed two-point arbitrage is identified also as
164
triangular arbitrageur. This finding is coherent with a certain degree of
specialization of the arbitrageurs, another relevant feature attributed to
practical arbitrageurs. Indeed, the two strategies are relatively different
and imply a cost in devising each of them. This result suggests thus that
arbitrageurs focused on a single strategy.
In conclusion, the results reported in Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 are
coherent and solid. While it is not possible to utterly exclude the presence
of false positives in the identified groups of arbitrageurs, a last form of
validation of this work could come in the form of a direct proof from the





A.1 Additional robustness checks on ∆T and
∆Q
As described in Section 3.3, the algorithm implemented to identify the
arbitrage actions compares the legs executed by the same user in a small
neighborhood of time and volume, defined by the parameters ∆T and
∆Q. In this Appendix I show that the results of my estimations do not
vary significantly when I consider larger or smaller sets of identified ar-
bitrage actions — i.e., if I modify the boundaries for the time delay and
volume difference by varying ∆T and ∆Q.
All the results in the following always include dyad and hourly fixed
effects (and, when allowed by the model, user fixed effects). Table 21
repeats the analysis in Table 16 by imposing ∆T = 30s and ∆Q = 1%
in columns (1-2-3), and ∆T = 600s and ∆Q = 20% in columns (4-5-
6). The dependent variable is with fees (1-4), without fees (2-5), and
with expected fees (3-6) — further details on this are discussed in Ap-
pendix A.2. The results hold whatever the specification. Interestingly,
the R2 is higher for smaller ∆T and ∆Q; larger boundaries could lead to
the inclusion of a higher amount of false positives. Table 22 shows that
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similar considerations apply also when considering alternative specifica-
tions of the expertise.
Interesting findings are reported in Table 23, that replicates Table 18
for ∆T = 30s and ∆Q = 1% in columns (1) to (6), and ∆T = 600s and
∆Q = 20% in (7) to (12). The results strengthen the intuition discussed
above that larger boundaries reduce the statistical power of the model.
Indeed, though the overall pattern is confirmed, the results for ∆T =
600s and ∆Q = 20% are often not statistically significant and the R2
is smaller. Noteworthy, instead, columns (1) to (6) provide even better
results with respect to those reported in the main analysis (with ∆T =
300s and ∆Q = 10%), both considering the β1 coefficients, and the R2.
These results are especially important, as they demonstrate that the
findings described in the main body of the paper are not circumscribed
to a specific parametrization of ∆T and ∆Q. The boundaries ∆T = 300s
and ∆Q = 10% appear then to be reasonable, though their selection is
not backed by a rigorous method but rather by examination of the de-
scriptive statistics. While it seems plausible that smaller intervals lead
to higher statistical precision at the cost of excluding some true positives
from the sample, larger values of ∆T and ∆Q lead to the inclusion of ad-
ditional points in the sample, at the cost of a weaker statistical power and
likely of a larger fraction of false positives. In addition, I point out that
one could incur in self-selection bias by further restricting the bound-
aries on time and volume. Indeed, as shown in Section 3.3, less skilled
users tend to execute actions with larger δT and δQ. I thus prefer an in-
termediate, more conservative approach, and focus on ∆T = 300s and
∆Q = 10% in the main analysis.
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Table 21: Relationship between trade ability and profits. Robustness check
with alternative ∆T , ∆Q
Thresholds: 30s, 1% 600s, 20%
Dep. var.: With No Exp. With No Exp.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
D(Currencies) 1.2287∗∗ 0.8634∗∗ 1.1033∗∗ 1.2304∗∗∗ 0.8557∗∗∗ 1.1568∗∗∗
(0.4830) (0.3784) (0.4219) (0.1349) (0.1221) (0.1376)
Equiv. $ 0.6671 0.3140 0.4420 -0.3636 -1.0275 -0.5332
(0.8899) (0.7671) (0.7590) (0.8931) (0.8572) (0.8843)
Constant -0.5669 0.2005 -0.6963∗ -0.6018∗∗∗ 0.3510∗∗∗ -0.6794∗∗∗
(0.4602) (0.3622) (0.4028) (0.1274) (0.1153) (0.1270)
Time FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Dyad FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
N 3935 3935 3935 6554 6554 6554
R-squared 0.71 0.76 0.75 0.64 0.66 0.65
Standard errors in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Errors are clustered at user-level to account for intra-class correlation.
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Table 22: Relationship between trade ability and profits, alternative proxies. Robustness check with alternative ∆T ,
∆Q
Dep. var.: Spread (with fees)
Thresholds: 30s, 1% 600s, 20%













Equiv. $ 0.667 1.032 0.493 0.840 0.865 0.845 -0.364 -0.517 1.182 1.133 0.379 1.450
(0.890) (0.854) (0.441) (0.868) (0.858) (0.716) (0.893) (1.166) (1.052) (1.402) (1.027) (1.231)
Constant -0.567 -2.333 -2.379∗∗∗ -0.213 0.628∗∗∗ -2.084∗ -0.602∗∗∗ -0.520 -1.193∗∗∗ -0.144 0.595∗∗∗ -0.867∗∗∗
(0.460) (1.735) (0.690) (0.243) (0.054) (1.226) (0.127) (0.566) (0.223) (0.122) (0.040) (0.142)
Time FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Dyad FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
N 3935 3935 3935 3935 3935 3935 6554 6554 6554 6554 6554 6554
R-squared 0.71 0.74 0.78 0.71 0.71 0.75 0.64 0.63 0.66 0.63 0.64 0.66
Standard errors in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Errors are clustered at user-level to account for intra-class correlation.
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Table 23: Responsiveness to official rate variations. Robustness check with alternative ∆T , ∆Q.
Thresholds: 30s, 1% 600s, 20%
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Int. D(Currencies) 1.420 -0.094
(1.108) (3.143)
Int. Log(Currencies) 3.049∗ 0.275
(1.546) (0.980)
Int. Log(Actions) 0.593∗∗∗ 0.040
(0.173) (0.356)
Int. D(Metaorder) 2.404∗ 2.024∗∗
(1.429) (0.814)
Int. D(Aggressive) -0.608 1.823
(1.324) (2.420)
Int. PC1 0.704∗∗∗ 0.317
(0.245) (0.204)
DeltaER 0.000 -4.226 -2.547 -0.693 1.433 -2.561∗ 0.390 -0.188 0.035 -1.394 0.246 -2.160
(.) (3.074) (1.524) (1.024) (1.121) (1.430) (3.226) (1.782) (2.410) (0.965) (0.667) (1.694)
Equiv. $ 0.012 0.002 -0.021 0.009 0.011 -0.008 -0.935 -0.956 -0.939 -1.037 -0.927 -1.009
(0.583) (0.575) (0.586) (0.584) (0.583) (0.586) (0.838) (0.825) (0.825) (0.881) (0.833) (0.861)
User FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Time FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Dyad FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
N 3923 3923 3923 3923 3923 3923 6322 6322 6322 6322 6322 6322
R-squared 0.81 0.81 0.81 0.81 0.81 0.81 0.71 0.71 0.71 0.71 0.71 0.71
Standard errors in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Errors are clustered at user-level to account for intra-class correlation.
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A.2 Robustness checks on alternative measures
of transaction costs
In the following we repeat the main estimations in Tables 16, 17, 18 for
the case in which profits are measured without including the fees, and
with the fees a user would expect to pay given his transaction history
(Tables 24, 25, 26). Results are consistent with those reported for the main
estimations.
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Table 24: Relationship between trade ability and profits. Robustness check with alternative measures of profits (no
fees, expected fees)
Dep. var.: Spread (Without fees) Spread (Expected fees)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
D(Currencies) 1.0687∗∗∗ 1.1651∗∗∗ 0.8727∗∗∗ 0.9316∗∗∗ 1.3977∗∗∗ 1.4436∗∗∗ 1.1583∗∗∗ 1.2160∗∗∗
(0.2204) (0.1880) (0.1416) (0.1486) (0.1845) (0.1878) (0.1643) (0.1702)
Equiv. $ 2.3429 1.3837 0.0384 -0.4376 3.7186∗∗ 2.6949∗ 0.4920 0.0296
(1.6352) (1.3343) (1.1974) (1.1337) (1.8186) (1.6110) (1.2224) (1.0973)
Constant 0.0823 0.0048 0.2756∗∗ 0.2283 -0.9895∗∗∗ -1.0211∗∗∗ -0.7191∗∗∗ -0.7642∗∗∗
(0.1582) (0.1640) (0.1350) (0.1428) (0.1582) (0.1676) (0.1540) (0.1616)
Time FE N N Y Y N N Y Y
Dyad FE N Y N Y N Y N Y
N 6594 6582 5307 5284 6594 6582 5307 5284
R-squared 0.07 0.12 0.70 0.71 0.12 0.17 0.70 0.70
Standard errors in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Errors are clustered at user-level to account for intra-class correlation.
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Table 25: Relationship between trade ability and profits, alternative proxies. Robustness check with alternative
measures of profits (no fees, expected fees)
Dep. var.: Spread (Without fees) Spread (Expected fees)













Equiv. $ -0.438 -0.462 0.253 -0.563 -0.328 -0.041 0.030 -0.034 0.859 -0.117 0.170 0.530
(1.134) (1.217) (1.170) (1.279) (1.122) (1.231) (1.097) (1.230) (1.216) (1.294) (1.090) (1.270)
Constant 0.228 -0.086 -0.288 1.023∗∗∗ 1.139∗∗∗ 0.030 -0.764∗∗∗ -0.900 -1.321∗∗∗ 0.238∗ 0.424∗∗∗ -0.989∗∗∗
(0.143) (0.509) (0.290) (0.072) (0.027) (0.237) (0.161) (0.595) (0.265) (0.139) (0.029) (0.266)
Time FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Dyad FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
N 5284 5284 5284 5284 5284 5284 5284 5284 5284 5284 5284 5284
R-squared 0.71 0.71 0.72 0.70 0.71 0.71 0.70 0.70 0.72 0.69 0.70 0.71
Standard errors in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Errors are clustered at user-level to account for intra-class correlation.
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Table 26: Responsiveness to official rate variations. Robustness check with alternative measures of profits (no fees,
expected fees)
Dep. var.: Spread (Without fees) Spread (Expected fees)













∆R -0.496 -2.769∗ -0.355 -1.248 0.602 -3.182∗∗ -0.607 -2.583∗ -0.343 -1.160 0.582 -2.998∗
(5.212) (1.533) (2.422) (0.846) (0.964) (1.555) (5.193) (1.548) (2.391) (0.839) (0.956) (1.535)
Equiv. $ -0.730 -0.872 -0.751 -0.810 -0.738 -0.818 -0.705 -0.839 -0.725 -0.780 -0.713 -0.788
(0.838) (0.889) (0.832) (0.881) (0.843) (0.875) (0.826) (0.872) (0.820) (0.865) (0.830) (0.860)
User FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Time FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Dyad FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
N 5142 5142 5142 5142 5142 5142 5142 5142 5142 5142 5142 5142
R-squared 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75
Standard errors in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Errors are clustered at user-level to account for intra-class correlation.
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A.3 Robustness checks on learning-by-doing
Our analysis is based on the assumption that trade ability is an innate
characteristic for the investors, i.e. it does not increase significantly over
time through trading. In Section 3.4 we address the concern that users
might instead learn by trading and we show that this is unlikely in our
context. As a robustness check, we repeat here the regressions reported
in Tables 16, 17, 18 by excluding the users active in multiple markets if
the time passed between their first arbitrage action and the first one in
a new currency market is large (i.e., more than 14 days). The results are
shown in Tables 27, 28, 29, and their interpretation is in accordance with
the one reported for the main estimations.
Table 27: Relationship between trade ability and profits. Robustness check
on learning-by-doing
Dep. var.: Spread (with fees)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
D(Currencies) 1.6040∗∗∗ 1.6340∗∗∗ 0.8320∗∗∗ 0.8280∗∗∗
(0.2099) (0.2031) (0.2391) (0.2850)
Equiv. $ 2.4045 1.7055 0.1145 0.5385
(1.6007) (1.3292) (1.1578) (0.9215)
Constant -1.0294∗∗∗ -1.0457∗∗∗ -0.2440 -0.2314
(0.1605) (0.1973) (0.2202) (0.2666)
Time FE N N Y Y
Dyad FE N Y N Y
N 4817 4805 4053 4032
R-squared 0.21 0.29 0.75 0.76
Standard errors in parentheses ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Errors are clustered at user-level to account for intra-class correlation.
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Table 28: Relationship between trade ability and profits, alternative proxies.
Robustness check on learning-by-doing
Dep. var.: Spread (with fees)













Equiv. $ 0.5385 0.4517 0.0911 0.5386 0.7176 0.3940
(0.9215) (0.8186) (0.7401) (0.9046) (0.8718) (0.8288)
Constant -0.2314 -2.3370∗ -1.9417∗∗∗ -0.5109∗∗ 0.5793∗∗∗ -1.3833∗∗
(0.2666) (1.1859) (0.7161) (0.2200) (0.0526) (0.6772)
Time FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Dyad FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
N 4032 4032 4032 4032 4032 4032
R-squared 0.76 0.79 0.81 0.76 0.76 0.78
Standard errors in parentheses ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Errors are clustered at user-level to account for intra-class correlation.
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Table 29: Responsiveness to official rate variations. Robustness check on
learning-by-doing
Dep. var.: Spread (with fees)













∆R -15.963∗∗ -5.242 -7.116∗ -3.198 0.668 -7.463
(6.042) (4.754) (3.605) (3.883) (1.580) (4.947)
Equiv. $ -0.024 -0.051 -0.114 -0.035 -0.035 -0.073
(0.640) (0.639) (0.646) (0.647) (0.647) (0.645)
User FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Time FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Dyad FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
N 3957 3957 3957 3957 3957 3957
R-squared 0.84 0.84 0.84 0.84 0.84 0.84
Standard errors in parentheses ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Errors are clustered at user-level to account for intra-class correlation.
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A.4 Analysis of individual fiat-to-fiat markets
Table 30: Profitability of the arbitrage actions, illustrative example on indi-
vidual markets.
Without fees With fees
buy leg sell leg official e.r. implied e.r. profit/loss implied e.r. profit/loss
EUR USD 1.40 1.405 profit 1.402 profit
EUR USD 1.40 1.395 loss 1.390 loss
USD EUR 1.40 1.395 profit 1.399 profit
USD EUR 1.40 1.405 loss 1.410 loss
Notes: to compare graphically the actions executed in the same currency market, I
now construct the profits (spread between implied and official rates) keeping the of-
ficial rate fixed. That is, I compare all actions belonging to a given dyad to the same
official rate. Here, for example, I consider the dyad (EUR,USD) and I express implied
rates in EURtoUSD, independently of which currency appears in the buy side. When
the implied rate is higher than the official one, it is profitable to buy bitcoins in EUR
and sell them for USD, that is, to implicitly buy USD using EUR; viceversa when the
implied rate is lower. Fees reduce the margins for profit and worsen losses.
Figure 35 focuses on the EUR/USD market; Panel 35a reports the official
exchange rate (gray line) along with all the N = 1,931 triangular actions
performed in that market, depicted as dots whose color is red when the
bitcoins are bought in EUR and sold in USD - that is, actions where users
implicitly buy USD using EUR - and vice versa for the green ones. I will
refer to them respectively as the ‘EUR buy’ trades and the ‘USD buy’
trades. The implied rates in the plots are computed excluding the trans-
action costs. I underline that the purpose of arbitrage is to profit from
an asset mispricing across different markets: as shown in Table 30, the
points above (below) the line are profitable if the investor buys bitcoins
in EUR (USD) and sells for USD (EUR).
Interestingly, I do not observe persistent price deviations with respect
to the official exchange rate, nor I observe arbitrage activity taking the
form of an organic response to mispricings from multiple individuals
independently trading across currency markets in a univocal direction
(determined by the sign of the price deviation), pushing prices towards
equilibrium. Rather, it is possible to observe that the implied exchange
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Figure 35: Comparison between the implied and the official exchange
rate for the detected arbitrage actions (left), and the multi-currency trades
(right).
(a) All arbitrage actions
(b) Multi-currency trades, EUR/USD
market
Notes: values are reported in absolute terms; the gray line represents the official ex-
change rate. Note that, while in Panel (a) the trades are distributed coherently with
respect to a profit-based logic, the multi-currency trades are always non-profitable
and ‘anchor’ the Bitcoin price across different markets.
rate closely tracks the official one and that actions seemingly exploit op-
portunities arising due to price volatility between the two of them. I in-
terpret such dynamics as the consequence of many uninformed traders
who push prices for a short time far from fundamental values, and the
arbitrageurs as the liquidity providers that profit from these demand
shocks by exploiting such mispricings. This interpretation is consistent
with the results reported in the main body of the paper, with the limited
aggressiveness of the expert users on the markets, and with the model
of arbitrageurs as liquidity providers described in Gromb and Vayanos
(2010).
I hypothesize that the arbitrage opportunities were likely limited by
the existence of a feature called multi-currency trading, which was intro-
duced in September 2011 along with the possibility to trade in fiat cur-
rencies other than USD. Such feature facilitated the bitcoin trades against
minor currencies by allowing the execution of orders involving different
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currencies in the buy and sell leg, for an additional fee of 2.5%1. It is
very likely that this mechanism anchored the movements of the bitcoin
price in minor markets to the main one, BTCtoUSD. Panel 35b compares
the official exchange rate to the implied rate for the trades in EUR and
USD that exploited the multi-currency feature. For reasons detailed in
Chapter 2 and related to how Mt. Gox internally transcribed the trades,
I provide information on this mechanism only with respect to the time
period ranging from August 2011 to October 2012 excluding July 2012.
These trades are systematically unprofitable. (If I account for and remove
the 2.5% fee, the dots converge steadily to the official exchange rate: the
gray line shows the official EURtoUSD exchange rate, and the gray band
delimits the ±2.5% deviation area.)
Further insights on the dynamics of the arbitrage activity result when
I decompose the actions reported in Panel 35a per groups of users. I
thus report in Figure 36 the spread between the implied rate and the of-
ficial rate as a percentage of the latter, and I consider three cases: I show
the actions executed by users that made less than 10 arbitrage actions in
Panel 36a, and those made by users active in a single market in Panel 36b.
In Panel 36c I consider instead only the actions ascribable to the users ac-
tive in multiple markets. On the right side I include the transaction costs,
while on the left side I exclude them; the gray shaded band approximates
the area in which the transaction costs might2 exceed the potential gains
originated by the spread between the implied and the official rate. The
differences between the first two cases and the third are evident; in the
former two, the points are more randomly dispersed around the zero,
while in the latter the EUR buy trades and the USD buy trades are clus-
tered. Second, in the latter scenario trades are less dispersed in time,
and seemingly part of complex automated strategie, as discussed in Sec-
tion 3.3.
1To conduct such trades, Mt. Gox acted as an intermediary between parties via a virtual
internal account. See https://bit.ly/3jXtTPe. It is also interesting to notice that only
around 1% of the arbitrage actions are composed by legs that are part of multi-currency
trades: arbitrageurs do not use this feature, as it entails additional fees.
2As discussed in Appendix A.2, the fees paid depend on the users’ trading history, thus
are specific to each individual and vary across users and in time.
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Figure 36: Difference between the implied and the official exchange rate as
a percentage of the exchange rate for the EURtoUSD market.
(a) Few actions, without fees (left) & including fees (right)
(b) Single market, without fees (left) & including fees (right)
(c) Multiple market, without fees (left) & including fees (right)
Notes: Panel (a) reports only the actions executed by the users that made less than 10
arbitrage actions, Panel (b) those executed by the users active in a single market, and
Panel (c) those executed by users active in multiple markets. On the right, fees are
included; on the left, fees are excluded. The gray shaded bands represent the area in
which transaction costs might exceed the potential profits.
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A.5 Supplemental Figures and Tables
Table 31: Summary statistics.
(N = 6, 629) Mean St.D. Min 25% 50% 75% Max
Profits, fees, % 0.42 1.26 -11.35 0.08 0.62 1.10 18.16
’Equiv. $’ 52.54 169.63 0.00 0.36 7.40 41.42 4666.66
∆R (abs) 0.06 0.08 0.00 0.01 0.04 0.08 1.16
D(Currencies) 0.89 0.31 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Log(Currencies) 1.64 0.51 0.69 1.10 1.61 1.95 2.48
Log(Actions) 5.94 2.14 0.00 5.30 6.54 7.68 7.68
D(Metaorder) 0.67 0.47 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
D(Aggressive) 0.06 0.23 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00
PC1 6.57 2.83 -0.77 5.03 8.16 8.83 8.83
Notes: This table summarizes the main variables employed in the regression analyses.
The sample is the number of arbitrage actions (N = 6,629). The profits are expressed
as a percentage of the spread between the implied and the official rate, as explained
in Table 10; the ’Equiv. $’ term is the value of the trade expressed in USD dollars.
The remaining rows refer to alternative measures of the investors trading ability.
D(Currencies) is equal to 1 if the user exploited multiple currency markets to conduct
arbitrage. It is a dummy variable, as well as D(Metaorder) and D(aggressive), re-
spectively equal to 1 if the action was conducted by a user who executed metaorders
or aggressive orders. Log(Currencies) is the logarithm of the currency markets ex-
ploited by the investor who conducted the arbitrage action, while Log(Actions) is the
logarithm of the number of actions they executed. PC1 is the scores of the arbitrage
action, obtained by performing a principal component analysis as described in Table
15.
Table 32: Pearson correlation for the main variables used in the model
D(Cur) Log(Cur) Log(Act) D(Met) D(Agg) PC1 Profits Eq. $ ∆R
D(Cur) 1 0.65 0.8 0.41 -0.44 0.76 0.39 -0.14 -0.10
Log(Cur) 1 0.74 0.63 -0.31 0.79 0.22 -0.18 -0.08
Log(Act) 1 0.57 -0.53 0.9 0.43 -0.18 -0.11
D(Met) 1 -0.35 0.86 0.24 -0.17 -0.04
D(Agg) 1 -0.52 -0.28 0.13 0.01
PC1 1 0.39 -0.2 -0.09
Profits 1 -0.01 -0.02
Eq. $ 1 0.04
∆R 1.00
Notes: The correlation is constructed on the sample of the actions (N = 6,629).
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Figure 37: Example of an online arbitrage tool (captured by the Internet
Archive on 8 April 2013)
Figure 38: Growth of the triangular arbitrage actions as a function of ∆T
and ∆Q.
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Notes: the y-axis reports the profitability of the actions, depicted as dots, and the
x-axis shows their evolution in time. The different colors correspond to actions con-
ducted in different currency markets. I hide the last unit of each user identifier to
preserve the anonymity.
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Figure 40: Comparison between the implied and the official exchange
rate for the detected arbitrage actions (left), and the multi-currency trades
(right).












Notes: the Panels refer respectively to the GBPtoUSD, the EURtoGBP, and the AU-
DtoUSD markets. Left Panels report the arbitrage actions, right Panels the multi-
currency trades.
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Figure 41: Difference between the implied and the official exchange rate as
a percentage of the exchange rate, actions executed only by users active in
multiple markets.
(a) GBPtoUSD. Without fees (left) & including fees (right)
(b) EURtoGBP. Without fees (left) & including fees (right)
(c) AUDtoUSD. Without fees (left) & including fees (right)
Notes: Panels (a) refer to the GBPtoUSD market, Panels (b) to the EURtoGBP, and
Panels (c) to the AUDtoUSD market. I report only the actions of users active in many






B.1 Statistics on the choice of the parameters
This appendix reports statistics related to Sections 4.3.1 and 4.3.2 and
additional information useful to better understand the methodology I
proposed to identify the arbitrageurs.
Figure 42 shows the 15 days (centered) moving average for the num-
ber of daily trades that were executed in Bitstamp, BTC-e, and Mt. Gox
(using both the Bitcoincharts.com data and those of the leaked dataset):
the users’ trading activity is definitely higher in the latter, where the
number of daily trades is often bigger by one order of magnitude or
more. As a consequence, I hypothesize that users performing arbitrage
would necessarily do it exploiting Mt. Gox as the main platform, due to
the higher market liquidity.
Second, I address the choice of aggregating the trades at the hourly
level. The trades in the counterpart exchanges are sparse across the day:
thus, I believe that constructing sequences of actions at time intervals
shorter than one hour for the similarity metrics (e.g., 10-minute or 5-
minute time windows) would increase the complexity of the approach
without adding explanatory information. In addition, Figure 43 sows
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the evolution in time of the coefficient of variation for the prices in the
counterpart exchanges, aggregated at hourly level. Prices do not vary
consistently in the time window considered, thus I can safely assume
that prices are ‘fixed’ and do not vary within the same hourly window.
Figure 42: Centered 15 days moving average for the number of daily trades
executed in BTC-e, Bitstamp, and Mt. Gox.




Table 33: Quantiles for the Bitstamp and BTC-e users, relative to the number
of hours of activity.
Hours of activity Hours of activity
Bitstamp BTC-e Bitstamp BTC-e
mean 29.18 26.29 50% 5 5
std 170.61 159.51 75% 16 14
min 1 1 95% 97 86
25% 2 2 max 11352 11352
Table 33 reports statistics (mean, standard deviation, quantiles) on the
number of hours of activity for the Mt. Gox users. As the data show, the
assumption that arbitrageurs are users who performed arbitrage over a
long period of time leads to a significant trade-off between the size of
the sample analyzed and the accuracy of the results. In Chapter 3 it is
shown that the arbitrageurs that executed most of the arbitrage actions
are few and large users. For this reason I assume it is safe to restrict the
analysis to a limited group of users who executed many trades. Second,
as a validation, I repeat the analysis with a larger sample (instead of 100,
I consider users active for more than 10 hours) and I report the results
in Appendix B.2. I do not increase further the sample size, as for users
with too few actions it would be difficult to distinguish whether positive
outcomes are due to random fluctuations or to actual strategic actions.
In the latter, I accept a higher number of false positives in the first stage,
expecting them to be ruled out in the post-filtering phase.
In Section 4.3.1 I introduced a cutoff on the share of arbitrage-like
actions, to divide users in two sets (potential arbitrageurs and non arbi-
trageurs) and to inspect the differences between them. In order to pro-
vide a criterion to choose that parameter, I compute the Pearson corre-
lation between the price differences of Bitstamp and BTC-e against Mt.
Gox: in principle, since an investor can be identified as a potential ar-
bitrageur in both exchanges, if the ideal series are strongly correlated
a higher cutoff is needed to better classify users; since the value is low
(0.014), I imposed the cutoff at 0.33 (that is, 33% of arbitrage-like actions);
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I repeated the analysis with a cutoff at 0.5. Results are similar; here I in-
cluded only the results for 0.33. Note anyway that this parameter serves
mainly for qualitative purposes: it is not used in the post-filtering pro-
cedure to detect the final set of arbitrageurs. In that step of the analysis
I use the same threshold (0.3) both for the share of arbitrage-like actions
and for the share of mirror actions. I explicitly choose a large threshold
in order to maintain a conservative approach in the arbitrageurs identi-
fication.
Below I report additional information for the two sets of users, namely
the potential arbitrageurs and the non-arbitrageurs, to highlight the dif-
ferences between their distributions of the shares of actions with a mir-
ror trade per user. I follow the scheme adopted in the main analysis
(Bitstamp on the left, BTC-e on the right, restrictive scenario on top and
looser scenario in the bottom part). I report the kernel density estimation
together with statistics on the mean, the standard deviation, the skew-
ness and the kurtosis (Figure 44), qq-plots (Figure 45) and pp-plots (Fig-
ure 46). I plotted the probability plots following the methodology pro-
posed in Gibbons and Chakraborti (2011) and Thode (2002).
Finally, the parameters ∆T and ∆Q are chosen based on the empir-
ical evidence reported in Chapter 3. The vast majority of trades lie in a
small interval around ∆T = 0s and ∆Q = 0%. As in the previous Chap-
ter I considered two different scenarios, a more conservative and a less
conservative one. I follow the same approach and choose the parameters
accordingly.
B.2 Analysis for users active for more than 10
hours
In the following paragraphs I repeat, as a robustness check, the analyses
reported in Section 4.3 by considering the users that were active for more
than 10 hours instead of 100. Figures 47,48, and 49 show that the results
are qualitatively similar to those reported in the main analysis. In total,
821 arbitrageurs are identified, 192 between Mt. Gox and Bitstamp, and
759 between Mt. Gox and BTC-e.
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Figure 44: Kernel density estimation.
(a) more restrictive scenario: ∆T = 30s and ∆Q = 1%
(b) less restrictive scenario: ∆T = 300s and ∆Q = 10%
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Figure 45: QQ-plots.
(a) more restrictive scenario: ∆T = 30s and ∆Q = 1%
(b) less restrictive scenario: ∆T = 300s and ∆Q = 10%
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Figure 46: PP-plots.
(a) more restrictive scenario: ∆T = 30s and ∆Q = 1%
(b) less restrictive scenario: ∆T = 300s and ∆Q = 10%
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Figure 47: Share of trades that correspond to two-point arbitrage actions
with another exchange, per user, 10 hours or more.
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Figure 48: Share of actions with a mirror trade in the counter-part exchange,
10 hours or more.
(a) more restrictive scenario: ∆T = 30s and ∆Q = 1%
(b) less restrictive scenario: ∆T = 300s and ∆Q = 10%
Notes: users for which the matching occurs on 10 hours or less are excluded from this
analysis. Share of actions with a mirror trade in the counterpart exchange (left: Bit-
stamp, right: BTC-e), per user ranked in descending order. Users are represented on
two different lines (yellow: non arbitrageurs, blue: potential arbitrageurs), to quali-
tatively inspect the differences between the two groups. Panel (a) reports the results
for a more restrictive scenario, panel (b) for a less restrictive one.
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Figure 49: Post-filtering procedure, 10 hours or more.
(a) more restrictive scenario: ∆T = 30s and ∆Q = 1%
(b) less restrictive scenario: ∆T = 300s and ∆Q = 10%
Notes: I plot a dot per each user for which the matching occurs on more than 10 hours.
The y-axis is the share of actions with a mirror trade in the counterpart exchange, and
the x-axis is the share of arbitrge-like actions (left: Bitstamp, right: BTC-e). Again,
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